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Abstract
Decision-making processes behind instrumental actions can be divided into two categories:
goal-directed processes, and automatic (or habitual) processes. Goal-directed processes
evaluate actions based on the value of their consequences and produce a course of action
that will lead to desired goals. This form of decision-making, however, is computationally
demanding and prone to suffer from the “curse of dimensionality”, i.e., it does not scale to
complex environments. To overcome this limitation, individuals employ automatic actions,
which are less flexible than goal-directed actions, but are also less expensive in terms of the
required computational resources. The structure of such automatic actions, their interaction
with goal-directed actions, and their behavioral and computational properties are the topics
of the current thesis. We conceptualize the structure of automatic actions as sequences of
actions that form a single response unit and are integrated within goal-directed processes in a
hierarchical manner. We then represent this hypothesis using the computational framework
of reinforcement learning and develop a new normative computational model for the acqui-
sition of action sequences, and their hierarchical interaction with goal-directed processes.
We develop a neurally plausible hypothesis for the role of neuromodulator dopamine as a
teaching signal for the acquisition of action sequences. We further explore the predictions of
the proposed model in a two-stage decision-making task in humans and we show that the
proposed model has higher explanatory power than its alternatives. Finally, we translate the
two-stage decision-making task to an experimental protocol in rats and show that, similar to
humans, rats also use action sequences and engage in hierarchical decision-making. The re-
sults provide a new theoretical and experimental paradigm for conceptualizing and measuring
the operation of goal-directed and automatic actions and their interactions.
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1 Introduction
Behavioral evidence suggests that decision-making systems behind the choices made by
humans and other animals can be divided to two categories, known as goal-directed, and
automatic processes (also referred to as habitual processes). Goal-directed action is a form of
decision-making guided by encoding the relationship between actions and their consequences
and the value of those consequences. In this form of decision-making an agent deliberates over
the consequences of its actions, and chooses the course of action that leads to desired outcome.
Outcome devaluation studies provide direct evidence that both humans (Valentin, Dickinson,
& O’Doherty, 2007; Tricomi, Balleine, & O’Doherty, 2009) and other animals (C. D. Adams,
1982; Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson, Squire, Varga, & Smith, 1998; Tolman, 1948) engage in
this form of action control. For example, in a typical experiment an agent is first trained
to perform two different actions that earn different food outcomes. After this training, an
outcome devaluation treatment is conducted off baseline or offline; i.e., in a situation where
the outcome is presented without the action being performed, a treatment that generally
involves sating the animals on one of the two outcomes to decrease its value. Subsequently,
back online, a test is conducted in which choice between the two actions is assessed in
the absence of the outcome. Typically, when given this choice, humans and other animals
decrease their performance of the action that previously delivered the now devalued outcome,
demonstrating that such actions reflect both the relationship to their consequences and the
1
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value of those consequences.
Extended training makes goal-directed actions habitual or automatic (we will use these two
terms interchangeably hereafter). This automaticity has two manifestations: (i) inflexibility
of actions to the offline changes in the value of their outcomes (Coutureau & Killcross, 2003;
Dickinson et al., 1998; Quinn, Pittenger, Lee, Pierson, & Taylor, 2013; Wassum, Cely, Maidment,
& Balleine, 2009; Yin, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2004, 2005)(Figure 1.1), and (ii) the concatenation
of actions executed together to form action sequences that are then treated as a single response
unit (Lashley, 1951; Book, 1908)(Figure 1.2). These two aspects of automaticity share a similar
neural structure, however, computationally, they have been attributed to two different models:
insensitivity to changes in outcome value has often been interpreted as evidence for a model-
free reinforcement learning (RL) account of instrumental conditioning (Daw, Niv, & Dayan,
2005), whereas the development of action sequences has been linked to hierarchical RL
(Botvinick, 2008; Ito & Doya, 2011).
The current thesis develops the hypothesis that a goal-directed hierarchical RL system can
explain various aspects of decision-making processes, including the behavioral phenomena
which are attributed to model-free RL. We develop a new computational model, and test its
predictions in both humans and rats. The structure of the thesis is as follows: in chapter 2
we review multiple forms of decision-making systems in the brain. In chapter 3 we provide a
new neurally plausible computational model for action sequence learning, and investigate
its behavioral power in explaining automatic actions. In chapter 4 we provide data from
a decision-making task in humans, and we directly compare the proposed hierarchical RL
account and the model-free RL account, in explaining choices. In chapter 5 we develop a task
similar to that we developed in humans, and we provide evidence for the operation of the
hierarchical RL in rats. Finally, in chapter 6 we provide the summary and conclusion of the
thesis.
2
Figure 1.1 – The effect of training on the sensitivity of actions to the value of their outcomes.
Animals were trained to press a lever in order to earn sucrose pellets. One group of animals
received 100 pairings of lever presses with sucrose pellets (Group 100), while the other group
received 500 pairings (Group 500). Before the extinction test, within each group, for some of
the animals the outcome was devalued (Group 100-P and Group 500-P), while for the rest the
outcome remained valued (Group 100-U and Group 100-U). As the figure shows, the number
of responses in Group 500-P is not effected by the devaluation of the outcome, while in Group
100-P, the responses for earning the devalued outcome have decreased. From (C. D. Adams,
1982)
3
Chapter 1. Introduction
Figure 1.2 – Evidence for the formation of action sequences in the sequential reaction time
task (SRTT). When the subjects were asked to perform a fixed sequence of actions (RT re-
peating), reaction times (RT) decreased, which is a sign of the formation of action sequences.
The solid line represents ‘predictive responses’, i.e., the responses that elicit even before the
corresponding stimulus signals that the response should be made. As the figure shows, in
the late stages of training almost all the responses are predictive, which is another sign of the
formation of action sequences. In contrast, when the sequence of actions to be performed
was variable (RT random), reaction times remained slow relative to repeating trials even after
extended training. From (Matsuzaka et al., 2007)
.
4
2 Multiple forms of decision-making
Humans and other animals are able to adjust their decisions by learning about their surround-
ing environment. Evidence shows that such decisions, are driven by multiple decision-making
processes, which have partly overlapping neural, computational, and behavioral character-
istics. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of each system, and also how these
systems interact in order to produce final actions. We start by introducing some concepts
from reinforcement learning (RL) literature (Sutton & Barto, 1998) - a widely used framework
for studying decision-making processes in the brain - and then, building on this theoretical
framework, we review the psychological and neural properties of each system. The chapter
is divided into two-sections: the prediction problem (section 2.1), and the control problem
(section 2.2), which as their titles indicate, correspondingly address how predictions about
future events are made, and how the predictions are used in conjunction with actions in order
to control the environment. These two sorts of problems roughly map onto what are known
as Pavlovian conditioning, and Instrumental conditioning in the animal learning literature,
which we will present in turn.
5
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2.1 Pavlovian conditioning: the prediction problem
In a classic experiment, Pavlov (1849-1936) trained a dog in a condition in which the presenta-
tion of a stimulus (e.g., a bell) was followed by food. He observed that the dog began to salivate
in response to the presentation of the stimulus, even before the food was being delivered
(Pavlov, 1927), which suggested that the dog had associated the food with the bell. This phe-
nomenon is called Pavlovian conditioning, which in general is composed of three elements:
the predicting stimulus (the bell in this example), which is called conditioned stimulus (CS),
the predicted stimulus (food in this example), which is called unconditioned stimulus (US),
and the response that is triggered in anticipation of the US (salivation in this example), which
is called conditioned responses (CR).
The association between a CS and a US can take place at different levels. Indeed, both the CS
and US have a variety of sensory and motivational features, which can enter into association.
In general, features of a US can be divided into three categories: sensory features, motivational
features, and a reinforcer component. The sensory features of a US define the identity of the
US, which for example can refer to the specific taste of a food or its texture that uniquely
distinguishes it from other stimuli. The motivational features are the representation of the
US across the dimensions of primary incentives such as nutrients, salts, fluids, etc. Finally,
the reinforcer component represents the hedonic component of a US. For example, for a
hungry animal, receiving two units of food pellets has a higher reinforcer component than
receiving one unit of food pellet. During the conditioning process, an animal associates all,
or a subset of the US features with the CS. Later on, whenever the CS is present, the animal
elicits CRs in anticipation that the US will shortly occur (Figure 2.1). In the computational
models of conditioning processes (next sections), the reinforcer component is usually called a
reward component and hereafter we use the term reward component instead of the reinforcer
component.
6
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Se
M CS
US
Re
CR
Figure 2.1 – An unconditioned stimulus is generally composed of sensory features (Se), moti-
vational features (M), and a reward (reinforcer) component. A CS can enter into an association
with either of these components, which will then trigger the associated conditioned response
whenever the CS is present.
2.1.1 Markov Reward Process
With some simplifications, the structure of Pavlovian conditioning can be formalized using
Markov Reward Processes. A Markov Reward Process is a tuple (S , {P (.|s)},R), where:
• S is a set of states,
• {P (.|s)} is the transition model. P (s′|s) represents the probability of transition to state s′
if the current state is s.
• R is a reward function. R(s) is the reward of state s.
The term state in the above definition refers to distinguishable situations or events in the envi-
ronment that an individual perceives through its sensory inputs. In Pavlovian conditioning, for
example, presentation of a CS and US correspond to two different states of the environment,
which we can denote by sCS, and sUS correspondingly. In the previous example, the state sCS
is identified by the presentation of the bell signaled by its sensory features such as the sound
that it makes, and state sUS is identified by the sensory features of the US signaled by the
sensory features of the food such as its taste and texture. As such, among the three mentioned
features (sensory, motivational, reward), the sensory features of the US and CS are represented
by the states of the environment. Similarly, R(s) represents the reward component of a state,
as for example, R(sUS) represents the reward component of the US. Finally, the transition
model corresponds to the relation between the states (for example, if the CS (the bell) is always
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followed by the US, then we will have P (sUS|sCS)= 1).
Thus, in summary, according to a Markov Reward Process, (i) an environment is composed
of several states, (ii) each state has an amount of reward associated with it, and (iii) there is a
transition model that defines how states are related to each other. As such, there is no inherent
difference between CS and US; both are states in the environment with certain sensory and
reward features. Based on this, we can refer to the states in the environment by their temporal
order instead of stating whether they are US or CS: the state of the environment at time t is
referred to as st . For example, within the Pavlovian conditioning, if we assume the origin of
time is when the CS is presented, then we have s0 = sCS, and s1 = sUS. Similarly, the reward
received at time t is referred to as rt (for example, r0 =R(sCS) and r1 =R(sUS)).
The definition of the Markov Reward Process provides a computational description of the
elements of the Pavlovain conditioning process. However, remaining question is how an
animal learns and represents a Markov Reward Process. Here, evidence shows that animals
learn about a Markov Reward Process in two different ways. In the first way, they associate the
CS with the sensory feature of the US, i.e., by presenting the CS, sensory features of the US
can be predicted. In the second way, by presenting the CS, only the reward component of the
US can be predicted. These two forms of Pavlovian conditioning, at the computational level,
correspond to what are known as model-based and model-free learning. We will discuss these
in turn in the next two sections.
2.1.2 Model-based Pavlovian conditioning
In model-based Pavlovian conditioning, an individual learns the transition model of the
environment (and this is why this form of learning is called model-based), which allows it to
predict the next state, given the current state of the environment. An example is predicting
the sensory features of the upcoming US during the CS presentation. Such learning can take
place for example using the Rescorla-Wagner rule (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), according to
which the association between the CS and the US gradually increases with each pairing of
8
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the US and CS. Within the context of the Markov Reward Process, the Rescorla-Wagner rule
corresponds to the learning of the transition model of the environment1, i.e., the strength
of the association between a CS and a US in the Rescorla-Wagner model is equivalent to the
probability of the CS given the US. Inspired by the Rescorla-Wagner rule, for each pairing of
CS and US, the transition model can be updated as follows:
∆P (sUS|sCS)=α(1−P (sUS|sCS)) (2.1)
∆P (sUS|sCS)=−αP (sUS|sCS) (2.2)
whereα is the learning rate, and for example it can depend on the salience of the CS (0<α< 1)2.
sUS is any state other than sUS. The above equation intuitively implies that with each paring of
CS and US, the predicted probability of the US after the CS increases, and the probability of
no US after the CS decreases, and the rate of these increases and decreases depends on α.
The above conception of model-based Pavlovian conditioning is simplistic, and indeed, recent
theoretical work indicates that the structure of the Pavlovian learning can be more compli-
cated than learning the transition model, and can involve learning the latent causes in the
environment (Courville, Daw, & Touretzky, 2006; Gershman, Blei, & Niv, 2010; Gershman &
Niv, 2012). Within these accounts, instead of predicting the probability of the CS given the US
(P (sUS|sCS)), the learning involves predicting both the CS and US given a latent cause (LC ) in
the environment (P (sUS, sCS|LC )). Pavlovian conditioning in this conception involves inferring
the likelihood that a latent cause is present and, based on that, predicting the probability that
the US will happen.
One line of behavioral evidence supporting model-based Pavlovian conditioning comes from
post-conditioning stimulus revaluation experiments. In such experiments, after an initial
Pavlovian conditioning phase and the establishment of CRs, the ability of the US to induce
1It should be noted that the Rescorla-Wagner model is relevant only to the conditions in which US and CS occur
at the same time (see (Niv & Schoenbaum, 2008) for a discussion). However, here this learning rule is applied in
conditions that US and CS do not occur at the same time, in order to draw a parallel between this learning rule and
model-based Pavlovian conditioning.
2Note that α is usually multiplied by another factor denoted by β, which is the associative value of the US
(0<β< 1)). Here for simplicity this factor is not included.
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Table 2.1 – Post-conditioning stimulus revaluation. The experiment consists of three phases.
The first is the establishment of CRs. In the second phase, for one group of the subjects, the
ability of the US to induce CRs is manipulated (revalued). In the third phase (test), the ability
of the CS to trigger CRs is measured.
Group Phase 1 Phase 2 Test
Revalued CS→US US revaluation CS?
Control CS→US - CS?
unconditioned responses is manipulated (decreased or increased). Then, in the test phase,
the ability of the CS to induce CRs is measured in extinction (Table 2.1). Evidence from
rats (Rescorla, 1973; P. Holland & Rescorla, 1975; Cleland & Davey, 1982), humans (White &
Davey, 1989; Davey & McKenna, 1983), and non-human primates (Gallagher, McMahan, &
Schoenbaum, 1999; Izquierdo, Suda, & Murray, 2004) generally indicates that the stimulus
revaluation procedure changes the ability of the CS to induce CRs, a finding that indicates
animals have access to the sensory features of the US during the presentation of the CS, and
thus they have learned the transition model of the environment during the conditioning
phase.
In one example, Rescorla trained rats in a Pavlovian conditioning experiment in which a
CS was paired with a loud noise (US) (Rescorla, 1973). After this training, animals showed
suppression of lever presses during the CS. In the next phase of the experiment, a group of
animals were habituated to the loud noise by the repeated presentation of the US, a treatment
which decreases the effectiveness of the loud noise to induce unconditioned responses. In
the third phase of the experiment, animals were tested in the presentation of the CS. Results
indicated that the animals that had been habituated to the US, showed less suppression of
lever presses in comparison to the control group, which were not habituated to the loud noise.
In another experiment (Gallagher et al., 1999), animals were first trained to associate the
presentation of a CS with the delivery of food in a food cup. During the training animals
started to approach the food cup during the CS, which is a type of CR in anticipation of the
delivery of the US. In the devaluation phase the US was paired with illness by injection of LiCl
after the consumption of the US in home cages. In the test phase the animals for which the
10
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Table 2.2 – Design of the blocking and identity unblocking experiments. Please see the text for
a description.
Group Phase 1 Phase 2 Test
blocking CS1→US CS1 + CS2→US CS2→ CR-
identity unblocking CS1→US1 CS1 + CS2→US2 CS2→ CR+
US was devalued showed less approaches to the food cup during the CS, than the animals for
which the US was not devalued.
Another line of evidence in support of the model-based Pavlovian conditioning comes from
identity unblocking experiments (Table 2.2). The blocking paradigm has three phases: in the
first phase, a CS is associated with a US (CS1 → US). In the second phase, a compound of
the previous CS with a new CS (CS2) is associated with the US. Finally, in the test phase, the
ability of CS2 to induce a CR is measured. The results generally indicate that CS1 blocks CS2
from being associated with the US, and during the test, CS2 is less able to induce a CR (Kamin,
1969). The general explanation for why blocking happens is, after the first phase, CS1 is a good
predictor of the US, and thus CS2 does not become associated with the US.
The blocking effect can be unblocked if, in the second phase of a blocking experiment, the
identity of the US changes from that in phase 1. In identity unblocking, in the second phase,
the US is replaced by another US with different sensory properties, but the same reward
component. For example the US in the first phase can be food pellets with a certain flavor, and
in the second phase it can be the same food pellets with a different flavor. In this condition,
CS1 is still able to predict the reward component of the US, but not the sensory features of
it. Results of such experiments generally indicate that the CS2 triggers CRs during the test
(McDannald, Lucantonio, Burke, Niv, & Schoenbaum, 2011; P. C. Holland, 1984), which means
that the target of the learning process in the second phase is the prediction of the sensory
features of the US, consistent with model-based Pavlovian conditioning.
The identity unblocking effect is not always observed in experiments (e.g., (Ganesan & Pearce,
1988)). In fact, under some experimental conditions, blocking occurs even when the iden-
tity of the outcome in the second phase is different from the one in the first phase. Such
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experimental conditions are not yet systematically investigated, however, the fact that under
some conditions the blocking effect is not observed, suggests that the Pavlovian conditioning
process is derived by multiple learning processes, including model-based learning. One of
such processes is model-free Pavlovian conditioning, which will be discussed in the next
section.
2.1.3 Model-free Pavlovian conditioning
In model-free Pavlovian conditioning, an individual learns the reward component of the
upcoming state, without necessarily learning the sensory features of that state. For example,
an animal can learn that it will receive one unit of reward shortly after the CS, while not being
able to predict the identity of the upcoming state (in contrast to the model-based Pavlovian
conditioning). Within the Markov Reward Process context, instead of learning P (sUS|sCS)
(predicting the sensory features of the US during the CS), animals predict the amount of
reward that they will receive from CS onwards. Take for example a condition in which a CS is
followed by a US1 which constitutes one unit of reward, and after that there will be another
US (US2) which constitutes two units of reward. In this condition, the total amount of reward
that will be earned since the CS presentation is the sum of the rewards earned during the CS,
US1, and US2, which is called the value of the CS (Figure 2.2). The value of the CS, therefore,
equals 3 in this example and, in general, the total amount of reward that can be earned in a
state, and its future states is called the value of that state, denoted by V (s):
V (s)= E
[
T−1∑
τ=0
R(sτ)|s0 = s
]
(2.3)
where E is expectation over future states, and T is the duration of the experiment. The goal
of model-free Pavlovian conditioning is then to directly learn the amount of reward that can
be earned in the future states. Note that such values can also be calculated by predicting the
future states using model-based Pavlovian conditioning. However, the goal of model-free
Pavlovian conditioning is to predict such values without requiring the prediction of future
states. The way these values are learned is described in the rest of this section; before that we
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Se
sCS
Re
Se
sUS1
Re
Se
sUS2
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V(CS)
V(US1)V(US2)
Figure 2.2 – The structure of the environment is such that a CS is followed by US1, and US1 is
followed by US2. Each stimuli is composed of sensory features (Se), and a reward component
(Re). The model-based Pavlovian conditioning is learning to predict the sensory information
of the next state (arrows shown in the figure). On the other hand, model-free Pavlovian
conditioning is to learn the value of each state, which is the total amount of reward that will
be earned during or after that state. In this illustration, the value of the CS, denoted by V (C S),
includes the reward earned during the CS, plus the rewards earned during US1 and US2. The
value of US1 is the reward earned during US1 and US2. Finally, the value of US2 is the reward
earned during US2.
will review some evidence in support of such form of Pavlovain conditioning.
One line of evidence supporting model-free Pavlovian conditioning comes from quantity
unblocking experiments (Rescorla, 1999; Blaisdell, Denniston, & Miller, 1997; McDannald et
al., 2011). In these experiments (Table 2.3), in the first phase, a CS is being associated with a
US. In the second phase, the reward component of the US is manipulated by changing the
quantity of the US. For example, instead of earning one food pellet, the subjects earn two
food pellets at each pairing of the CS and US (see also (P. C. Holland, 1988) for the effect of
downshift in the magnitude of the US). This manipulation does not change the identity of
the US, but it changes the reward component of the US. In this condition, since CS1 is able
to predict the identity of the US in the second phase, model-based Pavlovian conditioning
predicts that CS1 should be able to block CS2 from being associated with the US3. In contrast,
evidence shows that changing the magnitude of the US unblocks CS2, which indicates that
predicting the reward component of the US is also a target of the Pavlovian conditioning (see
also aversive superconditioning (Dickinson, 1977) for a similar line of evidence).
3Note that in model-based Pavlovian conditioning, CS1 is associated with the identity of US, not amount of
reward received during US. The amount of reward received during US will be associated with the sensory features
of US (not CS).
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Table 2.3 – Design of the blocking and quantity unblocking experiments. Please see the text
for a description.
Group Phase 1 Phase 2 Test
blocking CS1→US CS1 + CS2→US CS2→ CR-
quantity unblocking CS1→US CS1 + CS2→ 2 ×US CS2→ CR+
Equation 2.3 defines the value of a state as the total amount of reward that can be earned in
the future, starting from that state. However, a remaining question that needs to be answered
is how an agent learns this value. Here, neural and behavioral evidence shows that the value
of a state is learned using the temporal-difference learning method (Sutton, 1988). According
to this method, an agent starts learning by an initial guess about the value of each state. Then,
during the learning process, as the agent receives rewards, it updates the values of states
according to how much the value of each state was mis-predicted. Formally, let’s assume that
the agent is in state s, and receives reward r , and then transfers to state s′. Also, let’s denote
the current estimate of the value of state s with Vˆ (s), which means that the agent expected
to earn Vˆ (s) amount of reward in the future, but, what it has actually earned in the current
trial is r amount of reward, plus whatever it will earn in the next state (Vˆ (s′)), which will sum
to r + Vˆ (s′). This difference between what the agent expected to earn, and what it actually
earned is the reward prediction error, denoted by δ:
δ= r + Vˆ (s′)− Vˆ (s) (2.4)
The calculation of the above error signal is one form of the bootstrap method, since the agent is
not sure about the value of the next state (Vˆ (s′)), but uses it anyway to calculate the prediction
error of the current state, with the hope that after several learning trials, all the values gradually
converge to their true values. The calculated reward prediction error is then used to adjust the
value of the states:
∆Vˆ (s)=αδ (2.5)
where α is a learning rate. This update rule changes ∆Vˆ (s) in the direction that decreases
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the error signal, and eventually when the error signal becomes zero, the true value of ∆Vˆ (s)
is learned. One attractive feature of the above learning rule is the correspondence between
the error signal (δ), and the activity of mid-brain dopamine neurons (Montague, Dayan, &
Sejnowski, 1996; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Houk, Adams, & Barto, 1994). Indeed,
there is extensive evidence in rodents and non-human primates that the activity of the mid-
brain dopamine neurons encodes the prediction error (see (Clark, Hollon, & Phillips, 2012) for
a review), and therefore, the model-free conception of the Pavlovian conditioning provides a
neurally plausible way of learning the value of different stimuli. We will present more evidence
in section 2.4.2, when explaining model-free instrumental learning.
2.2 Instrumental conditioning: the control problem
In the Pavlovian conditioning an individual learns to make predictions about the future states
of the environment, however, it cannot control those future states. In contrast, in instrumental
conditioning, an individual can influence future states of the environment by taking actions.
The goal of taking actions is to earn the maximum amount of reward, and the minimum
amount of punishment during the course of a task. This problem is known as reinforcement
learning (RL) in the machine learning literature, and it refers to the problem of learning to
choose a course of action so as to maximize a long-term objective. In a typical RL setting, an
agent (or a controller) interacts with an environment (or a system) by executing actions in
the environment and transitioning to a new state in the environment (Figure 2.3). Similar
to Pavlovian conditioning, each state is composed of a sensory component and a reward
component that the agent experiences by transitioning to that state.
2.2.1 Markov Decision Process
In section 2.1, we presented the Markov Reward Process as a way to formally represent Pavlo-
vian conditioning. In the case of instrumental conditioning, we augment a Markov Reward
Process with a set of actions, turning the Markov Reward Process into a Markov Decision
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Agent
Environment
Action
reward
state
Figure 2.3 – A typical RL setting. An RL agent makes actions in the environment, receives a
reward and transitions to the new state of the environment after executing each action.
Process (MDP). An MDP can formally be represented by a five tuple (S ,A , {P (.|s, a)},R,T ),
where:
• A set of statesS , which is called the state space.
• A set of actionsA ,
• The transition model P (.|s, a) (s ∈ S , a ∈A ). P (s′|s, a) represents the probability of
transition to s′ by taking action a in state s,
• The reward function R, which represents the reward associated with each state. R(s)
(s ∈S ) is the reward received by transitioning to state s.
• T is the number of decisions that are to be made.
Take for example the situation in a Skinner box, in which there are two levers available (left
lever and right lever), and pressing the left lever leads to the delivery of food pellets in the
food magazine, and pressing the right lever leads to the delivery of a sucrose solution into the
magazine. This environment consists of three states. The first state is the initial condition of
the box in which the outcome has not yet been delivered (si). By pressing the left lever, the
environment enters the second state in which a food pellet is delivered (sp), and similarly by
pressing the right lever, the environment enters the third state in which a sucrose pellet is
delivered (ss). An agent perceives entering into these states through the information that it
receives via its sensors. If for example a rat is interacting with this environment, then entering
into state sp is signaled to the animal by the specific sensory properties of the food pellets that
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the animal experiences during consumption and, similarly, transition to state ss is signaled
by the specific sensory properties of sucrose. The state that an action leads to is sometimes
referred to as the outcome of that action. For example, in the above example, food pellets
are the outcome of the left lever, and the sucrose solution is the outcome of the right lever.
Within this example, there are two actions available, pressing the left lever (Al) and pressing
the right lever (Ar). Since by taking action Al the environment transitions to state s
p we will
have P (sp|si, Al)= 1, and likewise, P (ss|si, Ar)= 1. As another example, assume a condition in
which on average every four left lever presses lead to the delivery of a food pellet (random-
ratio 4 schedule), which means that P (sp|si, Al)=
1
4
(these probabilities are sometimes called
action-outcome contingencies (A-O) in psychological terms).
Finally, similar to the Markov Reward Processes, there is a reward associated with each state.
In the above example, when the animal consumes food pellets, it assigns an incentive or a
reward to the current state of the environment, sp (this process is called incentive learning
(Dickinson & Balleine, 2002)). This reward is denoted by R(sp) for the pellet, and R(ss) for the
sucrose. For example, if a rat values food pellets twice as much as the sucrose solution, then
we can assume R(sp) = 1, and R(ss) = 0.5. Based on these factors, the MDP describing the
environment will be:
• S = {si, sp, ss},
• A= {Al, Ar},
• P (.|s, a)= {P (sp|si, Al)= 1,P (ss|si, Ar)= 1}
• R(sp)= 1, R(ss)= 0.25
• T = 10
where we assumed that there are 10 trials in which the animal is allowed to make a decision
(T = 10).
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The action selection policy of an agent indicates which action will be taken in each state. The
policy is denoted by pi(.|s), s ∈S , and it is the probability of taking action a in state s. In the
above example, if the agent always chooses the left lever, then we will have pi(Al|si )= 1, which
means that the probability of taking action Al in state s
i is one. The value of a policy, V pi, can
be defined as the total reward that the agent earns if it follows that policy:
V pi(s)= E
[
T−1∑
t=0
r (st )
]
(2.6)
For instance, in the condition described above, if the agent follows a policy that indicates
taking action Al in all the trials, (pi(Al|si )= 1), then V pi(s)= T since it will earn one amount of
reward in each trial. If the agent takes an action randomly (pi(Al|si )= 0.5, pi(Al|si )= 0.5), then
half of the time it receives R(sp), and the rest of the times it receives R(ss), and thus, the value
of the policy will be V pi(si )= 0.75T . Among all the action selection policies that an agent can
take, there is one policy which yields the highest amount of future rewards, which is called the
optimal policy, and is denoted by pi∗.
As mentioned earlier, the goal of a RL agent is to take the course of action that maximizes the
reward earned, or in other words, the goal is to discover the optimal policy (or close to optimal).
Such a policy is not known to the agent at the beginning, and it needs to be learned through
the interaction of the agent with the environment, a process which is called instrumental
conditioning. During instrumental conditioning, the agent builds a representation of the
environment, and then uses that representation to decide which action should be taken at
each state. Such a representation, however, is not unique, and there are multiple ways that the
agent can represent the environment, and yet maintain a good action selection policy. In fact,
evidence shows that depending on the internal and environmental conditions, individuals
can switch between different representations. In particular, in some conditions instrumental
actions exhibit the properties of goal-directed actions, and in other conditions they seem to
be automatic actions. These types of actions (instrumental actions) are explained in detail in
the following sections, and their behavioral and theoretical aspects are the main focus of the
current thesis.
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2.3 Instrumental conditioning: goal-directed actions
2.3.1 Behavioral properties
Goal-directed action selection can be defined as an action selection policy which is sensitive
to the changes in the underlying MDP of the environment. In simple words, in goal-directed
decision-making, an agent that previously took an action in order to attain a certain goal, will
no longer take that action if the value of the goal decreases for it, or it no longer believes that
the action will lead to the goal that it wanted to attain. Guided by this definition, a commonly
used experimental method for determining whether action selection is goal-directed, is to
manipulate the reward of the states of the environment, and then test whether it affects action
selection. A typical experiment for assessing whether action selection is goal-directed is called
outcome revaluation (Table 2.4). In such experiments, an agent is first trained to perform
two different actions that earn different food outcomes (i.e, two different actions that lead to
two different states). After this training, an outcome revaluation treatment is conducted, in
which the value of one of the outcomes (i.e., one of the states) is manipulated, a treatment
that generally involves sating the animals on one of the two outcomes to decrease its value.
Subsequently, back online, a test is conducted in which the choice between the two actions is
assessed in the absence of the outcome. Typically, when given this choice, humans and other
animals decrease their performance of the action that previously delivered the now devalued
outcome, which can be regarded as an operational definition that action selection has been
goal-directed (Colwill & Rescorla, 1985).
Changes in the value of outcomes is usually conducted in an offline manner, in which the
value of the outcome is manipulated without taking actions. In contrast, in online outcome
devaluation, the value of an outcome is manipulated during the performance of instrumental
actions. For example, assume that an animal has learned that food pellets can be earned
by pressing the left lever in the operant chamber. In this condition, the offline outcome
devaluation of food pellets can be achieved by feeding the animal with food pellets (without
requiring it to take any instrumental action) until it gets sated. In contrast, online outcome
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Table 2.4 – Design of revaluation experiments. During the training phase, subjects learn that
the outcome of one of the actions (A1) is O1, and the outcome of the other action is O2. Then,
the value of one of the outcomes is increased (inflation), or decreased (outcome devaluation).
Finally, during the test phase, animals are given a choice between A1 and A2, in order to probe
whether changes in the value of the outcomes affect their action selection.
Experiment Training Devaluation/Inflation Test
Devaluation
A1→O1
A2→O2 O1↓ A1 vs A2
Inflation
A1→O1
A2→O2 O1↑ A1 vs A2
devaluation of food pellets can be achieved by allowing animals to earn food pellets in the
training chamber by taking the instrumental action (pressing the left lever in this example).
The criteria for action selection to be goal-directed includes both online and offline outcome
devaluation. In practice, however, only an offline outcome devaluation test is conducted,
which is presumably a more stringent test than online outcome devaluation. It should also be
noted that, the test of outcome devaluation experiments is usually conducted in extinction
conditions in which the agent does not receive outcomes as a result of taking instrumental
actions. The benefit of testing in extinction conditions is that action selection only reflects
what the agent has learned prior to the test, and is not confounded by online learning during
the test.
The two common ways of manipulating outcome values are specific satiety, and conditioned
taste aversion. In specific satiety, animals are pre-fed with the outcome which we want to
devalue. For example, if the outcome of one of the actions is a food pellet, and the outcome of
the other action is a sucrose pellet, then changing the value of the sucrose pellet is achieved
by pre-feeding animals with sucrose pellets for one hour before the test. An alternative way
to change the value of an outcome is conditioning a taste aversion to the outcome. Animals
readily associate gastric malaise with specific foods and tastes (Garcia, Kimeldorf, & Koelling,
1955). Lithium chloride (LiCl) induces a gastric malaise in rats when injected intraperitoneally
and, by pairing the consumption of the outcome with injections of LiCl, animals attribute the
illness to the outcome they have just consumed, and in this way, the value of the outcome
decreases.
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2.3.2 Computational models: model-based RL
The observation that an offline change in the value of a state influences action selection,
reveals two aspects of goal-directed learning. Firstly, it shows that the learning algorithm
builds a representation of the transition model of the environment, or in other words, it has
learned action-outcome contingencies; otherwise, it is not possible for an agent to know which
action’s value will be affected by the change in the value of a state (as it has not learned the
links between actions and states). Secondly, it shows that in addition to the transition model
of the environment, actions are also guided by the reward component of states, otherwise
changing the reward component of the states by devaluation would not affect actions. Action
outcome contingencies (or the transition model of the environment in RL terms), and the
reward component of different outcomes are referred to as a model of the environment, and a
RL algorithm that builds a representation of the model of the environment is called model-
based RL.Within this framework, the explanation of a typical outcome devaluation experiment
is as follows: during the initial training, the agent learns the value of different states, as well
as the transition model of the environment. After the initial learning, during the outcome
revaluation phase, the value of one of the states updates, which leads to a change in the reward
function. Finally, during the test, the values of actions are calculated using the new reward
function, which will cause a decrease in the performance of the action that has a devalued
outcome. As such, model-based RL can produce behavior that is similar to the results of the
outcome revaluation experiments, and it is suggested, therefore, to be a model of goal-directed
learning (Daw et al., 2005; Keramati, Dezfouli, & Piray, 2011).
The next issue is how an agent learns the model of the environment. As mentioned earlier,
the model of the environment has two components: the transition model of the environment,
and the reward of each state. Let’s assume an agent is in state s, and performs action a and
enters a new state, s′. Given these experiences, the estimated probability of reaching s′ given s
and a increases, for example using the following rule:
∆P (s′|s, a)=α(1−P (s′|s, a)) (2.7)
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where α is a learning rate. Similarly, the estimated probability of reaching all the states other
than s′ (denoted by s¯) decreases:
∆P (s¯|s, a)=−αP (s¯|s, a) (2.8)
where α is a learning rate. In this way, after each experience of a transition to a new state the
agent updates its estimates of the transition model of the environment. At the same time, by
entering a new state, the agent also receives a reward by which the reward function will be
updated. For example, if the agent receives reward r by entering into state s, the reward of
state s updates as follows:
∆Rˆ(s)=α(Rˆ(s)− r ) (2.9)
where α is a learning rate. By having an estimate of the model of the environment, an agent
can calculate the value of each action. To see how this can be done, let’s denote the value of
action a in state s as Q(s, a). The value of such a state-action pair is the reward received in
state s (R(s)), plus the value of each new state that the action might lead to (V (s′)) weighted by
the probability of reaching each new state (P (s′|s, a)):
Q(s, a)=R(s)+∑
s′
P (s′|s, a)V (s′) (2.10)
the above equation defines the value of each state-action pair using the values of states (V (s′)).
Under the optimal policy, we can assume that in each state the agent will take the action that
has the highest value, and thus the value of a state will be equal to the value of the highest
state-action in that state:
V (s)=max
a
Q(s, a) (2.11)
where V (.) and Q(., .) refer to the values of states, and state-action pairs respectively.
Equations 2.10 and 2.11 are called Bellman optimality equations, which can be solved using
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different methods (Puterman, 1994). One such method is the tree search method in which,
starting from a state, the agent unfolds each node of the tree using equation 2.10, and continues
this process until it reaches a terminal state, i.e., a state which does not lead to any other
state (or an absorbing state). There are methods other than the tree search to solve Bellman
equations such as value iteration and policy iteration (e.g., (Puterman, 1994)). However, such
methods often suffer from the curse of dimensionality (Bellman, 1961): the complexity of the
state-space of the problem (and therefore finding the course of action that maximize the total
reward) often increases exponentially with the number of features or dimensions that define
the problem. For example, in the case of the tree search, for each step further that the agent
desires to predict the consequence of its actions, the number of nodes of the tree that need to
be unfolded increases exponentially. In the next section, we look more closely at this issue.
2.3.3 Computational models: complexity measures
The computational cost of finding the (near) optimal solution of an MDP is often called
computational complexity, and as we mentioned before the model-based approaches suffer
from high computational complexity (see (Littman, 1996) for a survey). For example, in
a standard model-based RL algorithm, known as Rmax, the computational complexity for
planning the next action isΩ(|S|2|A|) where |S| is the size of the state space, and |A| is the size
of the action space. As we will discuss in the next section, there are other algorithms which are
more efficient than model-based RL in terms of computational complexity.
Other than computational complexity, there are two more aspects that should be considered
when evaluating decision-making algorithms: sample complexity (Kakade, 2003), and space
complexity. Sample complexity, roughly means how much data an agent needs to gather in
order to make optimal decisions. As such, the sample complexity of an algorithm is basically a
reflection of how the algorithm trades-off between exploration and exploitation strategies. The
space complexity refers to the amount of space or memory an algorithm needs in the worst
case scenario. For example in a standard model-based algorithm, called Rmax (Brafman &
Tennenholtz, 2003), the space complexity isΘ(|S|2|A|) , which is intuitive since the probability
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of transition from each state to other states by each action should be stored by the algorithm.
There are algorithms other than model-based RL for solving an MDP, which have different
complexity properties. For example, a class of algorithms called model-free RL have lower
computational and space complexity than model-based RL, but can have higher sample com-
plexity than model-based RL. As such, it is not surprising that the brain employs different
algorithms depending on its available memory, computational resources, and environmental
conditions. In fact, in the next section, we provide behavioral evidence that the decision-
making process in the brain deviates from simple model-based RL. In particular, we review
behavioral evidence that support the brain using model-free RL (section 2.4.1), and hierarchi-
cal RL (section 2.4.4). Decision-making in such processes can be seen as a more automated
form of action selection, since such decision-making processes usually have lower computa-
tional or space costs compared to model-based RL. As such we call such processes automatic
processes, which is the topic of the next sections.
Before getting on to the properties of automatic actions, it should be noted that automatic
actions are not the only method that the brain utilizes to overcome the curse of dimensionality.
Some theories suggest that goal-directed decision-making collaborates with the Pavlovian
process for action control. Imagine that an agent desires to perform a tree search to make a
goal-directed action, but the depth of the tree is beyond the available computational resources
of the agent. In such a situation the agent can use some heuristics to approximate action
values. One psychologically plausible way to perform such heuristics is to use model-free
Pavlovian values of the states instead of calculating the value of each action in that state (see
(Huys et al., 2012) for a related approach). For example, a person might deliberate over the
available paths (actions) that can be taken to reach home, but will not calculate the values of
the actions that might be taken (expanding the tree) after reaching home, and will instead use
a model-free Pavlovian value that has previously been assigned to the state of being at home.
Another way of restricting the size of the forward search is searching the tree bottom-up
instead of top-down. This means that an agent first determines which outcome is desired, and
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Table 2.5 – Design a typical specific Pavlovian-instrumental transfer experiment. Please see
the text for description.
Pavlovian phase instrumental phase Test
S1→O1
S2→O2
A1→O1
A2→O2
S1: A1 vs A2
S2: A1 vs A2
then calculates which course of action leads to that outcome. While in the top-down approach,
the agent first considers which actions are available, and calculates all the potential outcomes
of the available actions4. A manifestation of such a process (bottom-up) can probably be
seen in a phenomenon known as specific Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (sPIT). A typical
sPIT experiment has three phases (Table 2.5). In the first phase (Pavlovian phase), two neutral
stimuli (S1 and S2) are being paired with two distinguishable outcomes (S1-O1, S2-O2). In the
second phase (instrumental phase), the outcomes are paired with two different actions (A1-O1
and A2-O2). Finally, in a test phase, animals are given a choice between A1 and A2 in the
presence of S1 or S2. Results generally show that in the presence of S1, animals perform the
action with similar outcome to that paired with S1 (action A1), and similarly, in the presence
of S2, animals perform action A2 (e.g., (Trapold & Overmier, 1972; Baxter & Zamble, 1982;
Kruse, Overmier, Konz, & Rokke, 1983; Colwill & Motzkin, 1994; Corbit, Muir, & Balleine, 2001)).
One interpretation of such results is that, the presence of say S1, primes the representation
of O1, and then the subject searches for the action that leads to O1, i.e., A1, which biases the
action selection toward the choice of action that has a consistent outcome with the presented
stimuli (see (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010)). Such kinds of interactions between instrumental
and Pavlovian systems are beyond the scope of the current thesis, and we will not discuss
them further.
2.4 Instrumental conditioning: automatic actions
In certain situations, actions made by an individual are not consistent with the goal-directed
schema explained in the previous section. Such deviations can generally be categorized into
4Note that the relative efficiency of the bottom-up search to the top-down search depends on the structure of
the decision-making tree, e.g., number of available actions and available outcomes, and it is not always necessarily
the case that the bottom-up search is better than the top-down search.
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two forms of behavior: (i) insensitivity to outcome devaluation and contingency degradation,
and (ii) performance of action sequences. In the following sections, we will explain each form
in turn, and then we will explore the theoretical aspect of each form.
2.4.1 Behavioral properties: outcome devaluation
As mentioned in the previous section, goal-directed actions are sensitive to changes in the
value of their outcomes. However, evidence shows that overtraining changes this property of
actions and makes them: (i) insensitive to changes in the value of the outcome (C. D. Adams,
1982; Dickinson, Balleine, Watt, Gonzalez, & Boakes, 1995; P. C. Holland, 2004; Killcross &
Coutureau, 2003; Yin et al., 2004; Lingawi & Balleine, 2012; Gremel & Costa, 2013); and (ii)
insensitive to changes in the causal relationship between the action and outcome delivery
(Dickinson et al., 1998). Here we describe, for illustration, data from a recent study in which
we were able to observe both effects in the same animals, in the same experiment, comparing
moderately trained and overtrained actions for their sensitivity to devaluation, induced by
outcome-specific satiety, and contingency degradation, induced by the imposition of an
omission schedule in rats. The data is presented in Figure 2.4. Rats were trained to press a
lever for sucrose and, after the satiety treatment, given a devaluation test (Figure 2.4A). After
retraining, they were given the contingency degradation test (Figure 2.4B). In the first test,
moderately trained rats showed a reinforcer devaluation effect; those sated on the sucrose
outcome reduced performance on the lever compared to those sated on another food. In
contrast, groups of overtrained rats did not differ in the test. In the second test, rats exposed
to the omission contingency were able to suppress the previously trained lever press response
to get sucrose, but only if moderately trained. The performance of overtrained rats did not
differ from the yoked, non-contingent controls.
There is an important difference between the experiment described above, and the experi-
ments described in the previous section for the test of goal-directed actions. In the above
experiment, there is only one instrumental action available, however, in the experiments
explained in the previous section, there are two actions, and two outcomes available in the
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Figure 2.4 – Four groups of rats (n=8) were trained to lever press for a 20% sucrose solution
on random-interval schedules (RI1, RI15, RI30, RI60) with moderately trained rats allowed
to earn 120 sucrose deliveries and overtrained rats 360 sugar deliveries (the latter involving
an additional 8 sessions of RI60 training with 30 sucrose deliveries per session). (A) For the
devaluation assessment, half of each group was then sated either on the sucrose or on their
maintenance chow before a 5-min extinction test was conducted on the levers. As shown in
the figure (panel A), moderately trained rats showed an reinforcer devaluation effect; those
sated on the sucrose outcome reduced performance on the lever relative to those sated on the
chow. In contrast, groups of overtrained rats did not differ in the test. Statistically we found a
training x devaluation interaction, F(1,28)=7.13, p<0.05, and a significant devaluation effect in
the moderately trained, F(1,28)=9.1, p<0.05 but not in the overtrained condition (F<1). (B) For
the contingency assessment, after devaluation all rats received a single session of retraining
for 30 sucrose deliveries before the moderately trained and overtrained rats were randomly
assigned to either an omission group or a yoked, non-contingent control group. During the
contingency test the sucrose outcome was no longer delivered contingent on lever pressing
and was instead delivered on a fixed time 10 sec schedule. For rats in the omission groups,
responses on the lever delayed the sucrose delivery by 10 sec. Rats in the yoked groups received
the sucrose at the same time as the omission group except there was no response contingency
in place. As is clear from the figure (panel B), rats exposed to the omission contingency in the
moderately trained group suppressed lever press performance relative to the non-contingent
control whereas those in the overtrained groups did not. Statistically, there was a training
x degradation interaction, F(1,28)=5.1, p<0.05, and a significant degradation effect in the
moderately trained, F(1,28)=7.8, p<0.05, but not in the overtrained condition (F<1).
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environment. In fact, evidence indicates that when animals have a choice between two instru-
mental actions, their choices remain sensitive to outcome devaluation, even after extended
training (Kosaki & Dickinson, 2010), and therefore, the training conditions for the study of
automatic actions usually consist of only one instrumental action.
In fact, even when only one instrumental action is available, other factors promote the for-
mation of automatic actions. In particular, random interval schedules of reinforcement (RI),
enhance the formation of automatic actions, in comparison to ratio schedules of reinforce-
ment or fixed-interval schedules (Dickinson, Nicholas, & Adams, 1983; Gremel & Costa, 2013;
Derusso et al., 2010) (see also (Derusso et al., 2010)).
2.4.2 Computational models: model-free RL
As mentioned in the previous sections, the learning and expression of goal-directed actions is
guided by what has been learnt about the model of the environment. The observation that
over-training renders such goal-directed actions insensitive to outcome revaluation, reveals
that the selection of automatic actions cannot be guided by the model of the environment.
Associative learning theories attribute such actions to stimulus-response (S-R) learning, which
means than an agent learns to elicit a response (R) when faced with a certain stimulus (S). In
essence, S-R theories of instrumental conditioning argue that whenever the performance of a
response is followed by positive reinforcement, then the strength of the association between
the response and the antecedent stimulus increases. Conversely, negative reinforcement after
a response decreases the strength of the S-R association (Thorndike, 1911).
Within S-R theories, reinforcement can be regarded as the reward component of the state
that the response (or action) leads to. As such, the strength of an S-R association will be
proportional to the reward that an action entails in the future: actions that have led to higher
rewards in the past are more likely to be taken in similar situations (or similar states in RL
terms) in the future. In simple words, this form of learning implies that whenever an action
leads to reward, the agent marks that action as a good action, and then in the future, the agent
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takes the actions that have been marked as good actions, without necessarily knowing what
the exact consequence of those actions will be.
As such, similar to goal-directed instrumental actions, the agent will take the actions with the
highest values. However, the difference is that the values of actions are updated at the time of
experiencing the reward, while in the goal-directed case, the values of actions are calculated at
the choice points. In other words, during the formation of S-R associations, by experiencing a
reward after taking an action, the value of that action updates and becomes cached for future
use, while in the goal-directed case, values are calculated at the choice points. Since values of
actions are cached, they remain unchanged after off-line devaluation of outcomes, and hence
can be regarded as computational basis for the insensitivity of overtrained actions to outcome
devaluation (Daw et al., 2005).
One way of learning the cached values of actions is through model-free RL. The goal of model-
free RL is to learn the value of each action in each state, without learning the model of the
environment. Following (Watkins, 1989), we denote the value of action a in state s with Q(s, a).
Now, assume that an agent is in stage s, and performs action a and enters a new state s′, and
receives reward r . The amount of mis-prediction in the value of the action generates a reward
prediction error:
δ= r +V (s′)−Q(s, a) (2.12)
where V (s′) is the value of state s′, which is equal to the value of the best action in state s′.
Then, using this error signal, the value of the action adjusts as follows:
∆Q(s, a)←αδ (2.13)
The above form of learning is called Q−learning (Watkins, 1989). There is another variant of
model-free RL, called SARSA (Sutton & Barto, 1998), in which the error signal is calculated
based on the value of the actual action that will be taken in the state s′, i.e., the error signal
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will be as follows:
δ= r +Q(s′, a′)−Q(s, a) (2.14)
where a′ is the action that will be taken in state s′. There is evidence in support of both forms
of learning in the brain (Morris, Nevet, Arkadir, Vaadia, & Bergman, 2006; Roesch, Calu, &
Schoenbaum, 2007).
As it is clear from the above equations, the learning process is similar to the model-free
Pavlovian conditioning, but the difference is that here, the values of actions are being learned,
while in the Pavlovian case the agent learns the value of states. Indeed, it is suggested that the
prediction error which is used in equation 2.13 is generated by the Pavlovian system. That is,
the prediction error that is generated by the Pavlovian model-free system is also sent out to
the instrumental model-free system for the purpose of learning the state-action values (Barto,
1995; Joel, Niv, & Ruppin, 2002). This form of learning is called actor-critic, in which an actor
selects and learns the value of actions, and a critic provides the error signal that adjusts action
values.
The information that reward prediction conveys is only regarding the reward component
of the outcome of actions and, thus, the identity of the consequence of actions will not be
represented during the learning process. The advantage of such a schema is that at the choice
points values are already calculated, and there is no need to deliberate over the consequence of
actions (as in the goal-directed process). However, choices will be insensitive to offline changes
in outcome values, since values are cached and updated only after the online experience of
actions. Due to this property of model-free RL, previous works have suggested that it is a
computational substrate for the insensitivity of overtrained actions to outcome devaluation
(Daw et al., 2005).
Evidence for model-free RL in the brain- As we will show in chapter 3, the model-free account is
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not the only way to explain insensitivity to outcome devaluation, therefore, further behavioral
or neural evidence is required to confirm the operation of the model-free RL behind choices.
One line of behavioral evidence can be provided based on the equation 2.13, which implies
that the effect of past rewards on current choices decays exponentially (with the rate of α).
This prediction has been confirmed in previous studies in humans, non-human primates,
and rodents (Lau & Glimcher, 2005; Sugrue, Corrado, & Newsome, 2004; Ito & Doya, 2009).
However, alternatively, it can be argued that a model-based learning algorithm can also predict
the same pattern; indeed, in equations 2.7 and 2.8, the effect of past experiences on the current
contingencies decreases exponentially, and since values are calculated using action-outcome
contingencies, the effect of past experiences on the current action values, and choices decays
exponentially, similar to the pattern predicted by model-free RL. Therefore, this behavioral
evidence alone is not sufficient to conclude that performance reflects the operation of model-
free instrumental conditioning.
Another line of evidence in support of model-free instrumental learning comes from the
connection between dopamine and the reward prediction error (equation 2.12). In fact,
similar to the Pavlovian conditioning, it is suggested that the phasic activity of dopamine
neurons code the prediction error, and serve as the teaching signal for the value of actions
(where in the Pavlovian case the signal was involved in learning the value of states). Causal
evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from studies showing that Parkinson patients,
who suffer from the degeneracy of dopamine neurons, are impaired in making optimal choices,
which can be recovered by the administration of L-DOPA (which is a dopamine agonist) (Frank,
Seeberger, & O’reilly, 2004; Bódi et al., 2009; Cools, Altamirano, & D’Esposito, 2006; Rutledge et
al., 2009). One notable feature of these experiments is that, subjects were presented with a
set of stimuli on the screen, and they were instructed to choose one of them, for example, by
pressing the corresponding button. Although this process can be interpreted as if subjects
are learning the value of actions, it is also consistent with the subjects learning the Pavlovian
value of states (stimuli). That is, subjects learn the Pavlovian value of the stimuli, and then
they evaluate actions in a model-based manner, and take the actions which correspond to
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the states with high values. As such, these experiments do not provide direct evidence for the
involvement of dopamine in learning the value of actions.
There is similar evidence from optogenetic studies in mice showing that, animals return to the
location in which they received stimulation of dopamine neurons in VTA (Tsai et al., 2009),
avoid locations in which the activity of dopamine neurons in ventral tegmental area (VTA)
was inhibited (Tan et al., 2012), and learn to nose-poke when nose-poking is followed by the
stimulation of dopamine neurons (K. M. Kim et al., 2012). In such experiments, the responses
that the animal presents can be seen as forms of the Pavlovian condition response (CR) (e.g.,
approaching the locations with high value), and thus the learning process can be interpreted in
terms of Pavlovian conditioning. There is another study in which animals needed to perform
an instrumental action in order to receive the stimulation (Adamantidis et al., 2011). This study
showed that animals preferred to take the action which delivered both food and stimulation,
over the action that only delivered food. However, similar to the experiments in Parkinson’s
patients, it can be argued that here the stimulation increases the value of the ‘food state’
through a Pavlovian learning mechanism, which implies a high value for the goal-directed
action that led to the food (see (Domingos et al., 2011) for a similar experiment using water).
Thus, in summary, although there is behavioral and neural evidence for the involvement
of model-free instrumental conditioning, such evidence can mainly be explained using a
combination of model-free Pavlovian conditioning, and model-based instrumental condition-
ing process. The above argument, however, only implies that the mentioned effects can be
explained using model-based instrumental conditioning, and since such experiments are not
accompanied by tests such as outcome devaluation it cannot be claimed that the underlying
process is necessarily model-based RL.
2.4.3 Computational models: arbitration rules
In section 2.3.2 we argued that model-based RL provides a plausible computational substrate
for goal-directed actions. Also, as argued in section 2.4.2, previous authors suggest that
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model-free RL exhibits properties that can explain insensitivity to outcome devaluation.
Now, a remaining question to be answered is why decision-making is model-based early
in training, whereas later in training it becomes model-free (since actions will be insensitive
to outcome devaluation after overtraining). Here, it is suggested that a third system, the
arbitrator, coordinates the contribution of the systems to choice. That is, at each choice point,
the arbitrator selects one of the systems, or a combination of both systems, to control actions.
Several models have been previously suggested for how the arbitrator works (Daw et al., 2005;
Keramati et al., 2011; Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Chersi, 2013; Lee, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2014), that
we illustrate them in this section.
Within a normative perspective, the logic of the arbitrator, i.e, shifting from model-based to
model-free, should stem from the algorithmic properties of each process. In section 2.3.3 we
mentioned that model-based RL is generally expensive in terms of computational and space
complexity, while model-free RL has a lower space complexity, which is O(|S||A|) compared
to O(|S|2|A|) in model-based RL. This means roughly that the operation of the model-free
system requires less memory than model-based RL. An implication of this observation is
that, when the agent has memory constraints, it would be more beneficial to rely on the
model-free system (Otto, Gershman, Markman, & Daw, 2013; Otto, Raio, Chiang, Phelps, &
Daw, 2013). Similarly, the computational complexity of model-free learning is O(ln|A|) (if
Q-values are presented by a heap data structure), compared to model-based RL which has
a higher computational complexity of Ω(|S|2|A|). As such, the model-free approach will be
more appropriate when computational resources are limited, or decisions need to be made
under temporal constraints.
But neither space nor computational complexity are directly related to the shift to model-free
RL after extended training, since memory and temporal constraints are not manipulated
during the course of training. However, what might be underlying the shift to model-free RL is
sample complexity: model-based RL generally requires less amount of data to make optimal
choices in comparison to model-free RL (see (Li, 2009, p.82) for a discussion). As such, early
in training when data is limited, the agent uses model-based RL, while later in training when
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enough data exists, the agent uses model-free RL which is more efficient in terms of space and
computational complexity. Inspired by this argument, previous works have suggested several
arbitration rules for how and why the brain switches between model-free and model-based
decision-making modalities. Such arbitration rules can be divided into two classes, which we
will discuss in the following section.
Class I arbitration rules- In this class of arbitration rules (Keramati et al., 2011) (see also
(Pezzulo et al., 2013)), it is assumed that the choices made by the goal-directed process are
always better than the choices of the model-free system, i.e., the model-based process has the
perfect information about the environment, which is consistent with the assumption that the
model-based system has lower sample complexity. On the other hand, it is assumed that the
model-based system takes longer to calculate which action should be taken, which is again
consistent with the fact that model-based RL has a higher computational complexity. Based on
this, the arbitration rule becomes as follows: if the value of perfect information (VPI) provided
by the model-based system exceeds the opportunity cost of waiting for the time consuming
model-based approach, then the model-based system will control actions, otherwise, the
model-free system will control actions. The value of perfect information is equivalent to the
extra amount of reward that can be gained if the model-free system knows the exact values
of actions (by querying the model-based process). The opportunity cost of the slowness in
the model-based system can be quantified using the concept of average reward rate (R¯) (Niv,
2007). The average reward rate represents the amount of reward that the agent can gain in a
unit of time, and thus the opportunity time of waiting for model-based calculations will be R¯τ,
where τ is the time taken by the model-based process.
Within the above schema, early in training when the estimations of the model-free system
are inaccurate, the value of perfect information is high, and thus control will be goal-directed.
Later in training when the estimations of the model-free system become rather accurate, the
value of perfect information drops, and the model-free system dominates behavior. An impor-
tant property of this class is that, the information that the arbitrator relies on for choosing a
system to control actions, is solely based on the estimation of the model-free system, and the
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model-based system is called only when it is required. This property allows an agent to exhibit
fast reaction times when relying on the model-free system.
Class II arbitration rules- This class of arbitration rules (Daw et al., 2005; Daw, Gershman,
Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011; Gläscher, Daw, Dayan, & O’Doherty, 2010; Lee et al., 2014)
assumes that there are conditions under which the values estimated by the goal-directed
process, i.e., model-based system, can be less accurate than the values estimated by model-free
RL. For example, if the available memory is limited the goal-directed process might sacrifice
the accuracy of the value computation for fitting the required computation in the available
memory. The model-free process, however, suffers less from such memory limitations, and
after sufficient training it eventually surpasses the model-based accuracy. This is in contrast
to the first class of arbitration rules, which assumed that the estimated values of the goal-
directed process are always more accurate than those of model-free RL. As such, in this class
of arbitration rules, the arbitrator receives inputs from both model-free and model-based
RL, and these inputs convey information about the accuracy of the estimates of each system.
Then, the arbitration allows each system to exert control over the actions proportional to the
certainty that they have about their decisions.
The major difference between this class of arbitration rules and the first class is that, in this
class, the goal-directed process is always engaged in decision-making, while in the first class,
the goal-directed process will only be engaged when required. In other words, in this class of
arbitration rules, even when the overt behavior is model-free, the model-based system is still
working behind the scene to feed its inputs into the arbitrator. (Keramati et al., 2011) showed
that the way in which class I arbitration rules conceptualize the arbitration is more consistent
with behavioral results.
2.4.4 Behavioral properties: action sequences
In the previous section we presented a property of automatic actions, which was their insen-
sitivity to outcome devaluation. In this section, we present another property of automatic
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actions, known as action chunking. Evidence shows that with practice, actions that are fre-
quently executed together concatenate to form action sequences (also known as action chunks,
macro actions, skills, tasks, sub-tasks or schema) which are then treated as a single response
unit (Book, 1908; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Pew, 1966) (see (Rhodes, Bullock, Verwey,
Averbeck, & Page, 2004) for a review). Within the domain of motor control, such action se-
quences can be a sequence of motor commands, as for example typing a new word for the
first time is a disjoint set of key presses (actions), while practice renders the whole set of key
presses as an integrated sequence of muscle contractions. More generally, actions within an
action sequence can be at a higher level than motor commands. For example, within the
area of executive functions, with practice, making a cup of tea becomes a sequence of actions
consisting of ‘boiling the water’, ‘adding sugar’, etc.
The problem of learning action sequences was called action syntax by Karl Lashley (1890-
1958), who is usually credited with pointing out the centrality of serial order learning in skilled
actions (Lashley, 1951). Lashley proposed a new theoretical point of view that rejected the
associative account of action sequence learning, called response chain theory (or associative
chain theory) (James, 1890). The response chain is basically an extension of the stimulus-
response learning theory (Guthrie, 1952; Hull, 1952), which postulates that within an action
sequence, the stimulation caused by an action triggers the next action in the sequence:
· · ·→Ri → Si →Ri+1 → Si+1 → . . .
where action Ri causes stimulus Si , which then triggers Ri+1. Take for example typing the
word “are”. The response chain theory suggests that seeing the word “are”, triggers the action
of pressing key “a”; then, the feedback produced by pressing the key “a” (e.g., kinesthetic
feedback, or perhaps the sight of letter “a” in the screen) triggers pressing the next key (“r”),
and this process continues up to the end of the word.
In contrast to the response chain theory, Lashley postulated that all actions that are to be
executed are determined at the onset of an action sequence within a motor program (Keele,
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1968; Henry & Rogers, 1960). Lahsley provided three lines of evidence in support of his theory.
Firstly, he argued that during the performance of an action sequence, reaction times are
faster than can be attributed to the feedback received from previous actions. For example,
(Rumelhart & Norman, 1982) argued that the mean interval between key presses in world
champion typists is 60 milliseconds, which is close to the neural transmission time between
the spinal cord and the effector, and thus there is not sufficient room for the feedback to
guide actions. This argument, however, was based on the assumption that the minimum
reaction time for responding to kinesthetic stimulation is 100 milliseconds (Glencross, 1977),
whereas later evidence showed that reaction times can be faster than was initially thought
(e.g., (J. A. Adams, 1976)). Moreover, not all reaction times are so fast that they cannot be
explained based on the feedback received from previous stimuli (Bruce, 1994).
Secondly, Lashley provided evidence from a man with damaged nerves leading to his leg
(which caused anesthesia for the movements of his knee joint, although he was still able to
voluntarily move his leg) (Lashley, 1917), arguing that even in the absence of sensory feedback,
individuals are able to make motor movements. Again here one can argue that in this situation
the feedback can be provided using other senses (Bruce, 1994). The third line of argument is
structure of the errors in the production of action sequences, which is not consistent with the
response chain theory. For example, transposition errors during typing (e.g., typing "becuase"
instead of "because") is one of the most common errors, which cannot be explained easily
using response chain theory (Rumelhart & Norman, 1982).
Other evidence has also been found, that is more consistent with Lashley’s account than the
response chain account. Firstly, it is reported that the time required to initiate a sequence
of movements increases in proportion to the length and complexity of the action sequence,
which presumably indicates that the elements that are to be executed are prepared at the
beginning of the sequence. In a seminal study, (Henry & Rogers, 1960) asked subjects to
perform three different actions in response to a tone stimulus. In one portion of the study,
subjects were instructed to simply withdraw their hands; in the second portion of the study,
subjects were asked to make two rapid movements after they withdrew their hands. Finally, in
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the third portion of the study, subjects were instructed to make four hand movements after
hand withdrawal. The result of the study showed that, in the second portion of the study, the
reaction time to start responding was 23 percent greater than the first portion (simple hand
removal). Similarly, the reaction time to start responding, in the longest sequence was 31
percent greater than the simple hand withdrawal.
Other studies have reported results similar to the above study (e.g., (Klapp, 1995, 1977; Stern-
berg, Monsell, Knoll, & Wright, 1978; Verwey, 1994; Canic & Franks, 1989)). However, the
differences in initiation times of short and long sequences diminish with practice (Klapp, 1995;
Hulstijn & van Galen, 1983; Verwey, 1994, 1999; van Mier & Hulstijn, 1993), which is taken
as a sign of the development of motor chunks (Brown & Carr, 1989; Klapp, 1995), i.e., with
practice, the whole sequence of movements is encapsulated within a motor chunk that can be
programmed as a single unit during the initiation of an action sequence.
The second line of evidence supporting Lashley’s argument comes from neurological studies.
Averbeck and colleagues (Averbeck, Chafee, Crowe, & Georgopoulos, 2002; Averbeck, Sohn,
& Lee, 2006; Averbeck, Chafee, Crowe, & Georgopoulos, 2003) trained monkeys to perform
a sequence of strokes to draw a predetermined geometric shape. For example, in a sample
trial, a monkey was shown a triangle, and was then required to draw a triangle using a joystick.
Within this example, the action sequence is composed of three actions, each corresponding
to drawing one edge of the triangle (there were four different shapes in the experiment).
Recordings from neurons in area 46 of the pre-frontal cortex of the animals, revealed that,
at the onset of the sequence of strokes (before the animal started to draw the shape), each
element of the action sequence to be executed was represented in the brain. In addition to
this, the activity of the representation of each action, corresponded to the order of that action
in the sequence, i.e., the action with the highest representation activity was the first action to
be executed, and this representation was deleted after the action was executed. Such findings
are more consistent with Lashley’s conception of action sequences than with response chain
theories. However, regarding the interpretation of this experiment, one can claim that the
neural activity reflects the sub-goals to be met (e.g., drawing each edge of the shape), rather
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than the sequence of actions (e.g., arm movements in this example), as indicated with some
studies (Mushiake, Saito, Sakamoto, Itoyama, & Tanji, 2006; Saga, Iba, Tanji, & Hoshi, 2011;
Shima, Isoda, Mushiake, & Tanji, 2007).
We will review more behavioral properties of action sequences in section 3.1 within the context
of the development of a new model for learning action sequences.
2.4.5 Computational models: hierarchical RL
Theoretical perspectives on action sequences have a long history (e.g., (Estes, 1972; Rumelhart
& Norman, 1982; Grossberg & Pearson, 2008; Cooper & Shallice, 2006; Botvinick, Niv, & Barto,
2009; Nakahara, Doya, & Hikosaka, 2001; Helie, Roeder, Vucovich, Rünger, & Ashby, n.d.;
Solway & Botvinick, 2012; Ito & Doya, 2011). See for a review (Botvinick, 2008)), and one of the
most recent forms is borrowed from the computational theory of hierarchical RL (Botvinick,
2008). This theory has the appealing property that it can be readily integrated with model-
based RL (which corresponds to goal-directed actions), and besides that, it is simple and
benefits from a sound theoretical foundation. Based on this, in the following, we present a
review of hierarchical RL, and in the next chapters, we will be using it for model development
and simulation.
As mentioned in section 2.3.3, model-based RL is not efficient in environments with high
numbers of states and actions, and therefore, it is not scalable to complex environments.
Hierarchical RL offers a solution to this problem by introducing the notion of extended actions
or temporally extended actions. Temporally extended actions are actions that take more
than one time step to complete. This is in contrast to the model-based and model-free
reinforcement learning frameworks that we presented in 2.3.2 and 2.4.2, in which an action
only took one time step to finish. The concept of temporally extended actions is close to the
notion of action sequences in psychology, and this is why hierarchical RL provides a suitable
framework for studying action sequences.
In order to incorporate temporally extended actions into RL, we need to extend the notion of
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MDPs (introduced in section 2.2) to semi-MDPs (SMDP), in which transition from one state
to another state can take more than one time step. As such, instead of the transition model
being P (s′|s, a) it will be P (s′,τ|s, a), which represents the probability of reaching state s′ after
the time step of τ, if action a was taken in state s. Within an SMDP, some actions can take
more than one time step to finish, while others can take only one time step to finish, similar
to MDPs. Actions that take one time step to finish are called primitive actions, as opposed to
temporally extended actions. Given an SMDP, the role of a hierarchical RL agent is to take the
course of action (either primitive or temporary extended actions) that maximizes the long-run
expected cumulative reward. To achieve this aim, several frameworks have been suggested
previously, such as options formalism (Sutton, Precup, & Singh, 1999), the HAMQ approach
(Parr & Russell, 1998), and the MAXQ value decomposition (Dietterich, 2000). We will be using
the options framework, due to its simplicity and popularity, and it will be presented in the
next section.
Options framework- A commonly used environment for the study of hierarchical RL is depicted
in Figure 2.5. The environment consists of four rooms, which are connected through hallways.
An agent is randomly initialized in one of the cells in the top-left room, and it can move to
other cells by taking actions. There are four primitive actions that the agent can take (left,
right, top, down), which move the agent to the corresponding cells in a stochastic manner.
The agent will receive a reward whenever it reaches the goal (‘G’ in the figure). In addition to
the primitive actions, at each cell, the agent can also select from the two options that take it to
the hallways of the current room. For example, if the agent is in the top-left room, one of the
options takes it to the right hallway, and the other option takes it to the bottom hallway (there
are eight options in total). Executing each option takes more than one time step, and thus,
options play the role of temporary extended actions. One way of thinking about options is
that they are solutions to sub-problems. For example, in the four-room task to reach the goal,
the agent first needs to reach a hallway (sub-problem), which can be achieved by executing
the appropriate option.
More generally, an option o is defined with three properties o = 〈I o ,pio ,βo〉. I o is called the
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G
A
Figure 2.5 – The four-room environment, which is used for studying hierarchical RL. Solid
arrows show primitive actions (left, right, up, down), and dashed arrows show available
options.
initiation set, which is the set of states in which option o can be initiated. pio is the internal
action-selection policy of the option, and defines how the option will be implemented at
the level of primitive actions. Finally, βo(s) is the termination condition of the option, which
defines the probability of the termination of the option upon entering state s.
Given a set of options and actions, the algorithm works as follows. In each state, the agent
evaluates the options that can be taken in that state, and it also evaluates the available primitive
actions in that state. If the agent chooses to run a primitive action, then it will execute that
action, and the process restarts in the next step. If the agent chooses to run an option, then
the option will start to select primitive actions according to its internal policy (pi(s)) until it
terminates. At each step, the option will be terminated with a certain probability. For example,
in the above scenario, the options will be terminated whenever the agent reaches the intended
hallway. In addition to such conditions (e.g., reaching the intended goal of executing the
option), there is usually one more condition in which an ongoing option can be terminated.
That situation occurs when, during the execution of an option, the agent realizes that there is
a primitive action which has a higher value than continuing the option. For example, in the
four-room scenraio, assume that an agent is in the top-left room, and starts an option in order
to reach the eastern hallway. However, due to the unpredictability of the environment, after
executing several actions, the agent finds itself near the southern hallway. In this condition,
the agent terminates the ongoing option (to reach the eastern hallway), and exits the southern
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hallway.
Options, from the respect that they are composed of several primitive actions, correspond to
the concept of action sequences in psychology. The difference, however, is that the execution
of options is based on the states of the environment, but the execution of action sequences
can be independent of the state of the environment, as discussed by Lashley. We will discuss
this issue in more detail in chapter 3. The second parallel is between the concept of option
termination, and the inhibition of action sequences. As we will discuss in the next chapters,
in certain conditions, the execution of an ongoing action sequence might be inappropriate,
meaning that the action sequence should be terminated, which is conceptually similar to the
termination of options.
model-based hierarchical RL- In the previous section we introduced the concept of options.
Given a set of options and primitive actions, a remaining question is how an agent evaluates
and selects actions. In principle, similar to primitive actions, options can be evaluated in both
a model-based and model-free manner. In the next chapters of the current thesis, we will
argue that a framework in which options and actions are evaluated in a model-based manner,
provides a parsimonious explanation for the multiple forms of decision-making processes.
Such a framework is called hierarchical model-based RL, which as its name implies, includes
options (the hierarchical component), and evaluates actions in a model-based manner, i.e.,
an agent builds a representation of the model of the environment.
The representation of the model of the environment that the hierarchical model-based RL
builds, consists of two parts. The first part is similar to the representation of the model-based
RL introduced in section 2.3.2, i.e., an agent learns the transition function of the primitive
actions (p(s′|s, a)), and also the reward of each state (R(s)). The second part involves learning
about options, and has three components: (i) discovering options, i.e., learning how primitive
actions can be organized in the form of useful options, (ii) learning the outcome of each option
after discovering them, i.e., to which state each option leads to (p(s′|o, a)), and (iii) learning
the total reward earned during the execution of the option (R(o)). R(o) summarizes all the
42
2.4. Instrumental conditioning: automatic actions
events that happen during the execution of an option, in terms of the amount of rewards
earned.
By building a representation of the environment, an agent can perform a tree search in order
to select actions. In the case of primitive actions, this search is similar to the flat model-based
RL (section 2.3.2). In the case of options, their value is composed of the value of the final
state that the option leads to, and the amount of reward that can be earned during the option
execution, which can be correspondingly calculated using p(s′|s, a), and R(o):
Q(s,o)=R(o)+∑
s′
P (s′|s,o)V (s′) (2.15)
where Q(s,o) is the value of execution option o in state s. It is important to note that the
term R(o) represents the total reward earned during the execution of the option, without
representing the actual states visited during the execution of that option5. In particular, since
for the evaluation of the options, the states visited during the option execution are not con-
sidered individually, then off-line changes in the values of these middle states will not reflect
on the values of the options that pass them. As we will discuss in the subsequent chapters,
this property can render decisions insensitive to outcome devaluation, a characteristic of
automatic actions.
There are two theoretical points worth mentioning regarding the utility of using options. The
first one is regarding whether using options speeds up learning, i.e, how adding options to the
learning algorithm affects the sample complexity of the algorithm. Experimental (Jong, Hester,
& Stone, 2008) and theoretical (Brunskill & Li, 2014) studies indicate that adding options can
potentially increase the speed of learning, depending on whether options are available in all,
or a sub-set of states. In fact, it can be shown that in the four-room environment, if the agent
is allowed to choose an option in all of the states, then the performance of the agent will be
5R(o) in fact summarizes events that have occurred during the execution of option o. However, one can imagine
other ways to summarize events that have occurred during the execution of option o. For example one can
assume that a quantity called S(o) tracks the probability of visiting each state during the execution of option o (i.e.,
cached states). Here, consistent with the current formulation of the options framework we assume that the agent
represents R(o).
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even worse than an agent without options (Jong et al., 2008). For example, if the agent is near
the goal, choosing to run an option will stop the agent from reaching the goal, because it will
take the agent to the hallways which are far from the goal. However, in the rooms other than
the goal room, using options can be beneficial. Similarly, theoretical results also suggest that
using options can improve the sample complexity of the learning algorithm, if the options are
available in a limited number of states, and in the rest of the states, only primitive actions are
available.
The second theoretical point is how adding options changes the computational complexity of
the learning algorithms. In discrete MDPs, there are some indications that using options can
facilitate the tree-search value computation (He & Brunskill, 2011), however these results are
restricted to the condition that only options can be selected by the agent (and not primitive
actions) (see (Mann & Mannor, 2014) section 1 for a brief review, and a generalization of the
results to the case of continuous MDPs). However, restricting the agent to select only options,
can lead to sub-optimal policies, since for example achieving a goal might need utilizing fine-
grain actions in addition to the options. As such, the utility gained by using options depends on
the states in which options are available, and whether options augment the space of primitive
actions or whether they replace primitive actions. In addition, how options are discovered,
i.e., how primitive actions form an option, can also affect the performance of the learning
algorithm. Obviously, if the options match the hierarchical structure of the environment, then
they will benefit the agent in reaching its goals, otherwise, they might hinder performance. In
chapter 3 we will introduce a new method for discovering action sequences.
2.4.6 Neural substrates
Previous studies have implicated several brain regions in the computational processes involved
in decision making (model-based Pavlovian, model-free Pavlovian, model-based instrumental,
model-free instrumental)(see for example (Balleine, Delgado, & Hikosaka, 2007; Dolan &
Dayan, 2013) for reviews). Here, we will review the neural substrates that are more relevant to
the current thesis. First, we briefly review the role of dopamine in automatic actions, and then,
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we will review the role of striatal sub-regions in each form of automatic actions.
2.4.6.1 Role of dopamine
Insensitivity to outcome devaluation induced by over-training has been shown to depend on
the ascending nigrostriatal dopamine pathway in rats (Faure, Haberland, Condé, & El Massioui,
2005), and the expression of NMDA receptors on dopamine neurons in mice (Wang et al.,
2011). Dopamine has also been implicated in the operation of action sequences. Evidence sug-
gests that the administration of a dopamine antagonist disrupts the chunking of movements
into well-integrated sequences (in capuchin monkeys) (Levesque et al., 2007), which can be
reversed by the co-administration of a dopamine agonist (Tremblay et al., 2009). In addition,
motor chunking appears not to occur in Parkinson’s patients (Benecke, Rothwell, Dick, Day, &
Marsden, 1987) due to a loss of dopaminergic activity in the sensorimotor putamen, which
can be restored in the patients on L-DOPA (Tremblay et al., 2010). The computational role that
dopamine plays in the formation of action sequences is unclear, and in chapter 3 we develop a
model for learning action sequences, which is based on the reward prediction error, and thus
provides a basis for understanding the role of dopamine in learning action sequences.
2.4.6.2 Striatal sub-regions
While overtraining causes performance to become insensitive to outcome devaluation, lesions
of the dorsolateral striatum (DLS; the sensorimotor striatum in rats) reverse this effect render-
ing performance once again sensitive to devaluation treatments (Yin et al., 2004). Likewise,
muscimol inactivation of DLS has been found to render otherwise habitual performance,
sensitive to changes in the action–outcome contingency (Yin, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2006).
There are similar reports in humans showing the involvement of sensorimotor putamen in
automatic actions (Tricomi et al., 2009; Wunderlich, Smittenaar, & Dolan, 2012).
Similarly, inactivation of the sensorimotor striatum disrupts the expression of previously
learned motor sequences (Miyachi, Hikosaka, Miyashita, Kárádi, & Rand, 1997), and learning
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new sequences (Yin, 2010). In humans, the blood oxygen level dependent activity in the
sensorimotor putamen is correlated with the concatenation of action sequences (Wymbs,
Bassett, Mucha, Porter, & Grafton, 2012), and the stage of training in action sequence learning
(Lehéricy et al., 2005; Jueptner, Frith, Brooks, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 1997). Neural
firing patterns recorded in rat’s DLS have been reported to mark the start and end of action
sequences in T-maze navigation (Thorn, Atallah, Howe, & Graybiel, 2010), and sequences of
lever presses (Jin & Costa, 2010; Jin, Tecuapetla, & Costa, 2014). Furthermore, it is reported that
most of the striatal neurons that were more active during the performance of a learned action
sequence, were in the sensorimotor striatum, whereas neurons in the associative striatum
responded more strongly to the performance of a new action sequence (Miyachi, Hikosaka, &
Lu, 2002).
For example, (Jog, Kubota, Connolly, Hillegaart, & Graybiel, 1999) over trained rats in a T-
maze and found that, as the component responses performed between the start and end
points of the maze declined in latency, the neural activity in sensorimotor striatum specific
to those points also gradually declined, to the extent that task-related activity was limited
to the first and last responses in the maze, i.e. the points at which any response sequence
or chunk should have been initiated and terminated. Similar effects have been observed by
(Barnes, Kubota, Hu, Jin, & Graybiel, 2005) and in fact, using response reversals, they were
also able to observe a collapse of the sequence, i.e. both the inter-maze responses and the
neural activity initially associated with those responses, reemerged along with task-irrelevant
movements. The inter-maze responses again declined with continued training post-reversal.
Hence, changes in both striatal unit activity and incidental behavioral responses tracked the
development of the sequence, as has been observed recently using a homogeneous sequence
of lever press responses, described above (Jin & Costa, 2010), and in a head movement habit
(Tang, Pawlak, Prokopenko, & West, 2007). Finally, (Kubota et al., 2009) reported observ-
ing electrophysiological effects associated with both the overall response sequence and the
component response primitives as these were rapidly remapped onto new stimuli presented
during the course of T-maze performance, suggesting that the mice (in this case) maintained
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separate representations of the sequence and component movements. Interestingly, Redish
and colleagues (Schmitzer-Torbert & Redish, 2004; A. Johnson, van der Meer, & Redish, 2007)
reported neural signals in the striatum associated with sequence learning in a novel navi-
gation task composed of a series of T-mazes reordered across days. Striatal activity differed
across different sequences of turns in the maze, but was also highly correlated across repeated
sequences suggesting, again, the co-occurrence of movement-specific and sequence-specific
activity in the striatum.
Thus, in summary, there are considerable similarities between the neural structures mediating
various forms of automatic actions, in terms of both striatal sub-regions and the role of
dopamine. The role of the sensorimotor striatum in action sequences, however, is not without
controversy (Turner & Desmurget, 2010). For example, inactivation of the globus pallidus
internus - the principal output of the sensorimotor striatum - does not increase the reaction
time in the ‘sequential trials’ of the sequential reaction times task (SRTT), which suggests that
the performance of action sequences is not dependent on the sensorimotor striatum. However,
the execution of sequence-based actions (as opposed to encoding) may not be dependent on
the sensorimotor striatum. In fact, based on this assumption, a neurocomputational model
has recently been developed (Helie et al., n.d.), in which the role of the basal ganglia is to train
the cortical-cortical connections that mediate sequence production. The model has shown to
be able to account for the data of (Desmurget & Turner, 2010) as well as some other aspects of
sequence learning.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter we introduced different forms of decision-making processes in the brain: (i)
Pavlovian conditioning and its two variants corresponding to model-based and model-free
value learning, and (ii) instrumental conditioning, which can be in the form of goal-directed or
automatic actions. We further presented three variants of RL models (model-based RL, model-
free RL, and hierarchical RL), and provided behavioral and neural evidence in support of each
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model. In the next chapter, we look closer at the behavioral and computational properties
of hierarchical RL, and investigate their implications for insensitivity of automatic actions to
outcome devaluation, contingency degradation, and action sequence learning.
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3 Hierarchical decision-making:
learning action sequences
In the previous chapter, we showed that insensitivity to outcome devaluation, and contingency
degradation are two important aspects of automatic actions, which are attributed to model-
free RL in previous works. In addition, we mentioned that action chunking is also an important
aspect of automatic actions, which has been linked to hierarchical RL. In this chapter, we
show that these two categories of automatic actions can be explained coherently using a
hierarchical RL model. After reviewing some behavioral properties of action sequences, we
develop a new normative model for learning action sequences and their interaction with
goal-directed processes. Finally, we show how the new model can account for a typical
sequence learning experiment, as well as outcome devaluation and contingency degradation
experiments.
3.1 Open-loop performance of action sequences
The flexibility of goal-directed actions reflects, the need for immediate, or at least rapidly
acquired, solutions to new problems and, indeed, evidence suggests that in novel environ-
ments there is a strong tendency for animals to generate behavioral variation and to resist
immediately repeating prior actions or sequences of actions (Neuringer, 2004; Neuringer &
Jensen, 2010). Of course, the need to explore new environments requires behavioral variation;
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once those solutions are found, however, exploiting the environment is best achieved through
behavioral stability, i.e. by persisting with a particular behavioral response. It is important
to recognize that, with persistence, actions can change their form, often quite rapidly. Errors
in execution and the inter-response time are both reduced and, as a consequence, actions
previously separated by extraneous movements or by long temporal intervals are more of-
ten performed together and with greater invariance (Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989;
Buitrago, Ringer, Schulz, Dichgans, & Luft, 2004; Buitrago, Schulz, Dichgans, & Luft, 2004).
With continuing repetition these action elements can become linked together and run off
together as a sequence, i.e. they can become chunked (Terrace, 1991; Graybiel, 1998). Practice
appears, therefore, to render variable, flexible, goal-directed actions into rapidly deployed,
relatively invariant, components of action sequences, suggesting that an important way in
which the form of a goal-directed action can change as it becomes habitual is via the links that
it forms with other actions to generate sequences (section 2.4.4).
The most important feature of sequence learning is the interdependency of actions (Shah, 2008).
Through the process of sequence learning, action control becomes increasingly dependent
on the history of previous actions and independent of environmental stimuli, to the point
that, given some triggering event, the whole sequence of actions is expressed as an integrated
unit. Take, for example, a typical sequence-learning experiment such as the serial reaction
time task (SRTT; (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987)). In this task a subject is required to elicit a specific
action in response to a specific cue. For example, cues can be asterisks that are presented on a
computer screen, and the corresponding responses require the subject to press the keys that
spatially match the cues’ positions that can appear in either a random or sequential order. In
the sequential trials condition, the position of the cues is repeated in a pattern such that the
position of the next stimulus can be predicted given the previous one. In the random trials
condition, stimuli are presented in random order and, thus, given the previous stimuli, the
next one cannot be predicted.
On a simple conception of the learning process in the SRTT, the subject takes an action and, if
it is successful, the association between that action and the cue strengthens. Then, the subject
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a)
b)
Figure 3.1 – (a) A closed-loop control system. After the controller executes an action it receives
cues regarding the new state of the environment and a reward. (b) An open-loop control
system in which the controller does not receive feedback from the environment. SRTT, serial
reaction time task.
.
waits for the next cue, and takes the action that has the strongest association with the cue.
From a control theory point of view, this learning process can be characterized as a closed-
loop control system in which, after each response, the controller (here the subject), receives
a feedback signal from the environment to guide future actions. In the SRTT, after taking
an action the subject receives two types of feedback: reward feedback and state feedback.
Reward feedback is the reward received after each response, for example, a specific amount of
juice, and is used for learning stimulus–response associations. State feedback is given by the
presentation of the next cue after the response that signals the new state of the environment,
and is used by the subject to select its next action. The term closed-loop commonly refers
to the loop created by the feedback path (Figure 3.1a). In the absence of this feedback, the
control system is called open-loop (Figure 3.1b; (Astrom & Murray, 2008)), according to which
the actions that the subject takes are not dependent on the presented cues or the received
rewards.
Clearly, closed-loop control is crucial for learning. Without feedback, the agent cannot learn
which response is correct. It also needs state feedback from the environment because the
correct response differs in each state and, as such, without knowing the current state, the agent
cannot make the correct response. However, in the sequential trials condition of the SRTT,
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the subject could potentially maintain a high level of performance without using the state
feedback; indeed, evidence suggests that is exactly what they do in accord with open-loop
control. Reaction time, defined as the time between the stimulus onset and the onset of the
behavioral response, is the primary measure in the SRTT. Evidence from rodents (Schwarting,
2009), non-human primates (Hikosaka, Rand, Miyachi, & Miyashita, 1995; Matsuzaka et
al., 2007; Desmurget & Turner, 2010) and humans (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Keele, Ivry,
Mayr, Hazeltine, & Heuer, 2003) suggests that, after training, reaction times are shorter in
the sequential trials than the random trials condition. In fact, if the subject is permitted to
respond during the inter-trial delay, then the reaction time can even be negative, i.e. the next
action is often executed before the presentation of the next stimulus (Matsuzaka et al., 2007;
Desmurget & Turner, 2010). (Matsuzaka et al., 2007) reported that, with increasing training,
the number of these predictive responses increases up to the point that in almost all trials, the
subject responds in a predictive manner without the visual cue (see also (Miyashita, Rand,
Miyachi, & Hikosaka, 1996), indicating that the number of predictive responses increases as a
sequence becomes well learned (see also (Carr & Watson, 1908) for a similar phenomenon in
maze navigation).
The occurrence of very short or negative reaction times in sequential trials implies that, after
sufficient learning, selection of an action is mostly dependent on the history of previous
actions and less dependent on the external stimuli (visual cues). In fact, even if the subject
does not respond predictively before stimulus presentation, it is clear that the decision as to
which action to take on the next trial is made before stimulus presentation. In a sequential
button-push task, (Matsumoto, Hanakawa, Maki, Graybiel, & Kimura, 1999) trained a monkey
to execute a series of three button pushes in response to illumination of the buttons in a fixed
cued sequence. After training, the monkey was tested in a condition in which the third button
in the sequence was located in a position different from its position during training. They
found that, during the first and sometimes the second trial, the monkeys would continue to
push the third button of the learned sequence even if one of the other targets was illuminated.
Similarly, (Desmurget & Turner, 2010) reported when the first stimuli of a random trial followed,
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by coincidence, the pattern of stimuli from a learned sequence, the animal responded as if the
next stimuli will be drawn from the learned sequence.
It appears, therefore, that, during the first stages of training, the subject learns the association
between cues and responses. At this stage, action selection is under closed-loop control
and relies on the observation of the cues. In the case of random trials, action selection
remains closed-loop through the course of learning. In sequential trials, however, with further
learning, action selection switches to open-loop control in which the execution of successive
actions is not related to the current state of the environment, something that leads to the
expression of action chunks (section 2.4.4). When actions are expressed in chunks, both state
identification, based on visual cues, and action evaluation appear to be bypassed. (Endress
& Wood, 2011), for example, note that successful sequence learning requires view-invariant
movement information, i.e. rather than depending on the relation between visual cues and
movement information in allocentric space, as goal-directed actions do (Willingham, 1998),
sequential movements appear to depend on position-based encoding in egocentric space.
Hence, chunked in this way, the performance of sequential movements is largely independent
of environmental feedback, allowing for very short reaction times in the open-loop mode.
Another line of evidence consistent with the cue-independency notion of habitual (automatic)
behavior comes from place/response learning tasks in animals (Tolman, Ritchie, & Kalish,
1946; Restle, 1957). In this type of task, rats begin each trial at the base of a T-maze surrounded
by environmental cues (e.g. windows, doors), and are trained to find food at the end of one
arm (e.g. the right, or east, arm). Following this training period, they are given probe tests
in which the maze is rotated 180 (with respect to the cues), and thus the start point will be
at the opposite side of the maze. Results show that after moderate training, at the choice
point the animal turns in the opposite direction to that previously learned (i.e. towards the
west arm; place strategy), suggesting that action control is state-dependent and based on the
environmental cues (closed-loop action control). However, after overtraining, rats switch and
at the test they take the same action that they learned in the initial training (i.e. they turn right;
a response strategy), indicating that overtraining renders action selection at the choice point
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independent of the environmental cues and the state identification process (open-loop action
control; (Ritchie, Aeschliman, & Pierce, 1950; Packard & McGaugh, 1996)).
Similarly, in more complex mazes in which a sequence of actions is required to reach the
goal, removal of environmental cues does not affect performance of a learned sequence of
egocentric movements (body turns), but disrupts the use of a place strategy (Rondi-Reig
et al., 2006). Learning the maze in a cue-deficient environment, but not in a cue-available
environment, in which decision-making should minimally rely on state-guided action control
is impaired by inactivation of sensorimotor striatum (Chang & Gold, 2004). Few studies have
addressed functional differences between the sensorimotor striatum and associative striatum
in place/response learning; however, in general it seems that the associative striatum is
involved in goal-directed decision-making (the place strategy), and the sensorimotor striatum
is involved in habitual responses (the response strategy; (Devan & White, 1999, 1999; Yin et al.,
2004; Moussa, Poucet, Amalric, & Sargolini, 2011)), consistent with the role of these striatal
sub-regions in instrumental conditioning (section 2.4.6.2) and SRTT.
Based on the mentioned similarities in neural and behavior aspects of increasing automaticity
in SRTT (sequential trials), maze learning and instrumental conditioning (insensitivity to
outcome devaluation and contingency degradation), we assume that action sequence forma-
tion is the underlying process of these modalities of habitual behavior. In order to formalize
this assumption, in the next section we use RL to provide a normative approach to modeling
changes in performance during action sequence learning. Next, in section 3.5 we show how
this model applies to the different forms of habitual behavior.
3.2 Average reward RL
A typical RL agent utilizes the following components for the purpose of learning and action
selection: (i) state identification – the agent identifies its current state based on the sensory
information received from its environment (e.g. visual cues); (ii) action selection – given
its current state, and its knowledge about the environment, the agent evaluates possible
54
3.2. Average reward RL
actions then selects and executes one of them; (iii) learning – after executing an action, the
agent enters a new state (e.g. receives new visual cues) and also receives a reward from the
environment. Using this feedback, the agent improves its knowledge about the environment.
This architecture is a closed-loop decision-making process because the action-selection
process is guided by the current state of the agent, which is identified based on sensory inputs
received from the environment. As we discussed in the previous section, action selection
in sequence learning is not guided by environmental stimuli, and so does not require a
state identification process. To explain sequence learning, therefore, we need to modify
this framework. In the following sections we will introduce a mixed open-loop/closed-loop
architecture for this purpose. Before turning to that issue, we shall first take a closer look at
the learning process in RL.
Assume that an agent is in state s, in which there is a set of possible actions, and the agent
selects one of them for execution, that we denote with a. The agent spends d time steps
in state s (commonly referred to as the state dwell time) and, after that, by taking actions a,
it enters a new state, s′ and receives reward r . The next state of the agent, the amount of
reward received after taking an action, and the state dwell times, depend on the dynamics of
the environment, which are determined, respectively, by the transition function, the reward
function and transition time function. The transition function, denoted by p(s′|s, a) indicates
the probability of reaching state s′ upon taking action a in state s. R(s) denotes the reward
function, which is the amount of reward the agent receives in state s. Finally, D(s), the
transition time function, is the time spent in state s (dwell time). The time that the agent
spends in a state is the sum of the time it takes the agent to make a decision, and the time it
takes for new stimuli to appear after executing an action.
The goal of the agent is to select actions that lead to a higher average reward per time step,
and this is why this formulation of the RL is called ‘average reward RL’ (Mahadevan, 1996;
Tsitsiklis & Roy, 1999; Daw & Tourtezky, 2000; Daw, 2002). This average reward, denoted by
R¯, can be defined as the total rewards obtained, divided by the total time spent for acquiring
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those rewards:
R¯ = r0+ r1+ r2+ . . .
d0+d1+d2+ . . .
(3.1)
If the environment is unchain1 (e.g., cyclic environment) then the average reward (R¯) will be
same for all the states. This condition holds for the cyclic environment that we discuss in this
chapter.
To choose an action amongst several alternatives, the agent assigns a subjective value to each
state–action pair. This subjective value is denoted by Q(s, a), and represents the value of taking
action a in state s (Watkins, 1989). These Q-values are learned such that an action with a
higher Q-value leads to more reward in a shorter time compared with an action with a lower
Q-value.
The first determinant of Q(s, a) is the immediate reward that the agent receives in s, which is
R(s). Besides the immediate reward the agent receives, the value of the next state the agent
enters is also important: actions through which the agent reaches a more valuable state are
more favorable. Thus, assuming that the agent reaches state s′ by taking action a, the value of
the next state, V (s′), is the second determinant of Q(s, a) and is assumed to be proportional to
the reward the agent gains in the future by taking its best action in the state s′. In general, for
any state s, V (s) is defined as follows:
V (s)=max
a
Q(s, a) (3.2)
The final determinant of Q(s, a) is the amount of time the agent spends in the state. If the agent
spends a long time in a state, then it will lose the opportunity of gaining future rewards. In
fact, losing D(s) time steps in state s is equal to losing D(s)R¯ that could potentially be accrued
in this time. Given these three determinants, the value of taking an action in a state can be
1Formally an environment is unchain if every state of the environment will be revisited eventually by probability
1, except for a finite (or empty) set of states which will never be visited after a certain point in time.
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computed as follows:
Q(s, a)=R(s)−D(s)R¯+E [V ′(s)] (3.3)
where the expectation in the last term is over s’:
Q(s, a)=R(s)−D(s)R¯+∑
s′
p(s′|s, a)V (s′) (3.4)
As the above equation implies, computing Q-values requires knowledge of the transition
probabilities, the reward functions and the state dwell times, which together constitute a
model of the environment. However, without a prior model of the environment, the agent can
estimate these quantities through its experience with the environment. For example, R(s) can
be estimated by averaging immediate reward received in state s. In the same manner, D(s)
can be computed as the average of waiting times in state s. An estimation of p(s′|s, a) can be
made by counting the number of times taking action a in state s leads to state s′. Given the
model of the environment, Q-values can be derived from equation 3.4 using dynamic pro-
gramming algorithms, such as value-iteration (Puterman, 1994; Mahadevan, 1996). Because
these methods of value computation rely on the model of the environment, they are called
model-based value computation methods. Using these state–action pairs, the agent can guide
its actions toward ones that lead to a higher average reward rate.
Returning to the overview of the decision-making process in RL, in (i) the agent identifies its
current state, s and then feeds state s into equation 3.4, allowing the value of different actions,
Q-values, to be computed. These Q-values guide the action-selection process, and the agent
takes the appropriate action (ii). By taking an action, the agent enters a new state, receives a
reward, and measures the time from entering the previous state, s, to entering the new state,
s′. Finally, using these quantities, the model of the environment is updated (iii).
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3.3 Action sequence formation
When an agent starts learning in a new environment all the decisions are based on model-
based action selection, i.e. after entering a new state, the agent computes Q-values using the
process introduced in the previous section and chooses one of the actions that tends to have
the higher Q-value. Under certain conditions, however, it may be more beneficial for the agent
to execute actions in a sequence without going through the action-selection process. First, we
discuss the process of sequence formation and, in the next section (section 3.4), how action
sequences interact with the model-based action selection.
We start by reviewing the environmental conditions in which action sequences form. Figure 3.2
shows three environments in which, by taking action A1 in state S, the agent enters state S′ or
S′′ with equal probability. In states S′ and S′′ two actions are available, A2 and A′2. Figure 3.2a
provides an example of the kind of environment in which an action sequence forms, i.e. in
states S′ and S′′, action A2 is the best action. An example of this environment is the situation
in which pressing a lever (action A1) leads to the illumination of, say, a light (state S′) or a tone
(state S′′) with equal probability, both of which signal that by entering the magazine (action
A2), the rat can gain a desirable outcome, and by not entering the magazine (action A′2) it
gains nothing. As a consequence, after taking action A1 in S the agent does not need to check
the upcoming state but can execute A2 irrespective of the next state, either S′ or S′′ (light or
tone). In this situation, actions A1 and A2 form an action sequence consisting of A1 and A2.
Hereafter in this chapter, we call these action sequences macro actions, and denote them, for
example, in this situation with {A1 A2}. Actions that are not macro, for example A1 or A2, are
called primitive actions.
Figure 3.2b shows a situation in which an action sequence does not form. In state S′, action
A2 is the best action, but in state S′′, action A′2 is the best. In the context of the previous
example, illumination of the light indicates that by entering the magazine, the animal will gain
a desirable outcome; but presentation of the tone indicates that entering the magazine is not
followed by a desirable outcome. Here, after taking A1 in S, the animal cannot select an action
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Figure 3.2 – (a) An example of an environment in which action sequences will form. Action
A1 leads to two different states with equal probability, in both of which action A2 is the best
action, and thus action sequence {A1 A2} forms. (b) An example of an environment in which
action sequences do not form. Action A1 leads to two different states with equal probability,
in one of which action A2 is the best action and, in another, action A′2 is the best action. As a
consequence, an action sequence {A1 A2} does not form. (c) An example of an environment in
which the process of sequence formation is non-trivial. Action A1 leads to two different states
with equal probability, in one of which action A2 is the best action, but in the other action A′2
is the best action (although A2 is a little bit worse than A′2).
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without knowing the upcoming state, and thus a macro action does not form.
Figure 3.2c shows a more challenging example. In state S′, A2 is the best action. In state S′′,
A2 is not the best action, but it is slightly worse than the best action, A′2 (e.g. three drops of a
liquid reward, vs. two drop of liquid reward). Does a sequence form in this case? To answer
this question, we need a cost-benefit analysis, i.e. what the agent gains by executing actions
A1 and A2 in sequence and what it loses. Assume it decides to always execute A2 after A1. If
the next state is S′, then it loses nothing, because action A2 is the best action in state S′. But,
if the next state is S′′, by taking A2 instead of the best action, A′2, the agent loses some of the
future rewards. The amount of these reward losses is equal to the difference between the value
of action A2, Q(S′′, A2), and the value of the best action, V (S′′), which will be Q(S′′, A2)−V (S′′),
that we denote by A(S′′, A2). A(S′′, A2) can be interpreted as the advantage of taking action A2
in state S′′ instead of the best action (Baird, 1993; Dayan & Balleine, 2002). In this example,
because the agent enters state S′′ after state S only half the time, the total cost of executing A1
and A2 in sequence will be 0.5A(S′′, A2).
Generalizing from the previous example, the cost of executing the macro action {aa′} in state
s is equal to:
C (s, a, a′)= E [Q(s′, a′)−V (s′)]= E [A(s′, a′)] (3.5)
where expectation over the next state, s′, given the previous action and the previous state, is:
C (s, a, a′)=∑
s′
P (s′|s, a)A(s′, a′) (3.6)
Using the above equation, the term C (s, a, a′) can be computed based on the model-based
approaches described. The agent computes Q(s′, a′) and V (s′) using equation 3.4, and then
C (s, a, a′) is calculated by equation 3.6. However, this means that at each decision point,
deciding whether to execute an action sequence, equation 3.6 should be evaluated for all
currently possible actions, and all possible subsequent actions. This will likely impose a heavy
processing load on the decision-making process, and could considerably increase the latency
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of action selection. It turns out, however, that C (s, a, a′) can be estimated efficiently using
samples of the temporal difference error signal (TD error signal).
Let’s assume that an agent is in state s′ and takes action a′ and reaches state s′′ and receives
reward r . Then the TD error signal experienced after taking action a′ in state s′ is defined as
follows:
δ= [r −dR¯+V (s′′)]−V (s′) (3.7)
Based on equation 3.4, the term [r−dR¯+V (s′′)] is a sample of Q(s′, a′). Thus, δwill be a sample
of A(s′, a′)2, and hence C (s, a, a′) can be estimated using samples of the TD error signal. By
taking action a in state s, and action a′ in state s′, C (s, a, a′) will be updated as follows:
C (s, a, a′)← (1−ηC )C (s, a, a′)+ηCαδ (3.8)
where ηC is the learning rate, and α is a factor, which equals 1 when the environment is
deterministic (see section 3.8 for more details). As mentioned above, extensive evidence from
animal and human studies suggests that the TD error signal is coded by the phasic activities of
mid-brain dopamine neurons (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2000). Thus, besides being more
efficient, utilizing the error signal for the purpose of sequence learning provides a neurally
plausible way for computing the cost of sequence-based action selection, C (s, a, a′).
Up to now, we have only considered one side of the trade-off, which is the cost of sequence-
based action selection. What are the benefits of sequence-based action selection? As discussed
in the previous section, expression of a sequence of actions is faster than selecting actions one
by one, based on the action evaluation process. This can be for several reasons; for example,
identification of the current state by processing environmental stimuli can be time consuming,
and the evaluation of actions using a model-based process is slower than having solely to
select the next action from the sequence. Besides being faster, executing actions without
2Note that we assumed that advantages (A) are calculated based on the value of the best action (V (s)), and not
based on the current policy.
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going through the decision-making process makes it possible to perform a simultaneous task
that requires decision-making resources. Here, we focus on the first advantage of sequence
learning.
Assume that selecting the next action of the current sequence is τ time steps faster than
selecting an action based on the action evaluation process. Saving τ time steps is equivalent to
gaining R¯τ more reward in the future (Niv, 2007). This provides the other side of the trade-off:
if the benefit of sequence-based action selection, R¯τ, exceeds its costs, −C (s, a, a′), then the
macro action {aa′} replaces action a in state s. Otherwise, if the macro action is already
formed, it decomposes to its constitutent actions, and action a replaces the macro action
{aa′}:
if −C (s, a, a′)< R¯τ then
replace action a with macro action {aa′} in state s
else
replace the macro action {aa′} with action a in state s
end if
After a macro action is added, it can be concatenated with other actions to form a longer
macro action. For example, macro action {aa′} can be concatenated with another action, say
a′′, and form the macro action {aa′a′′}. It is important to recognize that, during execution
of a macro action, primitive actions are not evaluated and thus the TD error signal is not
computed, which means the cost of the action sequence, C (s, a, a′), is not updated after it is
formed. This implies that a sequence should only form after the agent is certain about the
estimated costs and benefits of the sequence; otherwise, the agent could stick to a sub-optimal
sequence for a long period of time. This implies that action sequences should not form during
early stages of instrumental learning because a high degree of certainty requires sufficient
experience of the environment and hence more training time. In the current example, we did
not model the agent’s certainty about its estimations. Instead we assumed a large initial value
for the cost of sequence formation, and chose a slow learning rate for that cost ηC , something
that ensures sequences form only after the environment is well learned.
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Figure 3.3 – At state S, three actions are available: A1, A2, A3, where A1 and A2 are primitive
actions, and A3 is a macro action composed of primitive actions M1 . . . M4. If at state S, the
macro action is selected for execution, the action control transfers to the sequence-based
controller, and actions M1 . . . M4 become executed. After the termination of the macro action
control returns back to model-based decision-making at state S3.
3.4 A hierarchical model-based architecture
Assume that the agent is in state S in which several choices are available (Figure 3.3), two of
which are primitive actions (A1 and A2), and one of which is a macro action (A3). In state S
the agent uses model-based action evaluation, and selects one of the available actions for
execution, which can be either a primitive action or a macro action. After completion of a
primitive action the agent enters a new state in which it again uses a model-based evaluation
for selecting subsequent actions. However, if the selected action is the macro action, A3, its
execution is composed of taking a sequence of primitive actions (M1. . . M4). Nevertheless,
upon completion of the macro action, the agent identifies its new state (S3), and uses model-
based action evaluation again for selection of the next action.
The above scenario involves hierarchical model-based and sequence-based action control.
At the choice points, actions are selected based on the model-based evaluations. However,
during the execution of a sequence of actions, they are selected based on their sequential
order, without going through the evaluation process. As discussed in the previous section, this
sequence-based action selection can lead to higher average reward rates, in comparison to a
pure model-based decision-making system, which is the benefit of sequence-based action
selection. However, it can lead to a maladaptive behavior if the environment changes after
63
Chapter 3. Hierarchical decision-making: learning action sequences
action sequences have formed. For example, assume that after the macro action {aa′} has
formed, the environment changes so that the execution of action a′ after action a no longer
satisfies the cost–benefit analysis presented in the previous section - say the change causes the
value of the state to which action a′ leads to decrease significantly - as a consequence, taking
action a′ after action a will no longer be the best choice. If action control is sequence-based, it
is the previous action that determines the next action and not the consequences of the action.
Hence, the agent will continue to take action a′ even though it is not the most appropriate
action.
Ultimately, in this situation, we expect the macro action to decompose to its components so
that the agent can consider other alternative actions other than action a′. However, this does
not happen instantly after the environment has changed and, thus at least for a while, the
agent will continue behaving maladaptively. As mentioned in the previous section, after the
macro action has formed, its cost, C (s, a, a′), is not updated, because the system is working
on the open-loop mode and the TD error signal is not computed to update C (s, a, a′). As a
consequence, the cost side of the sequence formation trade-off is relatively insensitive to
environmental changes. The other side of the trade-off, R¯τ, however, is sensitive to environ-
mental changes: if the environment changes so that executing the macro action leads to a
decrease in the average reward the agent experiences, R¯, then this circumstance motivates
decomposition of the macro. In fact, this model predicts that, if the environmental changes
do not alter the average reward, then the agent will continue to take action a′ after a, even
if the change introduces better alternatives other than taking action a′. Nevertheless, if the
change causes a decrease in the average reward, then the macro action will decompose, and
the responses will adapt to the new situation. However, this cannot happen instantly after the
change because it takes several trials before the average reward adapts to the new condition.
The above feature of the model implies different sensitivity of sequence-based responses of the
model after an environmental change compared with the situation where responses are under
model-based control. As an example, in Figure 3.3 assume that the action A1 is the best action,
i.e. it has the highest Q-value among actions A1, A2 and A3, and so the agent takes action A1
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more frequently than the others. Now, assume that the environment changes, and the value of
the state that action A1 leads to (state S1) dramatically decreases. The next time that the agent
is making a decision in state S, it evaluates the consequences of action A1 using equation 3.4,
and finds out that A1 is no longer the best action, and adapts its behavior instantly to the new
conditions. Evidence for the effect of this type of environmental change on the behavior comes
from an experiment (Ostlund, Winterbauer, & Balleine, 2009) in which rats were trained on
two action sequences for two outcomes, i.e. R1→R2→O1 and R2→R1→O2. After this training,
either O1 or O2 was devalued, and performance of the two sequences (macro actions {R1R2}
and {R2R1}) were assessed in extinction. Results show that the performance of the sequence
that leads to the devalued outcome decreases, which implies that performance of a macro
action (e.g. {R1 R2}) is immediately sensitive to the value of the states to which it leads (O1).
Compare the above situation with one in which an environmental change causes a decrease
in the value of one of the states visited during a sequence, for example state S4. Here, a change
in the value of state S4 will not affect the value of action A3 (when evaluated at S). In fact,
one effect of chunking actions together and turning them into a single response unit is that
the representation of the action sequence is independent of its embedded individual actions
and their outcomes. Although this higher level representation of actions makes decision-
making easier and faster, it also renders the evaluation of action sequences insensitive both to
offline changes in individual action–outcome contingencies and to changes in the value of any
outcomes (states) delivered within the sequence boundaries (section 2.4.5). As such, although
the selection of an action other than A3 would be more optimal, A3 will be selected at state S.
After several trials, because taking action M2 does not lead to reward, the average reward that
the agent experiences decreases, and the sequence should then decompose into its elements.
At this point, the control of actions will return to the model-based system and choices adapt to
the new environmental conditions. In the next section we show that insensitivity to reinforcer
devaluation and contingency degradation is due to this type of environmental change.
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3.5 Simulations
Having described the model, we are now in a position to establish whether it can provide
an accurate account of: (i) sequence learning, such as that observed in SRTT; and (ii) instru-
mental conditioning, particularly the shift in sensitivity of instrumental actions to reinforcer
devaluation and contingency degradation during the course of overtraining (see section 3.8
for implementation details).
3.5.1 Sequential and random trials of sequence learning
As already noted, when a sequence of stimuli is predictable, such as in the sequential trials of
the SRTT, along with the progress of learning as a result of sequence-based action selection,
reaction times decline. In contrast, when the sequence of stimuli is random, as it is in the
random trials condition of SRTT, reaction times do not decrease substantially during the course
of learning. Here, we simulated the model described previously in a task similar to SRTT. After
each correct button press the model receives one unit of reward. In the sequential trials
condition, after each correct button press the next stimulus in a fixed sequence is presented,
otherwise the sequence restarts and the first stimulus is presented. Here, we assume that
the order of stimuli is S0 to S3, where the correct button press in S0 is B0, B1 in S1, etc. In the
random trials condition, the next stimulus is selected randomly. It is assumed that it takes 400
milliseconds (ms) to make a decision using the model-based method, and 100 ms to elicit a
response under sequence-based action control.
The temporal dynamics of sequence formation is depicted in Figure 3.4. After several learning
trials, the agent learns the model of the environment (the rewards in states, delays in states
and the consequences of each action) and, as a consequence, the probability of taking the
correct actions increases, which implies that the agent gains more rewards and, thus, the
average reward that the agent receives, R¯, increases. This increase in the average reward
implies that a significant number of the rewards that could have been gained in the future are
being lost due to time taken for model-based action selection, and this favors the transition of
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action control to the sequence-based method, which is faster. At the same time, the cost of
sequence-based action selection, C (S0,B0,B1) decreases (Figure 3.4a), which means that the
agent has learned B1 is always the action that should be taken after B0. Eventually, the benefit
of sequence-based action selection becomes larger than its cost and, at that stage, the macro
action {B0B1} replaces the B0 action (Figure 3.4b). Later, actions B2 and B3 form the macro
action {B2B3} and, finally, the two previously formed macro actions concatenate, and the
macro action {B0B1B2B3} is formed. In addition, as shown in Figure 3.4a, after a macro action
is formed the average reward that the agent gains increases due to faster decision-making.
Figure 3.4c shows the reaction times. As the figure shows, by forming new action sequences,
reaction times decrease up to the point that only selection of the action sequence is based
on model-based action control, and all subsequent button presses during the sequence are
based on sequence-based action control. Figure 3.4c also shows the reaction times in the
case of random trials, which remain constant largely because the sequence of stimuli is not
predictable and the cost of sequence-based action selection remains high so that no action
sequence forms (Figure 3.4d).
3.5.2 Instrumental conditioning
In this section, we aimed to validate the model in instrumental conditioning paradigms.
Figure 3.5a depicts a formal representation of a simple instrumental conditioning task. The
task starts in state S0 and the agent has two options: the press lever (PL) action; and enter
magazine (E M) action. By taking action PL, and then action E M , the agent enters state S0
in which it receives one unit of reward (r = 1). All other actions, for example taking action
E M before action PL, leads to no reward. Entering state S1 is cued for example by a ‘click’
produced by the pellet dispenser, or ‘buzz’ of the pump if sucrose solution is the reward. After
several learning trials, the agent learns the model of the environment; the value of the PL
action exceeds the value of action E M , and the probability of taking action PL increases. As
the probability of taking action PL increases, the agent gains more rewards and, hence, the
average reward R¯ increases. Simultaneously, the cost of sequence-based action selection
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Figure 3.4 – The dynamics of sequence learning in sequential and random trials of SRTT. (a, b)
As the learning progresses, the average reward that the agent gains increases, indicative of a
high cost of waiting for model-based action selection. At the same time, the cost of sequence-
based action selection decreases (top panel), which means that the agent has discovered the
correct action sequences. Whenever the cost becomes less than the benefit, a new action
sequence forms (bottom panel). The abscissa axis shows the number of action selections. (c)
Reaction times decrease in sequential trials as a result of sequence formation but they remain
constant in the random trials of SRTT because, (d) no action sequence forms. Data reported
are means over 10 runs.
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decreases, which means the agent has learned that action PL is always the action that should
be taken after the E M action and, as a consequence, the macro action {E M ,PL} replaces
the E M action (Figure 3.6a). From that point, the action PL is always taken after E M . In
addition to the {E M ,PL} action sequence, the other action sequence, i.e., {PL,E M } is also
presumably being formed by over-training, which together with {E M ,PL} will eventually form
a cyclic pattern of E M actions followed by PL actions. In the following section we will show
that the {E M ,PL} part of the cycle plays an important role in behavioral data observed after
over-training, and therefore we will focus on this component in the future sections.
The schematic representation in Figure 3.5a corresponds to a continuous reinforcement
schedule, in which each lever press is followed by a reinforcer delivery (e.g. (C. D. Adams,
1982)). However, in most experimental settings, animals are required to execute a number
of lever presses (in the case of ratio schedules), or press the lever after an amount of time
has passed since the previous reward delivery (in the case of interval schedules) in order to
obtain reward. One approach to analysing these kinds of experiments using the paradigm
illustrated in Figure 3.5a is through application of the ‘response unit hypothesis’ (Skinner,
1938; Mowrer & Jones, 1945), according to which the total set of lever presses required for
reward delivery is considered as a single unit of response. For example, in the case of fixed
ratio schedules, if 10 lever presses are required to produce reinforcement, the whole 10 lever
presses are considered as a single unit, corresponding to the action PL in Figure 3.5a. In ratio
schedules this hypothesis is supported by the observation that, early in learning, the animal
frequently takes the E M action, which, with the progress of learning, tends to occur only after
the last lever press (Denny, Wells, & Maatsch, 1957; Overmann & Denny, 1974; Platt & Day,
1979).
Following this training, animals are given an extinction test, in which rewards are not delivered.
During the course of extinction, the response unit mainly preserves its form and only the last
response is likely to be followed by the E M action (Denny et al., 1957). Further, the average
number of executed response units in extinction is independent of the number of lever presses
required for reinforcer delivery, indicating that the whole response unit is being extinguished,
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Figure 3.5 – Formal representation of instrumental conditioning tasks. (a) Instrumental
learning: by taking the press lever (PL) action, and then enter magazine (E M) action, the
agent earns a reward of magnitude one. By taking E M action in state S2 and PL action in state
S1, the agent remains in the same state (not shown in the figure). (b, c) Reinforcer devaluation:
the agent learns that the reward at state S0 is devalued, and then is tested in extinction in
which no reward is delivered. (d) Non-contingent training: unlike as in (a), reward is not
contingent on the PL action, and the agent can gain the reward only by entering the magazine.
(e) Omission training: taking the PL action causes a delay in the reward delivery, and the agent
should wait 6 seconds before it can gain the reward by entering the magazine.
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and not individual lever presses (Denny et al., 1957; Overmann & Denny, 1974; Platt & Day,
1979). In the case of interval schedules, because reinforcement of a lever press depends on the
time that has passed since the previous reward delivery, the ‘response unit hypothesis’ has to
be generalized to temporal response unit structures in which the animal continues to lever
press for a certain amount of time (instead of for a certain number of times), in the form of
‘bouts’ of lever pressing (Shull & Grimes, 2003), or nose poking (Shull, Gaynor, & Grimes, 2002).
In fact, in the previous section, in the course of analysing SRTT, we applied the ‘response unit
hypothesis’ by treating the action of pressing the button as a single response unit, which of
course can be broken into smaller units. Similarly, in the case of maze learning, the action of
reaching the choice point from starting point can be thought as a sequence of steps. Is the
formation of such response units (e.g. PL action composed of homogenous set of responses)
through the action sequence formation method proposed in the previous section, or do they
form in a level different from that in which macro action {E M ,PL} forms? We leave the answer
to this question for future works.
In the next two sections, we investigated the behavior of the model, based on Figure 3.5a,
when an environmental change occurs both before and after sequence formation.
3.5.2.1 Reinforcer devaluation before vs. after action sequence formation
As described above, in reinforcer devaluation studies, the value of the outcome of an action is
reduced offline through some treatment (such as specific satiety or taste aversion learning)
and the performance of the action subsequently assessed in extinction. There is a considerable
literature demonstrating that, with moderate training, instrumental performance is sensitive
to this change on value, whereas after more extended training it is not (cf. Figure 2.4).
To assess the accuracy of the model it was simulated using the procedure depicted in Figure 3.5.
The procedure has three steps. The first step (Figure 3.5a) is the instrumental learning phase,
described in the previous section. The next step (Figure 3.5b) models the devaluation phase in
which the model learns that the reward obtained in state S0 is devalued (r =−1). The third
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phase is the test conducted under extinction conditions, i.e. reward is not delivered in state
S0 (r = 0). The critical question here is whether the model chooses action PL in state S0. As
noted previously, experimental evidence shows that after moderate training, the agent chooses
action PL, whereas after extended training it does not. Figure 3.6b shows the probability of
taking action PL after moderate training (in this case after 3000 action selections). As the
figure shows, because action selection is under model-based control, when the reward in state
S0 is devalued, the value of taking PL action in state S0 is immediately affected and, as such,
the probability of taking action PL decreases.
The same is not true of overtrained actions. Figure 3.6c shows the sensitivity of responses to
devaluation after extended training (9000 action selections). At this point the action sequence
{E M ,PL} has been formed (Figure 3.6a) and, as the figure shows, unlike moderate training
the agent continues taking action PL after reinforcer devaluation. This is because action
selection is under sequence-based action control, and the outcome is delivered in the middle
of action sequence {E M ,PL}, which implies that the value of the action sequence will remain
unchanged after the offline devaluation of the value of the outcome, and therefore, the agent
will continue selecting action sequence {E M ,PL}. After several learning trials, because the
experiment is conducted in extinction and no reward is received, the average reward decreases,
which means deciding faster is not beneficial, and causes the macro action {E M ,PL} to
decompose to action E M and action PL. At this point, behavioral control should return to
the model-based system, and the probability of taking action PL should adjust to the new
conditions induced by devaluation.
3.5.2.2 Contingency degradation before vs. after action sequence formation
In section 2.4.1 we pointed out that habits are not just insensitive to reinforcer devaluation
but also to the effects of degrading the instrumental contingency. A good example of this
is the failure of habits to adjust to the imposition of an omission schedule, as shown in
figure 2.4B. Having learned that lever pressing delivers food, the omission schedule reverses
that relationship such that food becomes freely available without needing to lever press
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Figure 3.6 – Sensitivity of the model to reinforcer devaluation and contingency manipula-
tions before and after sequence formation. (a) In the moderate training condition, actions
are selected based on the model-based evaluation (left panel) but, after extended training,
the selection of the press lever (PL) action is potentiated by its previous action [here enter
magazine (E M); right panel]. (b) After the devaluation phase (shown by the solid-line), the
probability of pressing the lever decreases instantly if the model is moderately trained. The
abscissa axis shows the number of action selections. (c) After the devaluation phase behavior
does not adapt until the action sequence decomposes and control returns to the model-based
method. (d) In a moderately trained model the probability of selecting action PL starts to
decrease in the contingency degradation condition, although the rate of decrease is greater
in the case of omission training. (e) When training is extensive, behavior does not adjust
and the non-contingent and omission groups perform at the same rate until the sequence
decomposes. Data reported are means over 3000 runs.
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to receive it. However, in the experimental group, lever pressing delays free food delivery;
hence, the rats now have to learn to stop lever pressing to get the reward. The ability to stop
responding in the omission group is compared with rats given exposure to a zero contingency
between lever pressing and reward delivery (the non-contingent control). As shown previously
(e.g. (Dickinson et al., 1998); Figure 2.4B) in this situation, rats who are given moderate
instrumental training are able to withhold their lever press action to get food; the omission
group responds less than the control group when the omission schedule is introduced. When
lever pressing has been overtrained, however, the rats are insensitive to omission and cannot
withhold their lever press responses compared with the control group.
For the simulation of non-contingent reward delivery in the control condition, the model
underwent the instrumental conditioning procedure described in the previous section (Fig-
ure 3.5a), and then the model was simulated in the task depicted in Figure 3.5d. The agent
can obtain reward by taking action E M without performing action PL, and hence reward
delivery is no longer contingent upon action PL. For the simulation of the omission schedule,
after instrumental training (Figure 3.5a), the agent was exposed to the schedule depicted in
Figure 3.5e. The difference between this schedule and the non-contingent schedule is that,
after pressing the lever, the model must wait 6 seconds before obtaining the reward by taking
action E M , which models the fact that rewards are delayed if the animal chooses action PL
under the omission schedule. The behavior of the model after moderate training is depicted
in Figure 3.6d. As the figure shows, after the introduction of the degradation procedure, the
probability of taking action PL starts to decrease. The rate of decrease is faster in the case
of the omission schedule, in comparison to the non-contingent schedule. This is because
the final value of action PL in the omission condition is lower than the final value of the
non-contingent condition and, therefore, the values adjust faster in the omission case.
Figure 3.6e shows the effect of omission and degradation after more extended training when
action selection is under sequence-based control. As the figure shows, in both the control and
omission conditions, the probability of selecting the action fails to adjust to the new conditions
and the agent continues selecting action PL. However, in the omission condition, because
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rewards are delayed as a result of pressing the lever, the average reward starts to decrease
and, after sufficient omission training, the action sequence decomposes, and behavior starts
to adapt to the new conditions. In the case of non-contingent reward delivery, because the
average reward remains constant, the model predicts that the agent will continue pressing
the lever, even after extended exposure to the non-contingent schedule. This prediction has
not been assessed in the literature largely because exposure to non-contingent reward tends
to have a generally suppressive effect on performance, as competition from E M responding
increases and action PL begins to extinguish.
Although somewhat idealized relative to the effects observed in real animals, it should be clear
that, in contrast to simple RL, sequence learning and habitual actions are both accurately
modeled by this mixed model-based and sequence-based architecture. The implications of
this model for the behavior of real animals and for theories of goal-directed and habitual
action control are described below.
3.6 Discussion
A number of investigators have noted the apparently competitive nature of these forms of
action control, and some have suggested that these processes may compete for access to the
motor system. Using this general approach, previous computational accounts have success-
fully explained the effect of reinforcer devaluation on instrumental responses in different
stages of learning (Daw et al., 2005; Keramati et al., 2011), the effect of habit formation on
reaction times (Keramati et al., 2011), and the effect of the complexity of state identification
on the behavioral control (Shah & Barto, 2009). All these approaches shares a common flat
architecture in which the goal-directed and the habitual systems work in parallel at the same
level, and utilize a third mechanism, called an arbitration mechanism (section 2.4.3), to decide
whether the next action will be controlled by the goal-directed or the habit process. They differ
from the hierarchical architecture used here in which the goal-directed system stands at a
higher level, with the role of the habit process limited to efficiently implementing decisions
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made by the goal-directed system in the form of macro actions. This structural difference itself
raises some important behavioral predictions. For example, in the hierarchical structure, the
goal-directed system treats macro actions as integrated units, and thus the action evaluation
process is blind to the change in the value of states visited during execution of the macro
action. Thus, in Figure 3.3, goal-directed action evaluation in state S depends only on the
value of states S1, S2, S3 and the total reward obtained through executing the macro action.
As a consequence, changing the value of state S4 has no immediate impact on the decisions
made at state S. In contrast, in a flat architecture, goal-directed action selection is conducted
by searching all the consequences of possible actions and, thus, a change in the value of state
S4 should immediately affect action selection in state S.
Another prediction of a sequence-based conception of habits is that, if an agent starts decision-
making in a state in which an action sequence has been learned (state S), it will immediately
show habit-like behavior, such as insensitivity to outcome devaluation. In contrast, if it starts
decision-making somewhere in the middle of a sequence (e.g. in the test phase the task starts
in an intermediary state such as S4), it will not show habit-like behavior. This is because in
the current conception of the model, an action sequence can be launched only in the state in
which is has been learned.
The problem of mixed closed-loop and open-loop decision-making has been previously
addressed and discussed in the literature, but the solutions proposed differ from that suggested
here. In the model proposed here, the inputs for the mixed architecture come from fast
action control in the open-loop mode, whereas in previous work they have come from a
cost associated with sensing the environment (Hansen, Barto, & Zilberstein, 1996), or the
complexity of modeling the environment (Kolter, Plagemann, Jackson, Ng, & Thrun, 2010).
From a control point of view, in most situations (especially stochastic environments), open-
loop action control is considered to be inappropriate. As such, in hierarchical approaches
to RL, the idea of macro actions is usually generalized to closed-loop action control (Barto &
Mahadevan, 2003).
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Behavioral and neural signatures of this generalized notion have been found in previous
studies (Haruno & Kawato, 2006; Botvinick, 2008; Botvinick et al., 2009; Badre & Frank, 2012;
Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011). Here, instead of using this generalized hierarchical RL, we
utilized a hierarchical approach with a mixed open-loop and closed-loop architecture that
allows us to incorporate the role of action sequences in habit-learning. Further, to examine
the potential neural substrates of this architecture, we developed a method based on the TD
error for learning macro actions, though various alternative methods have also been proposed
for this purpose (Korf, 1985; Iba, 1989; Randlø v, 1998; Mcgovern, 2002).
With regard specifically to sequences, the effect of overtraining on reaction times has been
addressed in instrumental conditioning models (Keramati et al., 2011), which often interprets
them as the result of transition to habitual control, which, because it is fast, results in a
reduction in reaction times. However, that model predicts a decrease in reaction times in
both random and sequential trials of SRTT. This is because, on that approach, a habit forms
whenever the values of the available choices are significantly different, irrespective of whether
the sequence of states is predictable. As such, because in both sequential and random trials
of SRTT the values of correct and incorrect responses are different, the model predicts that
habits will form and reaction times decrease in both cases, which is not consistent with the
evidence. In the sequence-learning literature, the issue of learning sequences of responses
and stimuli using TD error has been addressed (Berns & Sejnowski, 1998; Bapi & Doya, 2001;
Nakahara et al., 2001; Bissmarck, Nakahara, Doya, & Hikosaka, 2008). However, because these
models are generally developed for the purpose of visuo-motor sequence learning, it is not
straightforward to apply them to instrumental conditioning tasks. Likewise, the effect of the
predictability of stimuli (i.e. random vs. sequential trials in the SRTT) on reaction times is not
directly addressed in these models, which makes it hard to compare them in SRTT.
Based on a number of studies, it appears that the acquisition of goal-directed actions is
controlled by a circuit involving the medial prefrontal cortex and dorsomedial striatum (DMS).
For example in one study animals were trained to take two different actions (two different
levers) to earn two different outcomes. A test conducted after the devaluation of one of the
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outcomes, revealed that the control animals (with intact DMS) showed a preference for the
action which its outcome was not devalued, but the animals in which DMS was inactivated
selected both levers equally. Here an important question is how to interpret the lack of
insensitivity to outcome devaluation in animals with an inactivated DMS. One interpretation
can be that the inactivation of DMS resulted in the emergence of habits and such responses
are the result of the automatic action selection. However, this interpretation is not entirely
consistent with the framework proposed in this chapter, because in such experiments animals
are generally moderately trained, and therefore, the action sequences still won’t have had
a chance to develop. Another interpretation of such results is that the equal preference
for both actions observed during the test is actually the result of the random responses
generated by the disrupted goal-directed process (as a result of inactivating DMS), which
cannot evaluate and select actions appropriately. This latter interpretation is more consistent
with the framework suggested in this chapter, in which all the actions are dependent on the
goal-directed processes.
There is some evidence from previous studies indicating that although over-training makes
lever presses insensitive to changes in the outcome values, magazine entries remain sensitive
to the changes of the value of outcomes (Killcross & Coutureau, 2003) (although this effect is
not always observed). That is, animals for which the outcome has been devalued press the
lever at the same rate as the animals for which the outcome is has not been devalued, but
they enter the magazine less than the other group. This observation seems inconsistent with
the framework proposed here, since here it is suggested that animals perform a sequence
of magazine entries followed by lever presses. It is important to recognize that each initial
magazine entry is usually followed by further several magazine checks, i.e., animals check the
magazine multiple times before taking the next press. Such extra magazine entries can be
guided by Pavlovian processes, which are presumably sensitive to the changes in the value of
outcomes. As such, the observed decrement in magazine entries after outcome devaluation
can be because of the elimination of the extra magazine entries that animals make after the
first magazine entry. That is, the proposed action sequence is in place and animals take an
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E M action after each LP action, however, the E M action in non-devalued animals consists
of several magazine entries, while in the devalued animals it consists of a lower number of
magazine entries, which is consistent with the proposed framework and the above observation.
A recent study has investigated the role of dorsolateral striatum (DLS) and infralimbic cortex in
automatic actions measured by both the development of action sequences and the insensitivity
of actions to changes in outcome values (Smith & Graybiel, 2013, 2014). Animals were trained
in a T-maze, in which at the end of each arm a separate outcome (O1 and O2; chocolate milk
and sucrose solution in this experiment) was delivered to the them. At the start of each trial
there was a cue which told animals which arm they needed to enter in order to earn a reward
(the outcome specific to that arm). The study included two groups of animals: one group of
animals (CT) were trained moderately and only until they reached the criterion of statistically
significant performance, and the other group (OT) were trained for at least ten additional
sessions. Animals were then given a post-devaluation test, in which one of the outcomes was
devalued. Results showed that animals in the OT group kept running to the arm that would
have delivered the devalued outcome, while animals in the CT group significantly reduced
their runnings to the arm which would have delivered the devalued outcome. Neuronal
recording showed that task-bracketing activity in DLS, that marked the beginning and end of
each trial, was emerged in the OT group, and also interestingly in the CT group that according
to the behavioral results showed sensitivity to outcome devaluation. Such task-bracketing
activity, therefore, was unrelated to the sensitivity to outcome devaluation, however it was
negatively correlated with deliberative head movements at the choice point of the maze (at
the junction in which the animals needed to select an arm to run to). That is, higher DLS
activity at the beginning of each trial marked less amounts of deliberative head movements.
Such deliberative head movements, however, were not related to the sensitivity or insensitivity
to outcome values. Finally, The task-bracketing DLS activity once established, persisted
even after delivering the devalued outcome, which was accompanied by marked behavioral
changes.
In the above study the disassociation between deliberative head movements and sensitivity
79
Chapter 3. Hierarchical decision-making: learning action sequences
to outcome values can be understood within the hierarchical model-based RL framework
proposed here: the goal-directed process evaluates both O1 and O2 and chooses to run the
action sequence that leads to the non-devalued outcome, which implies sensitivity to outcome
values but lack of deliberative head movements (since actions will be selected according to
the sequence). As such one would expect to see the bracketing activity in DLS and at the same
time sensitivity to outcome values, as observed in the CT group. As a result of over-training,
according to the theory, insensitivity to outcome values developed in the OT group because
the boundaries of action sequences had expanded to include the outcome of each action
sequence, which made the evaluation of action sequences insensitive to changes in outcome
values.
One important restriction of the proposed model relates to the fact that it may seem implausi-
ble to assume that, after an action sequence has been formed, the individual actions are always
executed together. To address this issue it can, for example, be assumed that, occasionally,
the model-based controller interrupts the execution of actions during the performance of an
action sequence in order to facilitate learning new action sequences. Along the same lines,
it can be assumed that action sequences do not replace primitive actions (as proposed in
this paper), but are added as new actions to the list of available actions (see section 2.4.5
for a discussion). Finally, investigating why some kinds of reinforcement schedules lead to
habits (action sequences) whilst others do not, is an interesting issue and each of these will be
addressed in future work.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a new computational model for hierarchical goal-directed
decision-making, and developed a potential role for dopamine in learning action sequences.
Furthermore, we showed that this model can explain behavioral properties that have been
previously attributed to model-free RL. In the next chapter, we focus on the exclusive properties
of the proposed hierarchical account that model-free RL is unable to explain, and compare
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these two alternative account of automatic actions more directly.
3.8 Appendix
We aim to estimate C (s, a, a′) by the samples of the error signal experienced by taking action
a′, after action a in state s. C (s, a, a′) is defined as:
C (s, a, a′)= E [δ(s′, a′)|s, a] (3.9)
we maintain that:
C (s, a, a′)= E
[
P (a′|s, a)
P (a′|s′) δ(s
′, a′)|s, a, a′
]
(3.10)
this follows from:
C (s, a, a′)=E
[
P (a′|s, a)
P (a′|s′) δ(s
′, a′)|s, a, a′
]
=∑
s′
P (a′|s, a)P (s′|s, a, a′)
P (a′|s′) δ(s
′, a′)
=∑
s′
P (s′|s, a)δ(s′, a′)
= E [δ(s′, a′)|s, a]
(3.11)
P (a′|s, a) and P (a′|s′) can be estimated directly by counting number of times action a′ has
been taken after s, a and after s′, respectively. Given these, C (s, a, a′) can be estimated by
averaging over the samples of the error signal multiplied by the factor α:
α= P (a
′|s, a)
P (a′|s′) (3.12)
α is in fact the percentage of taking action a′ after s and a is due to being in state s′. If action
a′ is not available in state s′, we assume this factor is infinity. Given α, the cost function is
estimated using equation 3.8.
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The implementation of the mixed architecture is similar to model-based hierarchical rein-
forcement learning (RL). After execution of a macro action finished, the characteristics of
the underlying semi-Markov Decision Process (SMDP) are updated. That is, the total reward
obtained through executing the macro action, and the total time spent for executing the macro
action, are used for updating the reward and transition delay functions. Here, because we
assumed that reward function depends on the states, and not state–action pairs, the total
reward obtained through the macro action cannot be assigned to the state in which the macro
action was launched. This is because the total reward obtained through the macro action
can be different from the reward of the state. For addressing this problem, when an action
sequence was formed, a temporary extended auxiliary state is added to the SMDP, to which
the agent enters when the macro action starts, and exits when the macro action finished.
The transition delay and reward function of this auxiliary state is updated using the rewards
obtained through executing the macro action, and the time spent to take the macro action.
Because according to the Bellman equation for average reward semi-Markov RL, the Q-values
satisfy equation 3.4 (Puterman, 1994), when a non-exploratory action is taken (the action with
highest value is taken), we update the average reward as follows:
R¯ ← (1−σ)R¯+σ
[
r +V (s′)−V (s)
d
]
(3.13)
whereσ is the learning rate of the average reward. For the action selection (in the model-based
system), soft-max rule is used:
P (s|a)= e
βQ(s,a)∑
a′ eβQ(s,a
′) (3.14)
where parameter β determines the rate of exploration. For computing model-based values,
a tree-search algorithm was applied with the depth of search of three levels. After this level,
goal-directed estimations are replaced by model-free estimations.
Due to the fluctuations of C (s, a, a′) and R¯τ at the point they meet, a series of sequence forma-
tion/decomposition may happen before the two curves become separated. To address this
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Table 3.1 – Free parameters of the model, and their assigned values
Parameter Value
Update rate of the reward function 0.05
Update rate of the average reward (σ) 0.002
Update rate of the cost of sequence-based control (ηC ) 0.001
Initial value of the cost of sequence-based control -2
Rate of exploration (β) 4
issue, an asymmetric rule for sequence decomposition is used, and a sequence decomposes
only if −C (s, a, a′)> 1.6R¯τ. Also, for simplicity, we assumed that macro actions could not be
cyclic.
Internal parameters of the model are shown in Table 3.1.
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4 Hierarchical decision-making
in humans
In the previous chapter we showed that the outcome devaluation and contingency degradation
experiments can be explained using the proposed model-based hierarchical RL. In this chapter,
we develop a two-stage decision-making task in humans (based on the task developed by (Daw
et al., 2011)), and then we make a direct comparison between model-free and hierarchical
accounts of automatic actions.
4.1 Introduction
There is now considerable evidence from studies of instrumental conditioning in rats and
humans that the performance of reward-related actions reflects the involvement of two learn-
ing processes, one controlling the acquisition of goal-directed actions and the other of habits
(C. D. Adams, 1982; Dickinson et al., 1998; Dickinson, 1994; Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010).
This evidence suggests that goal-directed decision-making involves deliberating over the
consequences of alternative actions in order to predict their outcomes after which action
selection is guided by the value of the predicted outcome of each action. In this respect, action
evaluation relies on the representation of contingencies between actions and outcomes as
well as the value of the outcomes, which in sum constitute a model of the environment. In
contrast, habitual actions reflect the tendency of individuals to repeat behaviors that have
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led to desirable outcomes in the past and respect neither their causal relationship to, nor the
value of their consequences. As such, they are not guided by a model of the environment, and
are relatively inflexible in the face of environmental changes (Daw et al., 2005; Keramati et al.,
2011; Doya, 1999).
Although these features of goal-directed and habitual action are reasonably well accepted, the
structure of habitual control, and the way in which it interacts with the goal-directed process
in exerting that control, is not well understood. Two types of architecture have been proposed:
a hierarchical architecture and a flat architecture. In chapter 3, we described a version of the
hierarchical structure in the context of advancing a new theory of habits. Although habits are
usually described as single step actions, their tendency to combine or chunk with other actions
(Graybiel, 2008; Book, 1908; Lashley, 1951; Pew, 1966) and their insensitivity to changes in
the value of, and the causal relationship to, their consequences (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010;
Dickinson & Balleine, 2002), suggests that they may best be viewed as action sequences.
On this view habit sequences are represented independently of the individual actions and
outcomes embedded in them such that the decision-maker treats the whole sequence of
actions as a single response unit. As a consequence, the evaluation of action sequences is
divorced from offline environmental changes in individual action-outcome contingencies or
the value of outcomes inside the sequence boundaries and, as they are no longer guided by
the model of the environment (chapter 3), are executed irrespective of the outcome of each
individual action (Pew, 1966; Keele, 1968); i.e., the actions run off in an order predetermined
by the sequence, without requiring immediate feedback.
On this hierarchical view, such action sequences are utilized by a global goal-directed system
in order to efficiently reach its goals. This is achieved by learning the contingencies between
action sequences and goals and assessing at each decision point whether there is a habit
that can achieve that goal. If there is, it executes that habit after which control returns to the
goal-directed system. In essence, the goal-directed system functions at a higher level and
selects which habit should be executed whereas the role of habits is limited to the efficient
implementation of the decisions made by the goal-directed process (Ostlund et al., 2009)
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a) Hierarchical 
b) Flat 
GD H Ar 
Restaurant on this side of the road 
or head to crossing point? 
GD H Ar 
Look le  or right? 
GD H Ar 
Cross the road or …? 
Restaurant1
Figure 4.1 – An example illustrating the difference between the hierarchical and flat organiza-
tions. (a) Hierarchical interaction. The goal- directed system (GD) selects goals and decides
whether to go to a restaurant on this side of the road (Rr1) or on the other side of the road
(Rr2). If it chooses to go to the restaurant on the other side of the road, then it triggers the
habit of crossing the road and control transfers to the habitual process. After execution of
the habit finishes, control returns to the goal-directed system. (b) Flat interaction. At each
decision point, the arbitration mechanism (Ar) decides whether the next action should be
controlled by the goal-directed system or the habitual system (H).
(chapter 3) (see (Botvinick et al., 2009) for a review of other schemas).
Assume, for example, you are deciding whether to go to a restaurant on this side of the road or
on the other side of the road (Figure 4.1a). The goal-directed system evaluates both options,
and decides to go to the restaurant across the road. It thus triggers a ‘crossing the road’ habit,
and transfers the control to the habitual system. The habit is an action sequence composed of
several individual actions: (1) head to the crossing point, (2) look left, and (3) cross the road.
Individual actions are executed one after another, and after they finish, the control transfers
back to the goal-directed system to make the next decision such as, for example, choosing
from the menu in the restaurant.
In contrast to the hierarchical architecture, the flat architecture treats habits as single step
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actions rather than action sequences (e.g. (Daw et al., 2005)). At each step, an arbitration
mechanism decides whether the next action should be controlled by the goal-directed system
or the habitual system. In the context of the above example, at the beginning the arbitration
mechanism selects one of the systems to decide whether to go to the restaurant on this side
of the road or to the crossing point. Again, at the crossing point, the arbitration mechanism
selects one of the systems to decide whether to look left, or right, and similarly at each future
step the arbitration mechanism selects one of the systems to control behavior (Figure 4.1b). It
should be clear, therefore, that, in the flat approach, both systems are at the same level and
action evaluation happens in both processes; both systems evaluate available alternatives,
and the arbitration mechanism determines how these two evaluations combine to make the
final decision.
From the flat perspective, another difference between goal-directed and habitual processes lies
in how they evaluate actions. The goal-directed process obeys the same principles sketched
earlier: learning the model of the environment, and making predictions based on that model
(model-based evaluation). In contrast, the habitual system is model-free and evaluates ac-
tions based on their ‘cached’ reward history without searching through the action-outcome
contingencies (Daw et al., 2005; Doya, 1999).
More recently, Daw et al (Daw et al., 2011) have exploited the difference between model-free
and model-based evaluation to investigate the interaction of goal-directed and habit processes
in a flat structure reasoning that, because model-free evaluation is retrospective, chaining pre-
dictions backward across previous trials, and model-based evaluation is prospective, directly
assessing available future possibilities, it is possible to distinguish the two using a sequential,
multistage choice task. In this task subjects first make a binary choice (stage 1) then transition
to stage 2 in which they make a second choice to earn a reward. The best choice at stage 2
varies depending on the first choice and, to maintain a constant trade-off between habitual
and goal-directed systems, the reward probabilities in stage 2 are continually varied. By exam-
ining stage 1 choices, Daw et al were able to find evidence of mixed goal-directed and habitual
predictions.
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Here we show that stage 1 habitual actions, explained by the model-free evaluation in previous
work, can also be explained by assuming that stage 1 actions chunk with stage 2 actions,
reducing the source of habitual actions to the formation of action sequences. Based on this
finding we next examined specific predictions of each account. With regard to the two-stage
task, the flat account predicts that feedback received after the execution of an action will
affect subsequent decisions and, therefore, that arbitration between goal-directed and habit
controllers will recur anew at each stage. As a consequence, action-control at each stage of the
task should be independently established; in particular it should be noted that action control
in stage 2 should not depend on stage 1. In contrast, because our hierarchical account treats
habits as action sequences, and because the execution of habits is open-loop (section 3.1),
it predicts that, during the execution of a habit, actions will be executed one after another
without considering feedback from the environment during the sequence and, therefore,
that, when habitual, the action taken at stage 2 is already determined when starting the habit
sequence at stage 1. We made two further predictions from the hierarchical account: first,
because of their relative freedom from feedback, action sequences should be elicited more
quickly than single actions predicting that, when habitual, reaction times between stage
1 and stage 2 actions will be faster than when non-habitual. Second, and based on these
predictions, we anticipated that the hierarchical model would better fit the performance of
subjects working on this two-stage task than the flat model.
4.2 Material and Methods
4.2.1 Participants and behavioral task
Fifteen English speaking subjects (seven females; eight males; mean age 23.8 years [SD 4.3])
completed a two-stage decision-making task. After a description of the study, written consent
was obtained. This study was approved by the Sydney University Ethics Committee.
Each subject completed 270 trials, with a break after the first 120 trials (Figure 4.2). Each trial
started with the presentation of a black square and subjects could choose between pressing
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either ‘Z’ (using left hand) or ‘/’ (using right hand). After pressing the key, a slot machine
appeared on the screen, and the subject could make the next response, which would result in
either a monetary reward or no reward. The outcome was shown for two seconds and after
that an inter trial interval started and lasted for one second, after which the next trial began.
The probability of earning money at each choice was randomly set to either 0.2 or 0.7 at the
beginning of the session, and in each trial, with the chance of 1/7, they were again randomly
set to 0.2 or 0.7. This later step was to encourage searching for the best keys throughout the
session.
Subjects were instructed that the chance of reaching each slot machine by pressing each
key will not change throughout the task, but the goodness of the keys in terms of leading to
rewards will change over time.
If a stage 1 action is the best action (the maximum probability of receiving reward on the
keys of the slot machine that it commonly leads to is greater than the other action), and slot
machines reset in the next trial, the probability that the action remains the best action is 3/16.
Based on this, and given that probability of resetting is 1/7, the average number of trials for
which a stage 1 action remains the best action is as follows:
∑
i=1...∞
i (6/7+1/7×3/16)(i−1) (13/16×1/7)≈ 8.6 (4.1)
The fact that a stage 1 action remains the best for a few numbers of trials ensures that reward-
transition interaction does not emerge as the result of developing bias toward the best action.
4.2.2 Behavioral analysis
For all the analyses, we used R (R Core Team, 2012), and the R package lme4 (Bates & Maechler,
2009).
In the analysis presented in the section 4.3.1, we used mixed-effects logistic regression in
which whether the previous first stage action is repeated was a dependent variable, and the
90
4.2. Material and Methods
transition type (rare or common), and reward received in the previous trial were explanatory
variables. We treated all the explanatory variables as random effects.
In the analysis in the section 4.3.2, staying or switching to the other stage 2 action is the
dependent variable, and the reward received in the previous trial and staying on the stage 1
action were the explanatory variables. Only trials in which the stage 2 states were different
from previous trials were included in this analysis. All the explanatory variables were used
as random effects. In the second analysis of this section, staying on the same stage 2 action
is dependent variable, and whether stage 2 state is the same, and whether previous trial was
rewarded, are explanatory variables, and also random effects. Only trials in which stage 1
action is the same as the previous trial were included in this analysis. The third analysis is
similar to the third one, except that trials in which stage 1 action is not the same as the previous
trial are included in the analysis.
For analysis of the model behavior in the section 4.3.2, each model was simulated 3000 trials
in the task with the best fitting parameters of each individual (see the section 4.2.3 below for
more information). Then we analyzed data using linear mixed-effects regression in which the
probability of selecting the same second stage action by the model was taken as the dependent
variable, and the reward received in the previous trial and staying on the first stage actions
were explanatory variables. The intercept was treated as the random effect, and reported
p-values are MCMC-estimated using R package LanguageR (Baayen, 2011).
In the analysis in the first part of the section 4.3.3, staying on the same stage 2 action was a
dependent variable, and the reaction time was an explanatory and random effect. Only trials
in which the previous trial was rewarded (first analysis) or not rewarded (second analysis),
the stage 1 action was repeated, and the stage 2 state was not the same, were included in this
analysis.
In the second analysis of this section, we applied a recursive partitioning method by taking
(i) whether the previous trial is rewarded, (ii) whether the same first stage action is being
taken, and (iii) reaction time as covariates, and staying on the same second stage action
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as response. We used R package ‘party’ (Hothorn, Hornik, & Zeileis, 2006) for the analysis
which employs conditional inference trees for recursive partitioning. In short, the partitioning
method works as follows: at each stage of partitioning the algorithm performs a significance
test on independence between any of covariates and the response using permutation tests. If
the hypothesis is rejected (in the current analysis p-value less than 0.05), it selects the covariate
which has strongest association with the response, and performs a split on that covariate.
4.2.3 Computational modeling
4.2.3.1 Simulation environment
We assumed that the environment has five states; the initial state denoted by S0, (the black
screen in Figure 4.2), slot machine states denoted by S1 and S2, the reward state denoted by
SRe and no-reward state denoted by SN R .
4.2.3.2 Model-based, model-free RL hybrid
For modeling the flat interaction, a family of hybrid models similar to the previous works was
used (Daw et al., 2011; Gläscher et al., 2010; Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013). A model-based RL
(Sutton & Barto, 1998) model was used for modeling goal-directed behavior; and a Q-learning
model (Watkins, 1989) was used to model the habitual behavior. We assumed that actions A1
and A2 are available in states S0, S1 and S2.
Model-based RL- we denote the transition function with T (s′|a, s) which is the probability of
reaching state s′ after executing action a in state s. We assume that the transition function at
stage 1 is fixed (T (S1|A1,S0)= 0.7 and T (S2|A2,S0)= 0.7) and it will not change during learning.
For other states, after executing action a in state s and reaching state s′, the transition function
updates as follows:
∀s′′ ∈ {SRe ,SN R } : T (s′′|s, a)=
 (1−η)T (s
′′|s, a)+η : s′ = s′′
(1−η)T (s′′|s, a) : s′ 6= s′′
(4.2)
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Where η (0< η< 1) is the update rate of the state-action-state transitions.
We assumed that the reward at state SRe is one (R(SRe )= 1), and zero in all other states. Based
on this, the goal-directed value of taking action a in state s is as follows:
∀s ∈ {S0,S1,S2} : V G (s, a)=
∑
s′
T (s′|s, a)V G (s′) (4.3)
Where:
V G (s)=
 maxa V
G (s, a) : s ∈ {S0,S1,S2}
R(s) : s ∈ {SRe ,SN R }
(4.4)
Model-free RL- After taking action a in state s, and reaching state s′, model-free values update
as follows:
Q H (s, a)←Q H (s, a)+α(V H (s′)−Q H (s, a)) (4.5)
Where α (0<α< 1) is the learning rate, which can be different in stage 1 and stage 2 actions.
For stage 1 actions (actions executed in S0), α=α1, and for stage 2 actions α=α2. Also
V H (s)=
 maxa Q
H (s, a) : s ∈ {S0,S1,S2}
R(s) : s ∈ {SRe ,SN R }
(4.6)
In the trials in which the best action is executed in s ∈ {S1,S2} the model-free value of the
action executed in state S0 also updates according to the outcome. If a was to be the action
which was taken in S0, a′ the action taken in s, and s′ the state visited after executing a′, values
update as follows:
Q H (S0, a)←Q H (S0, a)+α1λ(V H (s′)−Q H (s, a′)) (4.7)
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Where λ(0 < λ < 1) is the reinforcement eligibility parameter, and determines how stage 1
action values are affected by receiving the outcome after executing stage 2 actions.
Final values are then computed by combining the values provided by the habitual and goal-
directed processes:
V (s, a)=wV G (s, a)+ (1−w)Q H (s, a) (4.8)
Were w(0<w < 1) determines the relative contribution of habitual and goal-directed values
into the final values.
Finally, the probability of selecting action a in state s will be determined according to the
soft-max rule:
pi(s, a)= e
β(s)V (s,a)+κ(s,a)∑
a′ eβ(s)V (s,a
′)+κ(s,a′) (4.9)
Where κ(s, a) is the action preservation parameter and captures the general tendency of taking
the same action as the previous trial (H. Kim, Sul, Huh, Lee, & Jung, 2009; Lau & Glimcher,
2005). Assuming s = S0 and a being the action taken in the previous trial in the S0 state, then
k(s, a)= k, otherwise it will be zero. The β(s) parameter controls the rate of exploration, and
β(s)=β1 if s = S0 and β(s)=β2 if s ∈ {S1,S2}.
In the most general form, all the free parameters are included in the model: β1,β2,η,α1,λ,k, w
(we assumed that α2 = η). We generated eight simpler models by setting λ= 0, α1 =α2, and
β2 =β1.
4.2.3.3 Hierarchical model-based, sequence-based RL
Implementation of the hierarchical structure is similar to hierarchical RL (Barto & Mahadevan,
2003; Dietterich, 2000; Sutton et al., 1999), with action sequences (A1 A1, A1 A2, etc) as options
(Sutton et al., 1999). We assumed in state S0, actions A1, A2, A1 A1, A1 A2, A2 A2, and A2 A1 are
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available. In states S1 and S2, actions A1 and A2 are available. After reaching a terminal state
(SRe or SN R ), transition functions of both the action sequence, and the single action that led to
that state update according to equation 4.2. In the case of single actions, the transition function
will be updated by the η= η1 update rate, and in the case of action sequences, the transition
function will be updated by the η= η2 update rate. Based on the learned transition function,
value of action a in state s is calculated by the goal-directed system using equation 4.3.
The probability of selecting each action will be as follows:
pi(s, a)= e
βω(a)V G (s,a)+κ(s,a)∑
a′ eβω(a)V
G (s,a′)+κ(s,a′) (4.10)
Where ω(a) determines the relative preference for single actions instead of executing action
sequences. If action a is a single action ω(a) = w , and if action a is an action sequence,
ω(a)= 1−w . As before, κ(s, a) captures action perseveration. We assumed that κ(s, a)= k1
if action a is a single action, and κ(s, a) = k2 if action a is an action sequence. V G (s, a) is
calculated using Equation 4.3.
For calculating the probability of selecting actions in stage 2, given the first choice of the
subject, we need to know whether that action is a part of an action sequence selected earlier,
or is it under goal-directed control. Assume we know action A1 has been executed in state S0
by the subject, the probability of this action being due to performing the A1 A2 action sequence
is:
P (A1 A2|S0, A1)= pi(A1 A2|S0)
pi(A1|S0)+pi(A1 A2|S0)+pi(A1 A1|S0)
(4.11)
Similarly, the probability of observing A1 due to selecting the single action A1 is:
P (A1|S0, A1)= pi(A1|S0)
pi(A1|S0)+pi(A1 A2|S0)+pi(A1 A1|S0)
(4.12)
Based on this, the probability that the model assigns to action a in state s ∈ {S1,S2}, given that
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action a′ is being observed in S0 is:
P (s, a)= P (a′|S0, a′)pi(s|S)+P (a′a|S0, a′) (4.13)
Where P (a′a|S0, a′) and P (a|S0, a′) are calculated using equations 4.11 and 4.12 respectively.
In the most general form, all the free parameters are included in the model: β, η1, η2, k1, k2,
w . We generated eight simpler models by setting η2 = η1, ω(a)= 1, and k2 = k1.
In the analyses in the section 4.3.3, we assumed that reaction times in stage 2 are inversely
related to the probability of executing an action sequence in stage 1. As such, if subject has
taken action A1 in stage 1, and action A2 in stage 2, then model prediction of the reaction time
of A2 will be:
RT−1 = pi(A1 A2|S0)
pi(A1|S0)+pi(A1 A2|S0)
(4.14)
For the second analysis in the section 4.3.3, we aimed to remove the effect of action sequences
in stage 2 choices. We used eight models same as above, but the probability that the model
assigns to action a in state s ∈ {S1,S2}, was defined as:
P (a|s)=pi(a|s) (4.15)
Which indicates probability of taking each action in each slot machine is guided only by the
rewards earned on that slot machine, and not by the action sequences in stage1.
4.2.3.4 Model selection
Since the two families of models that we are comparing are not nested in each other, we
can’t use classical model selection. Instead, we use a Bayesian model selection for comparing
these two families of models (Penny et al., 2010). We first calculated the model evidence for
each model using the Laplace approximation (Daw, 2011; MacKay, 2003), and then calcu-
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lated the exceedance probability favoring each family, (taking model identity as a random
effect) using the ‘spm_compare_families’ routine in the spm8 software. Within each fam-
ily, exceedance probabilities were calculated using the ‘spm_BMS’ routine (Stephan, Penny,
Daunizeau, Moran, & Friston, 2009).
The Laplace approximation requires a prior assumption of probability distributions over the
free parameters of models. Similar to the previous study (Daw et al., 2011), for parameters be-
tween zero and one (learning rates, reinforcement eligibility, weight parameter), we assumed a
Beta(1.1, 1.1) distribution; for exploration-exploitation parameters we assumed a Gamma(1.2,
5) distribution, and for perseveration parameters, a Normal(0, 1) distribution was assumed.
The Laplace approximation includes finding the maximum a posteriori (MAP) parameter
estimates. For this purpose, we used the IPOPT software package (Wächter & Biegler, 2005)
for nonlinear optimization, and the DerApproximator package (Kroshko, n.d.) in order to
estimate the Hessian at the MAP point.
4.3 Results
Fifteen subjects completed a two-stage decision-making task (Figure 4.2), in which each
trial started with a choice between two key presses (stage 1 actions; A1 vs. A2). Each key
press resulted in the appearance of either of two slot machines (denoted by S1 and S2 and
distinguished by their colors) in a probabilistic manner. Next, at the slot machines, subjects
again chose between two key presses (stage 2 actions; A1 versus A2), and, as a result, received
an outcome; i.e., either a monetary reward or a neutral outcome. At stage 1, A1 most commonly
led to S1, and A2 to S2 (common transitions; 70% of the time). In a minority of trials, A1 led to
S2, and A2 to S1 (rare transitions; 30% of the time). This relationship was kept fixed throughout
the test. Each of the stage 2 responses at the slot machines earned a reward either at a high
probability (0.7) or a low probability (0.2). In order to ensure the subjects kept searching for
the best keys and slot machines during the test, at each trial, with a small probability (1:7),
the rewarding probability of each key changed randomly to either the high or low probability.
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Figure 4.2 – (a) Illustration of the timeline of events within a trial. Initially a black screen is
presented, and the subject can choose between pressing A1, or A2 (stage 1 choice). After a key
is pressed, one of the slot machines is presented, and the subject can again choose between
pressing A1, and A2 (stage 2 choice). Choices at stage 2 are reinforced by monetary reward.
(b) Structure of the task. One of the key presses commonly leads to one of slot machines
(70% of the time), and the other key commonly leads to the other slot machine. Choices at
stage 2 are reinforced either by a high probability (0.7) or a low probability (0.2). With a small
probability (1/7), the rewarding probability of each key changes randomly to either the high
or low probability.
.
Each participant completed 270 trials.
4.3.1 Goal-directed and habitual performance
In the analysis, we first sought to establish whether decision-making in this task is goal-
directed, habitual or a mixture of both and, if both, to assess whether goal-directed and
habitual control interact according to a flat structure or a hierarchical structure.
The first question can be answered by looking at the likelihood of the subjects repeating the
same stage 1 action on each trial based on feedback received on the previous trial (Daw et
al., 2011). Take for example a trial in which a subject presses A1 and transfers to the S2 slot
machine (which is rare result of choosing A1). If the participant presses a button of that slot
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Figure 4.3 – (a) Modeled habitual action control on the two–stage task: Under habitual control
a stage 1 action that has been eventually reinforced (reward) in the previous trial is more likely
to be repeated (higher stay probability), regardless of whether the repeated action commonly
leads to the same slot machine (common) or not (rare). (b) Modeled goal-directed action con-
trol on the two–stage task: Under goal-directed action control a reinforced action is repeated
if it commonly leads to the same slot machine in which reward is received, otherwise the
other action is selected. (c) Data from the experiment: Actual stay probabilities averaged over
all subjects and trials. When the previous trial was rewarded, stay probability was generally
higher (as in habitual control), and was also higher when the previous trial was a common
transition (as in goal-directed control). Thus, the responses of the subjects in the experiment
were found to be a mixture of both habitual and goal-directed action control.
.
machine and receives a reward, this implies S2 is probably a good slot machine and, if the
decision-making is goal-directed, in stage 1 of the next trial the subject should try to reach this
S2 slot machine again. It is expected therefore, that the probability that the subject will press A2
will increase because it is this key that (in this example) commonly leads to S2 (cf. Figure 4.3b).
In contrast, if decisions are habitual, subjects should not be guided by contingencies between
the responses and slot machines, and should tend to stay on the previously rewarded action,
A1 (Figure 4.3a).
The results are presented in Figure 4.3c, which shows the probability of repeating the same
action computed across all subjects and trials. We analyzed the data using mixed-effects
logistic regression analyses by taking all coefficients as random effects across subjects (see
section 4.2.2). Results show that being rewarded in the previous trial increased the chance of
staying on the same action, irrespective of whether it was a rare or a common transition (main
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effect of reward; coefficient estimate = 0.61; SE = 0.09; p<3e-11), which suggests that habits
constitute a component of the behavior. On the other hand, this increase was higher if the
previous trial was a common transition (and lower after an unrewarded trial), suggesting that
subjects also utilized their knowledge about the task structure (reward-transition interaction;
coefficient estimate = 0.41; SE = 0.11; p<5e-4). Therefore, the subjects’ behavior was a mixture
of both goal-directed and habitual actions. Also, as the figure shows, the probability of staying
on the same action is generally higher than not staying on it, irrespective of reward and
transition type in the previous trial (the intercept term is significantly positive; estimate =
1.52; SE = 0.20; p<10e-14), which reflects a general tendency of animals and humans to repeat
previous actions (Ito & Doya, 2009; Lau & Glimcher, 2005).
In previous studies, a hybrid model of model-free and model-based reinforcement learning
(RL) was advanced to explain the behavior of subjects on this task based on the flat structure
(Daw et al., 2011; Gläscher et al., 2010; Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013) (section 2.4.3). According
to this model, action values learned in model-free RL, roughly, reflect the frequency of the
action rewarded on previous trials irrespective of the action-outcome contingency (i.e., in the
current task, which key generates which slot machine) and, as such, these values underlie
the habitual component of the model. These model-free values are then mixed with the
values provided by the goal-directed system (modeled by a model-based RL) to produce the
final values which guide action selection. As a consequence, and consistent with the above
results, we should expect to see a combination of both habitual and goal-directed actions. The
prediction from this hybrid model is illustrated in Figure 4.4a. A hierarchical structure can,
however, also be used to explain these results. For example, assume that a subject presses
A1 in stage 1, and A2 in stage 2 and receives a reward. As a result, the goal-directed system
learns that contingency between the A1A2 action sequence and the reward is increased and
so it should be more likely to repeat the action sequence in the next trial, whether or not the
reward was received from the S1 or S2 slot machine (i.e., the common or rare transition). As
the evaluation and performance of an action sequence is not guided by the task structure (i.e.
the key-slot machine association), from this perspective it constitutes the habitual component
100
4.3. Results
0.5
1.0
reward no reward
Common
Rare
0.5
1.0
reward no reward
Common
Rare
a) b)
st
ay
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Figure 4.4 – The probability of staying on stage 1 action in simulations of: (a) the flat archi-
tecture; and, (b) the hierarchical architecture. Both architectures can model the pattern of
data observed in stage 1 stay probabilities on the task: i.e., a higher stay probability after being
rewarded on the previous trial and an interaction between reward and transition.
of the behavior (see (Dezfouli, Lingawi, & Balleine, 2014) for the relation of phenomenon
to outcome devaluation experiments). All actions - either single action (e.g., A1) or action
sequences (e.g., A1A2)-, will be subject to the goal-directed action selection process, such that
actions with higher values will be selected with a higher probability. As a consequence, this
implies that the behavior will be a mixture of habitual (when action sequences are selected)
and goal-directed (when single actions are selected) actions and that this mix of actions
can be generated without the need for the model-free component or an explicit arbitration
mechanism used in the flat structure. This prediction is illustrated in Figure 4.4b.
4.3.2 The interaction of goal-directed and habitual actions
Although both approaches are able to explain the mixture of behavioral control in the stage
1, they make different predictions about stage 2 choices. This is because, if the observed
habitual behavior is due to the execution of an action sequence, rather than cached values
as the model-free account supposes, then we expect the subject to repeat the whole action
sequence in the next trial, not just stage 1 action.
Staying on the same stage 1 action in the next trial after being rewarded implies that this is
probably a habitual response and so we expect the subject to repeat stage 2 action as well,
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Figure 4.5 – The probability of staying on stage 2 action on trials for which the slot machine
differs from the on one in the previous trial: (a) The observed stay probabilities. When the
subjects are rewarded and stay on the same stage 1 action (same), the probability of staying
on the same stage 2 action is higher. (a) Simulation of the flat architecture. Note that this is
not consistent with the pattern in panel (a). (c) Simulation of the hierarchical architecture,
which is consistent with the pattern observed in actual stay probabilities.
even if the slot machine is different from the one in the previous trial. In contrast, if the subject
switches to the other stage 1 action, the previous action sequence is not repeated, and thus
stage 2 action is not expected to be repeated if the subject ends with a different slot machine
in the next trial. In order to test this prediction, we looked at the trials that had a different slot
machine to the one in their previous trial.
Figure 4.5 shows the probability of repeating the same stage 2 action as a function of whether
this action was rewarded on the previous trial and the subject had subsequently taken the
same stage 1 action. Logistic regression conducted on stage 2 choices using factors of reward,
separating rewarded and non-rewarded trials, and action, separating trials on which stage 1
action was the same from those on which it differed, found neither an effect of reward (p>0.05),
nor of action (p>0.05) but found a significant interaction between these factors (coefficient
estimate = 1.02; SE = 0.38; p<0.008), indicating that, during the execution of habitual responses,
subjects tended to repeat stage 2 action. This interaction remained significant even when
we restricted the analysis either to trials after rare transitions (coefficient estimate = 1.33; SE
= 0.60; p<0.05) or after common transitions (coefficient estimate = 0.93; SE = 0.38; p<0.05).
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Figure 4.6 – The probability of staying on the stage 2 action when the same (a) or different (b)
stage 1 action is taken, as a function of whether the previous trial is rewarded, and whether
the stage 2 state is the same or different from the previous trial
Importantly, the fact that the effect of the reward was not significant rules out the possibility
that the effect was due to the generalization of the values across slot machines.
Simulations of the flat and hierarchical models are presented in Figure 4.5b and c, respectively.
As predicted, the hierarchical structure captures the pattern of the subjects’ stage 2 actions
(the interaction between the reward and the same stage 1 action; p<0.001), whereas the flat
structure is not consistent with repeating the same action in stage 2 (p>0.05).
Previously, we focused on trials with a different slot machine to the one in the previous trial.
This was because, in this condition, flat and hierarchical accounts provide different predictions.
When the slot machine is the same, both accounts (flat and hierarchical) predict that being
rewarded in the previous trial increases the probability of staying on the same stage 2 action. In
addition to this prediction, the hierarchical account predicts that when the slot machine is the
same as the one on the previous trial, this increase should be higher than the increase when
the slot machine is different. This is because, when the slot machine is different, staying on
the same stage 2 action is driven by execution of the previous action sequence whereas, when
the slot machine is the same, executing either the previous action sequence or a goal-directed
decision at stage 2 can result in staying on the same stage 2 action.
As a consequence we looked at the effect of being rewarded in the previous trial, and whether
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the slot machine was the same as the one in the previous trial, on the probability of staying
of the same stage 2 action (in the trials in which stage 1 action was the same as the previous
trial).
Figure 4.6a shows the results. A significant main effect of reward was found (coefficient
estimate = 0.69; SE = 0.21; p<0.002) indicating that being rewarded in the previous trial
increases the probability of taking the same stage 2 action, irrespective of whether the slot
machine was the same as the previous trial or not, which is consistent with the hierarchical
account. In addition, we found a significant interaction between the effect of reward and
whether the slot machine being the same (coefficient estimate = 3.46; SE = 0.51; p<3e-11),
consistent with the finding that the probability of staying on stage 2 action was higher when
stage 1 action was the same.
Figure 4.6b shows the probability of staying on the same stage 2 action when the subject takes
a different stage 1 action. As predicted, because the subject did not execute the previous action
sequence, the main effect of reward was not significant (p>0.05) but the interaction between
reward and stage 2 state being the same was significant (coefficient estimate = 1.72; SE = 0.40;
p<3e-5) which means that subjects tend to take the same action on the same slot machine
after being rewarded, as predicted by both accounts.
4.3.3 Reaction times during habit execution
In the previous section we showed that if, after being rewarded, the subject repeats the same
stage 1 action, they are probably repeating the previous action sequence and, as such, they
tend to repeat stage 2 action as well. However, even in the situation in which the subject is
executing an action sequence there will be trials on which they might not repeat the same
stage 2 action. In such conditions, we should suppose that either (i) the subject took an
exploratory goal-directed action in stage 1, or (ii) the subject started an action sequence but
its performance was inhibited and control returned to the evaluation system in stage 2. In
both cases, the hierarchical account predicts that reaction times on trials in which the same
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Figure 4.7 – (a) Reaction time (RT) in stage 2 action (when the same stage 1 action was taken)
as a function of whether the same stage 2 action was taken and whether previous trial is
rewarded (only calculated for trials on which stage 2 state was different from the previous
trial). (b) Predicted reaction times by the model (a.u. : arbitrary unit).
stage 2 action is not taken should be higher.
Figure 4.7a illustrates these reaction times as a function of whether the previous trial was
rewarded and the subject takes the same stage 2 action (only in trials on which the slot
machine is different from that on the previous trial and the subject subsequently takes the
same stage 1 action). If the previous trial is rewarded, reaction times were lower when a
subject completes an action sequence than when stage 2 action was not executed as a part of
a sequence (coefficient estimate = -1.66; SE = 0.45; p<3e-4). Importantly, the effect was not
significant when the previous trial was not rewarded (p>0.05), which rules out the possibility
that the observed increase in the reaction times was because of the cost of switching to the
other stage 2 action.
We further asked whether the model can predict the reaction times in stage 2. As mentioned
above, at stage 1, the goal-directed process more frequently selects actions that have a higher
contingency to reward (either single actions, or action sequences). As such, if an action
sequence has a high value, it is likely to be selected for execution, and so we expect a low
reaction time in stage 2. For example, assume the subject has executed action A1 in stage 1,
and A2 in stage 2 and the aim is to predict whether A2 has a high or low reaction time. It can
be argued, if the value of the A1A2 action sequence is high, then it was probably executed in
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stage 1, and thus the execution of A2 is part of an action sequence (A1A2) started in stage 1,
implying the subject should show a low reaction time. In general we assume that the reaction
time in stage 2 is inversely related to the value of the action sequence that contains that action
(see section 4.2.3.3). In the case of this example we will have:
RT−1 ∝ probability of executing action sequence A1A2
Based on this, we calculated the predicted reaction time of the action taken by the subject in
the conditions shown in Figure 4.7a. The results are shown in Figure 4.7b. As the figure shows,
the predicted reaction times by the model are consistent with the pattern of reaction times
observed in the data.
In general, the above analysis of stage 2 performance and this analysis of reaction times
implies that (i) when the previous trial is rewarded, (ii) the same stage 1 action is taken, and
(iii) the reaction time is low, then the subject is most likely performing an action sequence. As a
consequence it is expected to repeat the same stage 2 action, even on a different slot machine
to the one in the previous trial. In order to more closely examine this relationship we used
conditional inference trees and partitioned stage 2 actions into whether they involved staying
or switching to the other action based on the above three factors (see section 4.2.2). The results
are shown in Figure 4.8. As the figure shows, when the previous trial was not rewarded (node #
1 ‘no reward’ condition), staying on the same stage 2 action was independent of either whether
stage 1 action was repeated or the reaction time was low (p>0.05; permutation test). If the
previous trial was rewarded (node # 1 ‘reward’ condition) then, if the reaction time was high
(node #2 RT>0.437s) or the reaction time was low but the subject doesn’t repeat stage 1 action
(node #3 ‘different’ condition), then again stage 2 action was not repeated. Only when: (i) the
previous trial was rewarded, (ii) the subject took the same stage 1 action, and (iii) their reaction
time was low (node #3 ‘same’ condition), did the subject repeat stage 2 action, consistent with
the prediction of the hierarchical account.
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Figure 4.8 – Partitioning the probability of staying on the same stage 2 action (stay: staying
on the same stage 2 action; switch: switching to the other stage 2 action) as a function of (i)
reward on the previous trial (node #1), (ii) whether the same stage 1 action is taken (stage
1 action; node #3), and (iii) reaction times (RT). ‘n’ represents the number of data points;
p-values are calculated using a permutation test.
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4.4 Behavioral modeling: Bayesian model selection
The results described in the previous sections suggest that a hierarchical structure better
characterizes the effect of feedback from the previous trial on performance on the subsequent
trial. However, choices are generally guided by the feedback from all previous trials, not
just the immediately prior trial. As such, it is still to be established which framework better
captures behavior in this more general condition.
We used a Bayesian model selection method to establish which framework produces choices
that are the most similar to the subjects’ actions. Both flat and hierarchical architectures have
different variants with different degrees of freedom. As such, we compared a family of flat
models with a family of hierarchical models (Penny et al., 2010), where each family consists of
a complex model, and its nested simpler models. The results (Table 4.1) show that, given the
subjects’ data, the hierarchical family is more likely than the flat family to produces choices
similar to those made by the subjects. We found that the exceedance probability in favor
of the hierarchical family was 0.99 meaning, roughly, that we can be 99% confident that the
hierarchical family generated the observed data.
In the hierarchical family, the probabilities of taking actions in stage 2 are partially based
on the probability of taking an action sequence in stage 1. As these stage 2 choices are the
canonical difference between the two families, we expected that removing the effect of action
sequences on stage 2 choices would reduce the fit of the hierarchical account to data. Thus
we generated a family of hierarchical models similar to Table 4.1. but with the effect of action
sequences on stage 2 actions removed, and compared the generated family with the family
of hierarchical models presented in Table 4.1 (see section 4.2.3.3). Results indicated that the
exceedance probability in favor of the family in which the performance of action sequences
was reflected in stage 2 choices was 0.99, confirming that the selection of an action sequence
in stage 1 increased the probability of taking the second element of the action sequence in the
next stage.
Table 4.1 represents the model comparison results within each family. The parameter estimates
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Table 4.1 – Model comparison between hierarchical and flat families. H: Hierarchical; F: Flat.
Shown for each model: negative log model evidence − log(P (D|M)); a pseudo-r statistic (p–r 2)
which is a normalized measure of the degree of variance accounted for in comparison to a
model with random choices; the number of subjects favoring the best fitting model based on
the model evidence; The exceedance probability which represents the probability that each
model (or family) is most likely among alternatives over the population. *best fitting model in
each family. ** best fitting model.
In each family In total
Family Free parameters -log p(D|M) psudo-r 2
number
favoring
best
model
Exceedance
probability
Exceedance
probability
number
favoring
best
model
Exceedance
probability
β,η1,k1 4219.6 0.26 12 0.000 0.004 12
β,η1,k1, w 4092.7 0.29 13 0.000 0.003 13
β,η1,k1,k2 4189.3 0.27 12 0.001 0.005 12
β,η1,k1,η2 4127.9 0.29 11 0.003 0.013 11
β,η1,k1, w,k2 4074.9 0.30 11 0.002 0.011 11
β,η1,k1, w,η2 4078.0 0.30 10 0.004 0.011 10
β,η1,k1,k2,η2 4110.3 0.29 11 0.000 0.004 11
H
β,η1, w,k1,k2,η2 4058.7 0.3 - 0.986* 0.911** -
0.993
β1,η,k, w 4212.0 0.27 14 0.004 0.002 14
β1,η,k, w,β2 4212.5 0.27 12 0.004 0.004 13
β1,η,k, w,λ 4168.6 0.28 - 0.697* 0.006 12
β1,η,k, w,α1 4201.1 0.27 12 0.005 0.002 14
β1,η,k, w,β2,λ 4173.1 0.28 9 0.032 0.006 11
β1,η,k, w,β2,α1 4198.4 0.27 11 0.007 0.003 13
β1,η,k, w,λ,α1 4174.2 0.28 11 0.049 0.002 12
F
β1,η,k, w,β2,λ,α1 4169.4 0.28 10 0.199 0.005 12
0.006
for the best fitting model from each family in terms of the exceedance probabilities (Stephan et
al., 2009) are presented in Table 4.2. The best fitting models from each family were simulated
in the task conditions to produce Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5.
Table 4.2 – Best fitting parameter estimates for each family across subjects.
Hierarchical Flat
Parameter First Quartile Median Third Quartile Parameter First Quartile Median Third Quartile
β 4.24 5.80 6.96 β1 1.64 2.33 3.44
η1 0.82 0.89 0.95 η 0.65 0.84 0.93
k1 1.25 1.66 2.25 k 0.84 0.94 1.40
w 0.25 0.46 0.62 w 0.40 0.59 0.68
k2 -0.50 0.30 0.70 λ 0.69 0.93 0.95
η2 0.14 0.29 0.77 - - - -
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4.5 Discussion
Although prior research has suggested that goal-directed and habitual actions should be
conceived as single step actions organized according to a flat architecture (e.g. (Daw et al., 2005,
2011)), the results of the current experiment found that: (i) human subjects combined actions
together to form action sequences, as revealed by the open-loop execution of sequences of
actions and reaction times in the current task, and, therefore, that action sequences constituted
a necessary component of behavior; (ii) the use of action sequences by human subjects was
sufficient to explain habitual decisions on this task, meaning choices that were not guided
by action-outcome contingencies; and, (iii) a goal-directed system assessing both actions
and action sequences in a hierarchical manner explained behavior better than a flat model
attributing habits to model-free evaluation.
Furthermore, although hierarchical models have had a longstanding role in decision-making
(Lashley, 1951; Miller et al., 1960; Newell & Simon, 1963; Botvinick & Plaut, 2004; Estes, 1972;
Schneider & Logan, 2006; Cooper & Shallice, 2006, 2000), here we provide direct experimental
evidence for the role of these models in understanding the operation and interaction of
goal-directed and habitual actions. We used a version of the two-stage discrimination task
described by Daw et al (Daw et al., 2011) in which the ambiguity of stage 1 predictions by both
actions and stimuli was reduced by removing the explicit predictive cues of previous versions.
Using this task we found, as previously described, that action selection in stage 1 reflected a
mixture of goal-directed and habitual strategies. The two accounts diverge with respect to the
status of stage 2 actions; whereas the flat architecture/single step action perspective predicts
that the status of action selection in stage 2 should be independent of the first, we found that
this was not true; habitual action selection in stage 1 predicted continued habitual selection
in stage 2 as a sequence of actions, a finding predicted by a hierarchical goal-directed/habit
sequence account (Dezfouli & Balleine, 2012). According to this account, at the top of the
hierarchy the goal-directed system evaluates and selects goals and then habits efficiently
implement decisions made by the goal-directed system in the form of action sequences. In
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comparison to the other accounts, which posit a flat interaction between these two systems,
we found that the hierarchical account provides more accurate predictions both in terms
of the choices of the subjects, and in terms of their reaction times during action selection.
When performing according to a habitual sequence of actions, subjects tended to repeat
both previously reinforced sequences and to perform these sequences at significantly lower
reaction times than when their actions were goal-directed.
4.5.1 Hierarchical decision-making and the two-stage task
A number of studies have previously investigated the relationship between hierarchical RL
and decision-making (Doya, 1999; Botvinick et al., 2009; Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011; Diuk,
Tsai, Wallis, Botvinick, & Niv, 2013; Frank & Badre, 2012; Badre & Frank, 2012; Reynolds
& O’Reilly, 2009; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). We extended these studies by showing how the
formation of action sequences can lead to decisions that are insensitive to (i) the values of the
outcomes (Dezfouli & Balleine, 2012) and (ii) the contingency between specific actions and
their outcomes (i.e. the key press–slot machine associations in this study), the two defining
characteristics of the habitual behavior.
The other difference between the hierarchical RL model that we used here and previous
work is that we assumed that performance of action sequences is insensitive to the feedback
received during execution (Pew, 1966; Keele, 1968), whereas, in general, previous work based
on hierarchical RL theory has assumed that action selection is based on the state of the
environment (Barto & Mahadevan, 2003; Dietterich, 2000; Sutton et al., 1999). Within this
latter framework, one can posit that habits are hierarchically organized actions but that their
performance is sensitive to the feedback received after execution of each individual action.
Although this class of models can explain habitual behavior executed in stage 1 of the current
task, this approach predicts that stage 2 actions will, ultimately, be similar to those of the flat
architecture discussed earlier, which is not consistent with the data observed in this study.
In the hierarchical account advanced here we assumed, based on the previous findings in
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rodents (Balleine, Garner, Gonzalez, & Dickinson, 1995; Ostlund et al., 2009), that, similar
to single actions, action sequences are also under goal-directed control. Alternatively, it is
possible that the value of any action sequence is learned in a model-free manner (for example
using Q-learning) without learning the identity of the particular outcome that it predicts.
Our results are silent with respect to this latter assumption; nevertheless, whatever the case,
the conclusion that habitual responses in stage 1 were due to the execution of an action
sequence still holds. One way to study this issue is to add another choice to the end of the task,
making it a three stage task, and then asking whether performance of for example A1A2 action
sequence is goal-directed or habitual, which can be answered by devaluation of outcome of
A1A2, or using the same task structure that we used here to distinguish habitual and goal-
directed actions. However, again, if it were found that the selection of the A1A2 sequence was
not sensitive to environmental contingencies, or outcome values, this could be due either
to the formation of A1A2A3 action sequence (since outcome of A1A2 falls within sequence
boundaries (Dezfouli & Balleine, 2012)), or it could be because action sequences are open
to model-free evaluation. Similar to the study here, these accounts can be distinguished by
examining whether the subject selects A3 during habitual selection of A1A2 irrespective of the
outcome of A1A2 performance. If so, it can be concluded that the observed habitual behavior
is due to the formation of an action sequence, not model-free RL. Along the same lines, it is
possible to assume that, in the current study, stage 2 habitual responses were guided by a flat
model operating in parallel to the hierarchical model we propose here. Again, although the
task results are neutral with respect to this assumption, adding a parallel model increases the
model’s complexity, is not required to account for the current data, and so it necessity should
be motivated by additional behavioral data.
It might also be argued that, although the current predictions apply to the modified two-stage
discrimination task used here, they may not apply to previous versions of the task. In previous
versions, subjects at each stage chose between two symbols instead of two fixed actions and
the symbols moved from side to side at each trial ensuring there was no consistent mapping
between the button presses and the symbols. There are two points to make here: First, the
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fact that specific (e.g. left- or right-hand) actions are degraded in their contingency with the
outcome on this version of the task raises the issue of stimulus control; either the stimuli
exclusively mediate the predictions of stage 2 outcomes or the concept of action needs to be
made more liberal to the selection of a symbol. The former approach would, of course, render
the task Pavlovian, rather than instrumental, and the applicability of model-based control
problematic. Second, and relatedly, in order to apply our hierarchical model to the earlier task,
we also need to extend the concept of an ‘action’ from pressing a button (as in our task), to
selecting a symbol; if this is accepted then, using the logic laid out earlier, the hierarchical
goal-directed/habit sequences model can explain the results of the task. In the prior version of
the task, symbols in stage 2 were different from each other, for example in one of stage 2 states
subject could choose between symbols ‘C’ and ‘D’, but in the other stage 2 state, the choice
was between symbols ‘E’ and ‘F’. As such, we cannot directly assess the probability of staying
on the same stage 2 action if the subjects end up in a different stage 2 state. Nevertheless, the
hierarchical theory predicts that if the subject selects same stage 1 action, and ends up with
the same stage 2 state and selects the same stage 2 action, then the reaction time will be faster
than when they end up with in a different stage 2 state.
Here we assumed that action sequences were available to the subjects from the beginning
of the training, and we ignored that such action sequences needed to be acquired through a
learning process, as described in the previous chapter. This was mainly because we assumed
that the human subjects that participated in the study were generally familiar with taking a
sequence of button pressing on a computer keyboard, and so they could develop such action
sequences very quickly. Therefore, we didn’t include the process of action sequence learning
here.
4.5.2 Deviations from prediction and the interpretation of the two-stage task
Predictions of both models (flat and hierarchical) were found to deviate from the behavior
of the subjects in two cases. In the first case, if, after being rewarded, the subject switches to
the other action then both accounts predict that the probability of staying on stage 2 action
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should be on average 0.5 (Figure 5b,c). However, in the actual data it is below 0.5 (Figure
5a). In the second case, both accounts predict that the difference between stay probability in
common and rare transitions should be equal in both the reward and no-reward conditions
(Figure 4a,b), however, as Figure 3c shows, the difference is larger in the reward condition. It
is possible to capture these two deviations by adding more free parameters to the models;
however, since the deviations exist for both the flat and hierarchical families and so do not
affect the comparison between them, we didn’t add further parameters to account for these
two deviations.
As in previous work, we interpreted the interaction between being rewarded and the type of
transition in the previous trial (rare or common) as the evidence for goal-directed behavior.
It should, however, be noted that, if there is a strong initial bias in total possible reward for
one action vs. the other at the first-stage, and reward transitions are slow, then it is possible to
observe an interaction between reward and transition type without engaging a goal-directed
system. As a consequence of the higher overall probability of reward for taking, say, action
‘A1’ in stage 1, the subject can establish that action has a higher value (without relying on the
task structure) and so will take that action, i.e. ‘A1’, more frequently than the other, i.e. action
‘A2’, which means that the probability of staying on action ‘A1’ will be higher than action ‘A2’
in general. At the same time, because action ‘A1’ is better than the other action, most of the
rewarded common transitions and unrewarded rare transitions result from taking action ‘A1’.
Likewise, most of the unrewarded common transitions and rewarded rare transitions will be
the result of taking action ‘A2’. This fact, and the fact that stay probability on action ‘A1’ is
generally higher, will produce a reward-transition interaction, without having a goal-directed
system, at least in the period that action ‘A1’ is better than the other action. This bias is
proportional to how fast the bias in stage 1 values changes and cannot account for the current
data. It should also be noted that, as the comparison between the flat and hierarchical model
families was based on model fit, those results don’t suffer from this problem.
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4.5.3 Inhibitory interactions between goal-directed and habitual control
Although, on the hierarchical goal-directed/habit sequence model advanced here, habits are
integrated with the goal-directed process to reach the goals selected by this latter system,
competition can also occur between these two systems when the further execution of an
ongoing habit sequence is found to be inappropriate by the goal-directed system and it
attempts to take back control. This type of competition resembles the situation in an inhibitory
control task, such as the stop-signal task, in which subjects must respond quickly when a
‘go’ signal appears but must stop the action if a stop-signal appears (Verbruggen & Logan,
2008). In the context of our task, seeing a slot machine at stage 2 is the ‘go’ signal, which
causes the execution of the next action in the sequence. The stop signal comes from the
goal-directed system when the pending response is identified as inappropriate. Consistent
with this conception in conditions in which sequence performance is inhibited, reaction times
are slower. In the stop-signal task, subjects are typically able to inhibit their responses when
the stop signal is temporally close to the ‘go’ signal. Although the stop signal task is more
global in terms of response inhibition, whereas in the current task the inhibition is specific
to one as opposed to an alternative action, this implies that the ability of the goal-directed
system to override habits depends on how fast it calculates the correct action: the faster it
calculates, the higher the chance of taking control back before action execution.
4.5.4 Habit sequences vs. stimulus-response habits
It is also interesting to consider the relationship between habit sequences and stimulus-
response (S-R) theories of habit learning. The S-R theory of habit learning maintains that
habits are responses that are elicited by antecedent stimuli rather than their consequences
(Guthrie, 1935; Hull, 1943). Such S-R theories maintain that stimuli trigger their associated
behavioral responses due to an association between the stimulus and the response. According
to the habit sequence theory, however, the stimulus instead signals that the next action in the
sequence should be executed; i.e., in the context of our task, seeing a slot machine signals
that it is time for the next action to be executed. Although the next action to be executed
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is determined by the sequence and the stimulus does not play a role in the selection of the
next response, the response is still stimulus-bound to some extent (e.g., for timing and motor
coordination) and is elicited only when the next expected stimulus is encountered. Never-
theless, these two theories provide different predictions. For example, S-R theory predicts
that, in the presence of the appropriate stimulus the response will be performed, irrespective
of whether that stimulus was encountered as part of the habit sequence or not. In contrast,
habit sequence theory predicts that the individual will respond to the stimulus only when the
appropriate habit sequence has already been launched by the goal-directed system.
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5 Hierarchical decision-making
in rats
As mentioned in chapter 2, evidence indicates that goal-directed actions, i.e., actions that are
taken by an agent to attain a certain goal, are crucial components of decision-making pro-
cesses in animals and humans. The source of these actions is suggested to be a model-based
reinforcement learning system in the brain, which learns the contingencies between actions
and the states of the environment. Such a decision-making process, however, requires an
agent to firstly learn the correct representation of the task space, and secondly, hierarchically
organize actions in order to make goal-directed decision-making scalable to multi-stage and
complex environments. Here, using a sequential decision-making task in rats, we show that
the profile of choices made by animals reveals a gradual shift from a simple representation of
the task space, to a more complex form, which matches the true sequential structure of the
task. Subsequently, we show that within this multi-stage representation, animals engage in a
hierarchical model-based decision-making process. Furthermore, results of a Bayesian model
comparison procedure, consistent with the behavioral results, confirm that animals are using
hierarchical model-based reinforcement learning. Therefore, we provide evidence supporting
the hypothesis that the decision-making processes in the brain can be conceptualized using
model-based hierarchical reinforcement learning and we also provide a new experimental
protocol in rats, that can be used to measure the operation of these decision-making processes.
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5.1 Introduction
According to experimental evidence, there is a combination of multiple reinforcement-learning
(RL) systems behind the value-based decisions made by humans and other animals (Balleine
& O’Doherty, 2010; Daw et al., 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Doya, 1999; Keramati et al., 2011).
These systems have partly overlapping neural and computational substrates and choices made
by each system exhibit dissociable behavioral characteristics. Recently, it has been suggested
that these multiple systems are organized in a hierarchical structure in which higher-level
systems make high-level plans that are then delegated to the lower-level processes for the
purpose of implementation (Botvinick et al., 2009; Dezfouli & Balleine, 2013; Frank & Badre,
2012; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; Ito & Doya, 2011). As for example, one might decide between
making tea or coffee (high-level planning) and, if tea is chosen, the lower-lever processes
repeat the sequence of actions that are used for making tea.
The above description of the hierarchical organization of planning systems broadly maps onto
hierarchical model-based RL (HMB RL) (Barto & Mahadevan, 2003; Botvinick & Weinstein,
2014)(see section 2.4.5). The model-based component of this framework is a computational
description of what is known in the animal learning literature as goal-directed instrumental
conditioning (C. D. Adams, 1982; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994; Tolman, 1948) (section 2.3). For
action selection in a goal-directed manner, an agent deliberates over the consequences of
available actions and selects the actions that are predicted to lead to the desirable outcomes
(or goals). Such an action selection process, however, is known to suffer from the ‘curse
of dimensionality’, i.e., model-based RL does not scale to complex environments in which
the agent needs to iterate over a large number of future states and actions for decision-
making. HMB RL (Barto & Mahadevan, 2003) offers a solution to this problem by introducing
temporally extended actions. This notion is related to psychological studies of motor control
and skill learning according to which humans and other animals form action chunks or action
sequences by concatenating actions together (Lashley, 1951; Rosenbaum, 2009; Smith &
Graybiel, 2014) (section 2.4.4). After formation, these action sequences will serve the agent to
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reach its goals without the need to make decisions for each component of the action sequence
separately. In this way, a HMB RL evaluates all the actions, including actions sequences, and
selects one of them for execution (Dezfouli & Balleine, 2012).
Conceptually, predictions from HMB RL regarding how decisions are made and executed can
be divided into four dimensions: Firstly, HMB RL predicts that actions concatenate and make
action sequences that are performed as a single response unit. This prediction is supported by
a body of evidence that shows that humans (Rosenbaum, Cohen, Jax, Weiss, & van der Wel,
2007; Wymbs et al., 2012), non-human primates (Tanji, 2001), and rodents (Jin & Costa, 2010)
are able to form and execute sequences of actions in this way. The markers of such response
units are usually taken to be (i) faster reaction times between the elements of the action
sequences and (ii) feedback-free operation of the sequences, meaning that, once started, the
sequence will run to its end irrespective of the feedback received after the performance of
each individual action (Keele, 1968; Pew, 1966) (section 3.1).
Secondly, HMB RL implies that an action sequence is evaluated as a whole, not based on its
individual components. Providing evidence for this prediction requires a choice task in which
the disjoint evaluation of actions predicts different choices rather than evaluating a sequence
of actions as a whole. Here, direct studies are scarce (Dezfouli & Balleine, 2013; Ostlund et al.,
2009), although there is evidence from spatial navigation literature (Solway et al., 2014; Wiener
& Mallot, 2003).
Thirdly, according to HMB RL single actions are evaluated in a goal-directed manner. This
prediction is supported by outcome revaluation experiments in humans and rodents (Balleine
& O’Doherty, 2010), which show that the choice of actions is sensitive to changes in the value
of the outcome earned by a specific action.
Fourthly, HMB RL requires that, as with single actions, action sequences are also evaluated in
a goal-directed manner, meaning that, for example, a person used to starting a sequence of
actions in order to attain a certain goal will no longer start that sequence if the goal is no longer
desirable. This property extends the second point above such that an action sequence is not
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only evaluated as a whole, but also with respect to its ultimate outcome, which is supported
by outcome devaluation experiments in rats (Ostlund et al., 2009).
Finally, there is a hidden assumption for using HMB RL as a model of goal-directed actions
(or any other model-based RL system): an agent should be able to build a sequential repre-
sentation of the task space, i.e., the several intermediary needed to reach the goal such that
outcomes are not necessarily the immediate consequence of actions. Such ability has been
demonstrated in humans (e.g., (Daw et al., 2011)), rodents (Ostlund et al., 2009), and monkeys
(e.g., (Mushiake et al., 2006)).
As such, there is independent evidence regarding different aspects of a HMB RL in prior studies,
however, these aspects need to be demonstrated in a single decision-making task to confirm
the integrated operation of HMB RL as the backbone of the decision-making processes in
humans and animals. Here, we target the first three properties of HMB RL, the aim of the
current series of experiments is, therefore, to provide concurrent evidence for the operation
of these properties of HMB RL in rats. This aim requires a multi-stage decision-making task,
which can potentially engage action sequences and, on the other hand, the task must involve
changes in the value of the outcomes, in order to evaluate the operation of the model-based
component of the structure. Such a task has previously been developed in humans (Daw et
al., 2011; Dezfouli & Balleine, 2013) (chapter 4), and here we translated it to an experimental
protocol in rats.
We firstly show that, without any explicit instructions about the structure of the task (which
obviously cannot be provided in rats), early in training subjects made decisions based on the
assumption that the environment is composed of a single stage. Later in training they learned
the true state-space of the task, and made decisions accordingly. After this stage, we show that
subjects executed (first prediction), and evaluated (second prediction) action sequences as a
single response unit and, furthermore, the selection of the actions was goal-directed (third
prediction).
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5.2 Materials and methods
5.2.1 Subjects and apparatus
Eight experimentally naive male Hooded Wistar rats served as subjects in each experiment
(4 x 8 rats in total). All animals were housed in groups of three and handled daily for one
week before training. Training and testing took place in 32 Med Associates operant chambers
housed within sound- and light-resistant shells. The chambers were also equipped with a
pellet dispenser that delivered one 45 mg pellet when activated (Bio-Serve). The chambers
contained two retractable levers that could be inserted to the left and the right of the magazine.
The chambers contained a white noise generator, a Sonalert that delivered a 3 kHz tone, and a
solenoid that, when activated, delivered a 5 Hz clicker stimulus. All stimuli were adjusted to
80 dB in the presence of a background noise of 60 dB provided by a ventilation fan. A 3 W, 24 V
house light mounted on the wall across from the levers and magazine illuminated the chamber.
Microcomputers equipped with MED-PC software (Med Associates) controlled the equipment
and recorded responses. Animals were food deprived one week before starting behavioral
procedures. Feeding was such that rats were maintained at 90% of their free-feeding weight.
The animals were fed after the training sessions of the day and had ad libitum access to tap
water while in the home cage. Each training session (except magazine training sessions)
started with insertion of the levers, and ended with the retraction of the levers.
5.2.2 Statistical analysis
We used R (R Core Team, 2014) and lme4 packages (Bates & Maechler, 2014) to perform a
linear mixed effects analysis. In all the analyses, all the fixed effects (including intercepts) were
treated as random effects varying across subjects. For the analysis that included more than
one session, random effects were assumed to vary across sessions and subjects in a nested
manner. Confidence intervals (CI) of the estimates were calculated using the ‘confint’ method
of lme4 package with the ‘Wald’ parameter.
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Figure 5.1 – Each experiment started with two magazine training sessions (step 1), followed by
several lever training sessions (step 2), in which animals learned that pressing each lever (left
and right levers corresponding to ‘L’ and ‘R’ in the figure) would delivered a reward. The next
step was discrimination training (step 3), in which animals learned that when stimulus S1 was
presented action ‘L’ should be taken to earn a reward, and when S2 was presented action ‘R’
should be taken to earn a reward. The results of this phase of the experiments is presented in
section 5.3.1. The final step of the experiments was two-stage training, in which animals were
trained on a two-stage decision-making task. This training phase comprised multiple training
sessions, and in the middle or at the end of these training sessions several probe sessions were
inserted. The result of the training sessions and probe sessions are presented in two separate
sections. The result of the two-stage training is presented in section 5.3.2 and the result of
the probe sessions is presented in sections 5.3.4, 5.3.5, 5.3.6 and 5.3.7. The structure of the
two-stage task and the probe sessions is explained in Figure 5.2a,b,c.
5.2.3 Behavioral procedures
We conducted four experiments, each of which had several steps. The general structure of
the experiments was similar and it is depicted in Figure 5.1. Below we explain each step and
highlight the differences between the experiments.
Each experiment started with two sessions of magazine training in which grain-based food
pellets were delivered into the food magazine. A total of 30 pellets were delivered, on average
one pellet every 60 seconds. After this stage, animals were trained on a continuous reinforce-
ment schedule, in which each lever press led to the delivery of a pellet. Each lever was trained
in a separate session, and the total number of outcomes was limited to 60 per session. The
total duration of the sessions was limited to 60 minutes. Animals were trained one session on
the left lever, and one session on the right lever. In Experiments 1&3, animals received one
more session on each lever, and in Experiments 2&4 they received one more session in which
the levers were presented in alteration every ten minutes (each lever two times).
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Next, animals were trained on the discrimination phase. Each session started with the pre-
sentation of a stimulus. The stimulus remained presented until the animal took an action
(either pressing the left or right lever). Taking an action caused the stimulus to turn off, and
it could lead to the delivery of the outcome or it could have no consequence depending on
the action taken and presented stimulus. For one of the stimuli, taking the left action led to
reward, and for the other stimulus taking the right action led to reward. Levers and stimuli
were counterbalanced across subjects. After an action was chosen, there was a 60 second
inter-trial interval (ITI), and after that, the next trial started with the presentation of the next
stimulus, again chosen randomly. The duration of each session was 90 minutes, with no limit
on the maximum number of earned rewards. In Experiments 1-3, the stimuli were tone and
clicker, and in Experiment 4, the stimuli were constant and blinking house lights (5 Hz).
Next, subjects received training on the two-stage task depicted in Figure 5.2a in which ani-
mals first made a binary choice at stage 1 (signaled by the illumination of the house light in
Experiments 1-3), after which they transitioned the stage 2 states, in which again they made
another binary choice that could lead to reward delivery, or no-reward. After this, there was an
ITI started, and then the next trial stared with the presentation of the house light (Experiments
1-3). The ITI in Experiments 1&2 was 20 seconds, in Experiment 3, 5-sec, and in Experiment 4
it was 0-sec. Stage 2 states were signaled by the stimuli trained on the previous phase of the
experiment. In each trial, only one of the stage 2 states led to reward, whereas the other state
would not lead to a reward irrespective of the choice of actions. The stage 2 state that earned a
reward frequently switched between the states during the course of a session (Figure 5.2b).
In Experiment 1, this switch occurred every time four outcomes were received since the last
switch (with a maximum 40 outcomes in a session), which later in the training increased to
every eight outcomes (with a maximum 48 outcomes in a session), as depicted in Figure 5.4b.
In Experiment 2, the switch occurred whenever a randomly selected number of outcomes
were received since the last switch. This random number was uniformly drawn from range
8-16 (maximum 48 outcomes in a session). In Experiment 3, the switch occurred every fourth
outcome received (maximum 50 outcomes in a session). In Experiment 4, the switch occurred
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with a probability of 0.14 whenever the subject received an outcome (maximum 60 outcomes
in a session). Furthermore, in Experiments 1&2 because the ITI was long, animals received
a pre-training phase on the two-stage task in which the reward in the stage 2 state was fixed
during a session, and was changed across sessions. Subjects received 10 training sessions in
this condition. Similarly, in Experiment 2, subjects received two pre-training sessions in which
they could earn a reward in both stage 2 states.
Animals were trained on the two-stage task (Figure 5.2b) for 69 sessions in Experiment 1, 57
sessions in Experiment 2, 60 sessions in Experiment 3, and 40 sessions in Experiment 4. In
the middle of, or at the end of these training sessions, animals were given probe sessions in
which stage 1 actions led to stage 2 states in a probabilistic manner. One of the stage 1 actions
commonly led to one of the stage 2 states (80% of the time), and the other stage 1 action
commonly led to the other stage 2 state (Figure 5.2c). For the last probe session in Experiments
1&3, the probability that stage 1 actions led to stage 2 states was 50%. The exact positions of
probe sessions for Experiments 1-4 are depicted in Figure 5.4b, Figure 5.5b, Figure 5.6b, and
Figure 5.7b respectively. The probe sessions are marked with ‘*’ close to their labels. Hereafter,
we will refer to training sessions by their labels. For example ‘sx’, refers to the xth session of
training (starting from the very first training session, which was magazine training).
5.3 Results
We conducted four experiments, each of which had several phases. The general structure of
the experiments was similar and is depicted in Figure 5.1. The aim of the first phase of training
was to train animals to discriminate between the states of the environment (corresponding to
step 3 in Figure 5.1); the results of this phase are presented in section 5.3.1 for all experiments.
In the second phase, animals were trained on the two-stage task, which comprised multiple-
training sessions. In the middle, or at the end of these training sessions several probe sessions
were inserted. The results of the training sessions and probe sessions are presented in two
separate sections. In the first section (section 5.3.2), we present the overall profile of the
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Figure 5.2 – (a) Flow of events in the two-stage task. Trials started with the illumination of the
house light which signaled state S0 (Experiments 1-3). After an action was taken (‘L’ or ‘R’),
the house light turned off, and a stimulus started (S1 or S2). Next, subjects could take another
action (‘L’ or ‘R’), which could lead to the delivery of the outcome, or it might have no outcome.
(b) Stage 1 actions led to the stage 2 stimuli in a deterministic manner. The rewarding stage 2
state changed frequently (reversal). ‘O’ represents outcome, and ‘X’ represents no-outcome.
(c) In probe sessions, stage 1 actions led to the stage 2 states in a probabilistic manner. Taking
action ‘L’ led to state ‘S2’ commonly (80% of the times), and to state ‘S3’ rarely (dashed lines).
(d) Prediction of a pure model-based RL, which decides between choosing actions ‘L’ and ‘R’
at stage 1. This model predicts an interaction between staying on the same stage 1 action,
and earning a reward in the previous trial. (e) Prediction of a pure hierarchical model-based
RL which chooses between different action-sequences at stage 1 (LL, LR, RL, RR). This model
predicts the main effect of whether reward was received in the previous trial. (f) Prediction of
hierarchical model-based RL regarding the stage 2 choices, when the stimulus in the next trial
is different from the current trial. This model predicts that when the previous trial is rewarded,
if the subject stays on the same stage 1 action (stay), it will also stay on the same stage 2 action,
even if the other stage 2 action should be selected. In panels (d,e,f) numbers are arbitrary and
for the purpose of illustration.
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animals’ choices over the entire training period of all four experiments, and we establish that
over the course of training, rats learned that the task is a two-stage decision-making process
(not a single stage task that turns out to be the rats’ a priori assumption). Next, we focus
on the probe sessions which provided specific predictions regarding HMB RL framework
(section 5.3.3), and we present the results of Experiments 1-4 in sections 5.3.4, 5.3.5, 5.3.6 and
5.3.7 respectively.
5.3.1 Learning to discriminate between states
In this phase of training, subjects learned to discriminate between the states of the environ-
ment (S1 and S2). States are signaled by the stimuli, e.g., presence of the tone signaled S1, and
the clicker signaled S2. The basis of the discrimination was the action that should be taken in
each state to earn a reward, i.e., in S1 pressing the left lever (action ‘L’ hereafter) was rewarded,
and in S2 action ‘R’ was rewarded. The probability of taking the correct action for each session
is depicted in Figure 5.4a, Figure 5.5a, Figure 5.6a, and Figure 5.7a respectively for Experiments
1-4, which shows that animals learned to take the correct action. This is indicated by the
results of a logistic regression analysis over all the sessions of each experiment, which revealed
a significant effect of intercept on taking the correct action (Experiment 1 :β=2.1 (CI: 1.51,
2.71), SE=0.30,p<1e-11; Experiment 2: β=1.79 (CI: 1.09,2.50), SE=0.35,p<1e-6; Experiment 3:
β=1.58 (CI: 0.80, 2.37), SE=0.40,p<e-4; Experiment 4: β=0.89 (CI: 0.60, 1.18) SE=0.14,p<1e-8).
In Experiments 1-3, the tone and clicker were used as stimuli, but in Experiment 4, a blinking
house light, and a constant house light were used as stimuli (for the reasons described below).
5.3.2 Learning a two-stage representation of the task
This phase of the training process had two aims. The first aim was for the subjects to learn
the two-stage logic of the task, i.e., the outcomes are not only the result of their immediate
actions (stage2 actions), but stage 1 actions also matter. As we will show, without training,
animals attribute outcomes to the most recent actions, ignoring the two-stage structure of
the environment. The second aim was to train subjects to select actions flexibly based on the
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Figure 5.3 – a) The task has two stages, b) however, animals are not aware of that and they
need to learn this by experiencing the task. Data shows that early in training animals assume
the task has only one stage. As a result they repeated the most rewarded action in the next trial.
It can be shown that this kind of representation predicts that the odds ratio of the probability
of staying on the same stage 1 action will be below one (please see the text for an example).
Later in the training after the animals built a correct representation of the task, then the odds
ratio of the probability of staying on the same stage 1 action went above 1.
feedback they received in recent trials, i.e., promoting high learning rates. To achieve this aim,
we designed a dynamic environment that deprived animals of rewards if they were selecting
actions solely based on the most recent reinforced actions (the first aim), or when actions were
rigid and not guided by feedback (the second aim). The flow of events in the task is depicted in
Figure 5.2a. Subjects first made a binary choice at stage 1 (stage S0), and then they transferred
to either the S1 or S2 states. Then they made another binary choice, which led to either reward
delivery, or no-reward. After an inter-trial interval, the next trial started with presenting the
stimulus that signaled state S0.
Reward of each action and transition between states is depicted Figure 5.2b. Taking action ‘L’
at stage 1 led to state S2 at the second stage, and taking action ‘R’ at the first stage led to state
S1. Taking action ‘L’ in S2, or ‘R’ in S1 was never rewarded (consistent with the discrimination
training phase), however the two other actions (‘R’ in S1, and ‘L’ in S2) could be rewarded. In
each trial, only one of the states led to reward, and the other state would not lead to a reward
127
Chapter 5. Hierarchical decision-making in rats
irrespective of the choice of actions. The reward-earning state changed frequently after several
outcomes were received. As a result of this design, taking a particular stage 1 action earned
outcomes for certain number of times, but after that, the rat needed to switch to the other
action, otherwise it would not have earned any reward at all.
For the illustration of the dynamic of subjects’ choices across training sessions, we first looked
at the effect of reward on staying on the same stage 1 action. In all the subsequent analysis,
we only included trials in which subjects in the previous trial made a correct discrimination
at stage 2, because it was unclear how subjects updated the value of state and actions when
they did not receive a reward because of an incorrect discrimination at stage 2 (which was not
rewarded in any case).
Results of Experiments 1-4 are depicted in Figure 5.4b, Figure 5.5b, Figure 5.6b, and Figure 5.7b
respectively. For each session of training, the figures show the odds ratio of staying on the
same stage 1 action after earning a reward on the previous trial. Odds ratios were calculated
using logistic regression analysis on the effect the reward had on staying on the same stage
1 action in the next trial. At the beginning of the training, as Figure 5.5b, Figure 5.6b, and
Figure 5.7b show, subjects not only did not show a tendency to take the same action after
earning a reward in the previous trial, but they showed a tendency to switch to the other action.
This effect is statistically significant in the first five sessions of Experiment 2 (sessions s20 to
s24; β=-0.25 (CI: -0.37, -0.13), SE=0.06, p<1e-4), Experiment 3 (sessions s15 to s19; β=-0.14
(CI: -0.29, -0.007), SE=0.07, p=0.039), and Experiment 4 (sessions s31 to s35; β=-0.68 (CI: -0.92,
-0.45), SE=0.11, p<1e-8); but, for Experiment 1, although the effects were in the same direction,
they are not statistically significant (sessions s26 to s30; β=-0.06, SE=0.04, p=0.161), probably
because of the pre-training that animals received in this experiment. In fact, this pattern of
choices (Experiments 2-4) is exactly what we expect to see when subjects are treating the task
as having only a single stage (Figure 5.3): subjects repeat the stage 2 action that was rewarded
in the previous trial, in stage 1 of the next trial, i.e., they attribute the reward to the most recent
action. This resembles to switching to the other stage 1 action after receiving a reward. For
example, assume that a subject has performed action ‘L’ at stage 1 and ‘R’ at stage 2 and has
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received a reward. In the next trial, since they are attributing the reward to the most recent
action (‘R’), they repeat this action in the next trial, which makes it seems as though they have
switched to the other action at stage 1.
Another indicator of whether actions are selected under a single-stage, or a two-stage repre-
sentation of the task, is the pattern of magazine entries. Figure 5.4c, Figure 5.5c, Figure 5.6c,
and Figure 5.7c show the probability of magazine entry depending on whether subjects stayed
on the same stage 1 action and whether the previous trial was rewarded. As the figures show,
whenever the previous trial is rewarded, if the subject takes the rewarded stage 2 action of the
previous trial in stage 1 of the next trial (or equivalently switch to the other stage 1 actions),
then they enter the magazine after that action, suggesting that they treated the task as a single
stage decision process. This is indicated by the significant interaction between staying on
the same stage 1 action and earning a reward in the previous trial. In the first five sessions of
training, this effect was significant in all of the experiments: Experiment 1 (sessions s26 to
s30; β=-0.25 (CI: -0.38, -0.12), SE=0.06, p=1e-4), Experiment 2 (sessions s20 to s24; β=-0.14 (CI:
-0.25, -0.03), SE=0.05, p=0.012), Experiment 3 (sessions s15 to s19; β=-0.25 (CI: -0.37, -0.14),
SE=0.05, p<1e-4), and Experiment 4 (sessions s31 to s35; β=-0.19 (CI: -0.33, -0.06), SE=0.06,
p=0.004).
5.3.3 Predictions of HMB RL at stage 1 and stage 2 choices
In the previous phase of training, stage 1 actions led to stage 2 actions in a deterministic
manner, i.e., taking ‘L’ at stage 1 always led to state S2, and taking ‘R’ at stage 1 always led
to state S1 (Figure 5.2b). These are called ‘common’ transitions. Both during and at the end
of these training sessions, we inserted several probe sessions that also included some ‘rare’
transitions in which a stage 1 action led to the other stage 2 action, i.e., taking ‘L’ led to state ‘S1’,
and taking ‘R’ led to state ‘S2’ (Figure 5.2c)(Daw et al., 2011). These are called rare transitions
because they constitute 20% of the trials. Nevertheless, they are important because they allow
us to detect the operation of the model-based and hierarchical decision-making by analyzing
choices at stage 1 and stage 2 of the task.
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Following (Daw et al., 2011), the main analysis regarding stage 1 choices is to look at the
probability of staying on the same stage 1 action, depending on whether the previous trial
was rewarded and whether the transition in the previous trial was common or rare. Pure
model-based RL, which is choosing between actions ‘L’ and ‘R’ at stage 1, predicts that when-
ever subjects receive a reward in the previous trial, if the transition in the previous trial was
common, then they will stay on the same stage 1 action in the next trial, but if the previous
trial was a rare transition, then they will switch to the other stage 1 action in the next trial
to reach the state in which they earned a reward. As such, the operation of model-based RL
predicts an interaction between earning a reward in the previous trial and the transition type
of the previous trial (Figure 5.2d).
The other side of the spectrum is a pure hierarchical model-based RL in which, at stage 1,
model-based RL chooses between performing a sequence of actions: LL, LR, RL, RR. In this
condition, if the performance of an action was rewarded in the previous trial (e.g., performance
of the RR action sequence), then the subject takes the same action sequence in the next trial
(RR), which predicts that the subject will also stay on the same stage 1 action in the next
trial irrespective of the transition type of the previous trial. As such, involvement of pure
hierarchical model-based RL predicts a main effect of reward (Figure 5.2e). Given these two
extremes, a HMB RL, which chooses between all the actions and action sequences (i.e., L, R,
LL, LR, RL, RR), predicts a main effect reward as well as an interaction between reward and
transition.
In addition to the above pattern at stage 1, the HMB RL makes another prediction regarding the
pattern of choices at stage 2 (Dezfouli & Balleine, 2013). Imagine that a subject has performed
a LR action sequence and has received a reward. This means that after performing action ‘L’ at
stage 1, the subject has transitioned to state S2, in which it has taken action ‘R’. Hierarchical
model-based RL predicts that, in the next trial, the subject will take the same action sequence
LR, implying that it will take action ‘L’ at stage 1, and ‘R’ at stage 2, irrespective of which stage
2 state subjects end up in after taking action ‘L’. This predicts that, even if after taking action
‘L’, the subject transitions to state S1 (by a rare transition) in which action ‘L’ should be taken,
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the subject still has a tendency to take action ‘R’ to complete the action sequence. Thus, the
prediction will be: whenever a trial is rewarded, if the subject stays on the same stage 1 action,
it is probably repeating the previously rewarded action sequence and thus will repeat the same
stage 2 action even if that is a different stage 2 state from the previous trial (Figure 5.2f). This
pattern, predicts, therefore, an interaction between staying on the same stage 1 action, and
whether a reward was earned. In the following, we present analyses of stage 1 and stage 2
choices in each experiment (Dezfouli & Balleine, 2013). Note that for the stage 2 results, only
trials in which the stage 2 state differed from the previous trial are included for the analysis.
Similar to the previous phase, only trials in which subjects made a correct discrimination in
the previous trial are included in the subsequent analysis.
5.3.4 Experiment 1
Eight subjects were trained in a two-stage decision-making task that only included common
transitions (Figure 5.2b, Figure 5.4b). This experiment involved eight probe sessions (Fig-
ure 5.2c), and in each test session the probability of rare transitions was 80%, except for the
last session in which the probability of common and rare transitions was equal (%50) for
the reasons that we will explain below. For each session, we analyzed the pattern of choices
at stage 1 and stage 2 of the task, which are depicted in Figure 5.4d-h, and their statistical
analyses are presented in Table 5.1.
At the beginning of training, in session s40, there is a significant interaction between reward
and transition type (β=-0.28 (CI: -0.50, -0.05), SE=0.11, p=0.013), however with a negative
coefficient, which seems to indicate that subjects are staying away from reward in a goal-
directed manner (Figure 5.4d). However, it is straightforward to see that such a pattern
emerges when subjects treat the task as a single stage decision process and so tend to repeat
the most recently rewarded action. In contrast to this pattern, at the end of the training in
session s87 (Figure 5.4g), there is a significant interaction between reward and transition, with
a positive coefficient (β=0.62 (CI: 0.26, 0.98), SE=0.18, p=6e-4), which indicates that (1) subjects
have learned the two-stage logic of the task, (2) they have learned the contingency between
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Table 5.1 – Results of logistic regression analysis of stage 1, and stage 2 choices of Experiment
1. For the stage 1 choices, the analysis is focused on staying on the same stage 1 action in the
next trial based on whether the previous trial was rewarded (rew) and whether the previous
trial was common or rare (trans). ‘re:tr’ is the interaction between reward, and transition type,
and ‘inter’ refers to the intercept term. For stage 2 choices, the analysis focuses on staying on
the same stage 2 actions, based on staying on the same stage 1 action (stay), and earning a
reward in the previous trial (rew). ‘re:st’ is the interaction between ‘reward’, and ‘stay’. ‘p’ refers
to p-value.
Stage 1 actions
session s32 s40 s49 s57 s66 s78 s87 s94 s94:1 s94:2 s94:3
p 0.773 0.312 0.017 0.299 0.177 0.162 0.885 0.428 0.460 0.131 0.194
SE 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.22 0.12 0.24 0.26 0.29inter
β 0.04 0.11 0.38 0.12 0.18 0.15 -0.03 0.10 0.18 -0.39 0.37
p 0.938 0.085 0.090 0.067 0.021 0.001 0.904 <0.001 0.356 0.003 0.007
SE 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.29 0.23rew
β -0.01 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.39 0.02 0.46 0.19 0.85 0.62
p 0.764 0.628 0.098 0.016 0.825 0.383 0.993 0.498 0.407 0.644 0.335
SE 0.14 0.10 0.19 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.24 0.14 0.18 0.29 0.18trans
β 0.04 -0.05 -0.31 -0.28 -0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.09 0.15 -0.13 0.17
p 0.882 0.013 0.362 0.397 0.485 0.417 6.00e-04 <0.001 0.011 0.003 0.668
SE 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.29 0.21re:tr
β 0.01 -0.28 -0.12 0.10 -0.07 0.08 0.62 0.40 0.45 0.85 0.09
Stage 2 actions
session s32 s40 s49 s57 s66 s78 s87 s94 s94:1 s94:2 s94:3
p <1e-7 <1e-12 <1e-11 0.957 <1e-8 <1e-14 <1e-9 <1e-16 0.981 <1e-4 0.999
SE 0.44 0.41 0.43 169.6 0.47 0.35 0.45 0.29 329 0.57 >100inter
β -2.44 -2.93 -2.99 -9.07 -2.84 -2.82 -2.96 -2.67 -7.86 -2.47 -17.63
p 0.933 0.938 0.148 0.981 0.383 0.137 0.169 0.010 0.987 0.924 1
SE 0.32 0.37 0.45 169.6 0.43 0.32 0.45 0.26 329 0.51 >100rew
β 0.02 0.02 0.66 3.95 0.37 0.48 0.63 0.62 5.33 0.04 5.82
p 0.057 0.852 0.074 0.969 0.401 0.386 0.891 0.79 0.987 0.387 1
SE 0.40 0.52 0.48 169.6 0.40 0.33 0.46 0.27 329 0.50 >100stay
β 0.77 -0.09 0.86 -6.56 0.33 0.29 0.06 0.07 -5.21 0.43 2.95
p 0.105 0.515 0.957 0.979 0.089 0.200 0.443 0.85 0.990 0.809 1
SE 0.32 0.35 0.45 169.6 0.39 0.37 0.49 0.28 329 0.50 >100re:st
β 0.51 0.23 -0.02 4.38 0.67 0.47 0.37 -0.05 4.29 -0.12 5.88
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stage 1 actions and stage 2 states. In between these two sessions, there are two sessions (s66
and s78) in which subjects treat the task as a two-stage task, but actions are not yet guided by
the contingency between stage 1 actions and stage 2 states (Figure 5.4e,f). This is indicated by
the significant main effect of reward in these two sessions (Table 5.1/stage1/s66 and s78).
Such a pattern of responses in sessions s66, and s78 can be a product of hierarchical decision-
making. However, the hierarchical account, as mentioned earlier, predicts an interaction
between stay and reward at stage 2 choices, which is not observed in this dataset (Figure 5.4i;
Table 5.1/stage2/s66, s78), which could reflect inhibition of the performance of action se-
quences (we will elaborate this effect in the next experiments). Equally likely, this pattern of
choices could be the result of model-free RL, which predicts staying on the stage 1 choice after
earning reward (a main effect of reward at stage 1) without necessarily staying on the stage 2
choice. In any case, these two sessions seem to be intermediary stages in the development of
model-based actions, rather than a signature of other RL systems. Following this logic, one
can assume that, because the model-based RL is uncertain about the contingencies at this
stage, it updates them with each experience, i.e., with each rare transition, the contingencies
of stage 1 actions will be updated as if they lead to their rare outcomes, which predicts a main
effect of reward at stage 1 and the absence of a reward x transition interaction.
For further investigation of the above issue, at the end of the training sessions we performed
a probe session (s94) in which each stage 1 action led to each stage 2 action with equal
probability. The rationale for this manipulation was to make the contingencies ambiguous
for the subject and so render actions sensitive to their final outcomes. Figure 5.4h shows
the result of this session, and Figure 5.4j-l shows the result of the break down of the trials
to early, mid, and late trials (there were 48 outcomes in total). Over the whole session, the
effects of reward and also the interaction between reward and transition type were significant
(Table 5.1/stage1/s94). However, consistent with our expectation, early in training the behavior
was only model-based (Table 5.1/stage1/s94:1), whereas in the middle of the session there
was also an effect of reward (Table 5.1/stage1/s94:2), which is indicated by a reward by session
period interaction (period 1: number of outcomes < 16, period 2: 32 >number of outcomes
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Figure 5.4 – Experiment 1. (a) Results of the discrimination training showing the percentage
of the correct responses averaged over subjects. (b) Odds ratio of the probability of staying
on the same stage 1 action after getting rewarded on the previous trial. Odds ratio=1 implies
an equal preference for both actions. Sessions marked with ‘*’ are the probe sessions which
included both rare and common transitions. (c) The probability of entering the magazine as a
function of staying (stay) or switching (switch) to the other stage 1 action, and whether the
previous trial was rewarded (averaged over subjects and the first five sessions of the training; 8
* 5 data points contributed to each mean). (d-h, j-l) The probability of staying on the same
stage 1 action, averaged over subjects, as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded
(reward/no reward), and whether the transition in the previous trial was common or rare.
(i) Stage 2 choices in session s78. The graph shows the probability of staying on the same
stage 2 action averaged over subjects, as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded
(reward/no reward), and whether subjects stayed on the same stage 1 action (stay/switch).
Only trials in which the stage 2 state is different from the previous trial are included. Error-bars
1SEM.
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>=16) (β=0.35 (CI: 0.29, 1.19), SE=0.16, p=0.030). Late in the session the model-based effect was
removed from choices (Table 5.1/stage1/s94:3), which is indicated by a reward by transition
by session period interaction (period 1: 32 >number of outcomes >=16, period 2: number of
outcomes >=32) (β=-0.38 (CI: -0.74, -0.03), SE=0.18, p=0.033).
The results of this experiment revealed the development of model-based action, and how they
are affected by manipulating contingencies in the environment. However, we were not able to
see evidence for the engagement of HMB RL, in contrast to a previous study using a similar
task in humans (Dezfouli & Balleine, 2013). As discussed earlier, in order for the hierarchical
decision-making to emerge, animals need to consider the performance of action sequences
LL, LR, RL, RR at stage 1. This requires that these action sequences be already formed by
the concatenation of single actions, which takes place when the consecutive performance
of single actions gets rewarded. However, the training conditions of this experiment only
included common transitions, which means that only the performance of the sequences L->R,
and R->L will be rewarded, whereas and the performance of the sequence L->L and R->R is
never rewarded. As such, in order to promote the formation of these action sequences, in
the next set of experiments the subjects were explicitly trained on a condition in which the
performance of the LL and RR sequences earned reward.
5.3.5 Experiment 2
Eight subjects were trained in a two-stage decision-making task that only included common
transitions (Figure 5.2b, Figure 5.5b). In the middle of these training sessions, animals were
trained in a condition that only included rare transitions1 (sessions s62 to s64; Figure 5.5b),
which means that animals needed to perform the LL and RR sequences in order to earn a
reward. At the end of the training sessions, the animals were given a probe session which
included both common and rare transitions (80% common transitions).
1Note that in these sessions the definition of the rare transitions is similar to the previous sessions (i.e., action
‘L’ leading to state S1 and action ‘R’ leading to state S2), even though in these sessions rare transitions are more
common.
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Table 5.2 – Results of logistic regression analysis of stage 1, and stage 2 choices in Experiments
2-4. For the stage 1 choices, the analysis is focused on staying on the same stage 1 action in the
next trial, based on whether the previous trial was rewarded (rew), and whether the previous
trial was common or rare (trans). ‘re:tr’ is the interaction between reward, and transition type,
and ‘inter’ refers to the intercept term. For stage 2 choices, the analysis is focused on staying
on the same stage 2 actions, based on staying on the same stage 1 action (stay) and earning a
reward in the previous trial (rew). ‘re:st’ is the interaction between ‘reward’, and ‘stay’. ‘p’ refers
to p-value. ‘Expr’ stands for ‘Experiment’.
Stage 1 actions
Expr2 Expr3 Expr4
session s76 s74 s57 s58 s70
p <1e-8 0.84 0.149 0.019 0.375
SE 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.18inter
β 0.78 -0.02 0.21 0.47 -0.16
p <0.001 <1e-8 0.565 0.020 0.003
SE 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.13 0.20rew
β 0.45 0.49 0.10 0.32 0.59
p 0.467 0.78 0.299 0.616 0.111
SE 0.15 0.14 0.26 0.28 0.25trans
β -0.11 -0.04 0.27 -0.14 0.39
p 0.190 0.56 0.174 0.432 <1e-4
SE 0.14 0.08 0.36 0.16 0.21re:tr
β 0.18 0.05 0.49 0.12 0.92
Stage 2 actions
Expr2 Expr3 Expr4
session s76 s74 s57 s58 s70
p <1e-13 <1e-15 0.456 0.830 <0.001
SE 0.35 0.09 0.24 0.36 0.28inter
β -2.61 -0.86 -0.18 -0.07 0.96
p 0.145 0.001 0.004 <0.001 <0.001
SE 0.38 0.09 0.15 0.26 0.22rew
β 0.56 0.28 0.42 0.98 0.85
p 0.887 0.02 0.072 0.155 0.017
SE 0.33 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.24stay
β -0.04 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.58
p 0.600 0.24 0.007 0.513 0.011
SE 0.34 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.20re:st
β 0.18 0.09 0.43 0.11 0.52
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Stage 1 choices are depicted in Figure 5.5d, and the results of the logistic regression analysis are
presented in Table 5.2/stage1/expr2/s76, which indicates only the main effect of reward. This
pattern of choices at stage 1 is consistent with the engagement of pure hierarchical decision-
making. However, this account also predicts an interaction between staying on stage 1 actions,
and receiving a reward in the previous trial. The results of this stage 2 action are depicted in
Figure 5.5e, in which the mentioned interaction is not significant (Table 5.2/stage2/expr2/s76).
For a closer inspection of this effect, we broke down the trials into two kinds: (1) trials in
which animals earned a reward from a common transition in the previous trial (i.e., they have
performed a LR or RL action sequences), and therefore repeating that sequence in the next
trial involved moving from one side of the box to the other, (2) trials in which animals earned a
reward from a rare transition in the previous trial (i.e., they have performed a LL or RR action
sequence in the previous trial) and, therefore, repeating that sequence involved pressing the
same lever twice, without a need to move to the other side of the box. One can assume that,
because repeating the action sequence in the first kind of trial takes longer, subjects are more
likely to be able to inhibit an inappropriate ongoing action sequence, whereas in the later case,
performance of the action sequence is faster, and is more likely to be executed. Figure 5.5f
shows the probability of staying on the same stage 2 action, depending on whether the action
sequence to be executed required switching to the other side of the training box or not. As the
figure shows, when the previous trial was rewarded, and subjects stayed on the same stage 1
action, then in the second kind of trials, subjects were less able to inhibit the ongoing action
sequence. This is indicated by a result of logistic regression on the probability of staying on the
same stage 2 action as a function of whether the sequence performance required switching
to the other side of the training box (β=-1.06 (CI: -1.87,-0.24), SE=0.41, p=0.010). Note in
Figure 5.5f, some of the conditions occur only when there are two consecutive rare transitions
(since only trials in which the stage 2 state is different from the previous trial are included in
the analysis), which are sparse. As such, in the next experiment, in addition to other changes,
we gave a test in which the probability of common and rare transitions was equal (50%).
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Figure 5.5 – Experiment 2. (a) Results of the discrimination training, showing the percentage
of the correct responses. (b) Odds ratio of the probability of staying on the same stage 1 action
after getting rewarded in the previous trial. (c) The probability of entering the magazine as a
function of staying (stay) or switching (switch) to the other stage 1 action, and whether the
previous trial was rewarded (first five sessions of the training; 8 * 5 data points contributed
to each mean). (d) The probability of staying on the same stage 1 action (session s76) as a
function of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no reward) and whether the
transition in the previous trial was common or rare. (e) The probability of staying on the
same stage 2 action (session s76), as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded
(reward/no reward) and whether subjects stayed on the same stage 1 action (stay/switch). (f)
The probability of staying on the same stage 2 action as a function of whether the previous
trial was rewarded (reward/ no reward), whether the same stage 1 action was taken in the
current trial, (same/switch), and whether the performance of the action sequence required
switching to the other side of the box or not (same side/different sides). Only trials in which
the stage 2 state was different from the previous trial are included in panels e,f. Error-bars
1SEM.
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
s06 s14
%
co
rr
ec
t
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
reward no reward
%
st
ay common
rare
0
1
2
3
s15 s28 s54 s59 s74*
od
ds
 ra
tio
p−value
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
strict sequence
all rare
a) discrimination learning c) probability of entering magazine (EM)
b) reward learning
d) stage1 choices
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
reward no reward
%
EM stay
switch
no reward
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
reward
%
st
ay stay
switch
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
%
st
ay
same side
{ { { {
e) stage2 choices
f ) stage2 choices
Figure 5.6 – Experiment 3. (a) Results of the discrimination training, showing the percentage
of the correct responses. (b) Odds ratio of the probability of staying on the same stage 1 action
after getting rewarded in the previous trial. (c) The probability of entering the magazine as a
function of staying (stay) or switching (switch) to the other stage 1 action, and whether the
previous trial was rewarded (first five sessions of the training; 8 * 5 data points contributed to
each bar). (d) The probability of staying on the same stage 1 action (session s74) as a function
of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no reward), and whether the transition in
the previous trial was common or rare. (e) The probability of staying on the same stage 2 action
(session s74), as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no reward), and
whether subjects stayed on the same stage 1 action (stay/switch). (f) The probability of staying
on the same stage 2 action, as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/
no reward) whether the same stage 1 action was taken in the current trial, (same/switch), and
whether the performance of the action sequence required switching to the other side of the
box or not (same side/different sides). Only trials in which the stage 2 state was different from
the previous trial are included in panels e,f. Error-bars 1SEM.
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5.3.6 Experiment 3
The results of the previous experiment indicated that the lack of evidence for the engagement
of hierarchal RL at stage 2 choices was likely because the performance of the action sequences
that require pressing levers on both sides of the box is prone to high inhibition. Switching
from one side of the box to the other side of the box in some trials was intervened by a
magazine response (animals check the magazine before executing the second component
of the sequence) which can potentially make such action sequences prone to interruption
and inhibition. Based on this, in Experiment 3, if a subject made a magazine entry response
after a stage 1 action and before the stage 2 action, then the trial aborted (strict sequences in
Figure 5.6b).
Eight subjects were trained in a two-stage decision-making task that only included common
transitions (Figure 5.2b, Figure 5.6b). The result of the stage 1 choices is depicted in Figure 5.6d,
and the statistical analyses are presented in Table 5.2/stage1/expr3/s74, which indicates the
main effect of reward, which potentially indicates that rats were using hierarchical RL. The
results of the stage 2 choices are presented in Figure 5.6e, and the statistical analyses are
presented in Table 5.2/stage2/expr3/s74. Similar to Experiment 2, choices at stage 2 did not
indicate the operation of hierarchical decision-making; however, when animals were rewarded
and stayed on the same stage 1 action, then they seemed to be able to inhibit the action
sequences more if the sequence performance did not require switching to the other side of
the box (Figure 5.6f), as suggested by the result of a logistic regression assessing the effect of
switching sides on staying on the same stage 2 action (β=-1.4 (CI:-1.79,-.92), SE=0.26, p<1e-7).
5.3.7 Experiment 4
The result of Experiment 2 and 3 suggested increased inhibition of action sequences by the
stage 2 stimulus when subjects needed to switch from one side of the box to the other side.
This effect should be predicted to diminish if less salient stimuli were used to signal stage 2
states. Based on this, in this experiment instead of the clicker and tone signaling the stage 2
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states, we used a constant and a blinking house light to signal the stage 2 states. We trained
eight subjects in these conditions and, as expected, it took longer for the subjects to learn to
discriminate between these two stimuli, compared to the tone and clicker (Figure 5.7a vs e.g.,
Figure 5.6a), which is indicated by the result of a logistic regression that showed a significant
effect of experiment (Experiment 4 vs Experiment 3) on correct discrimination in the first 10
sessions (β=1.39 (CI: 0.60, 2.18), SE=0.40, p=5e-4).
After training (Figure 5.7b), animals were given three probe sessions (s57, s58, s70). Ta-
ble 5.2/stage1/expr4/s57,s58,s70 presents the statistical analysis of the sessions. In session
s57, animals did not show any sign of model-based or hierarchical decision-making at stage
1 (main effect of reward p>0.565; reward-transition interaction p>0.174), and there was no
indication of discrimination between the states at stage 2 choices (Table 5.2/stage2/expr4/s57,
s58:intercept, p>0.25). As such, animals were given another test (s58), which indicated a main
effect of reward (Table 5.2/stage1/expr4/s58), however, at stage 2, subjects did not show any
discrimination between stage 2 states (Table 5.2/stage2/expr4/s58:intercept; p>0.25). As such,
subjects were given nine more training sessions (s59 to s69), and then they were given a further
probe test (s70).
The results of stage 1 actions are presented in Figure 5.7d, and statistical analysis of stage 1
choices are presented in Table 5.2/stage1/expr4/s70. As the table shows, there was a significant
reward-transition interaction (p<1e-4), which indicates the engagement of the model-based
controller. In addition to that, the main effect of reward was also significant, which potentially
indicates the engagement of HMB RL. Figure 5.7e presents choices at stage 2, which were
consistent with the predictions of HMB RL about stage 2 choices, i.e., subjects tended to take
the same stage 2 action when the previous trial was rewarded and they stayed on the same
stage 1 actions. This is indicated by a significant interaction between staying on the same
stage 1 action and reward in the previous trial (β=0.52 (CI: 0.11, 0.92), SE=0.20, p=0.011).
Comparison of RL models. The above behavioral analysis suggests that HMB RL guides choices.
However, the analysis only reveals the effect of feedback from one-trial-back on current
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Figure 5.7 – Experiment 4. (a) Results of the discrimination training, showing the percentage
of the correct responses. (b) Odds ratio of the probability of staying on the same stage 1 action
after getting rewarded in the previous trial. (c) The probability of entering the magazine as a
function of staying (stay) or switching (switch) to the other stage 1 action, and whether the
previous trial was rewarded (first five sessions of the training; 8 * 5 data points contributed to
each bar). (d) The probability of staying on the same stage 1 action (session s70) as a function
of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no reward) and whether the transition
in the previous trial was common or rare. (e) The probability of staying on the same stage
2 action (session s70), as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no
reward) and whether subjects stayed on the same stage 1 action (stay/switch). (f) Simulation
of stage 1 choices, and (g) stage 2 choices using the best fitted parameters for each subject.
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choices, whereas choices are presumably guided by the history of prior feedback, and not
only the feedback received on the previous trial. As such, in order to analyze the full profile
of choices, we compared different variants of the RL algorithms using a Bayesian modeling
comparison procedure with the aim of confirming that subjects are using HMB RL as opposed
to other non-hierarchical alternatives. Based on previous studies using similar decision-
making tasks in humans (Daw et al., 2011; Dezfouli & Balleine, 2013; Gläscher, Daw, Dayan, &
O’Doherty, 2010), we compared four families of RL algorithms: (1) a non-hierarchical model-
based RL family, (2) a model-free RL family, (3) a hybrid model-free, model-based RL family,
and (4) a hierarchical model-based RL family. In total we considered 328 different models,
where each family consisted of several members with different degrees of freedom (please
see section 5.5 for details of each model). We then calculated the log-model evidence for
each model given the choices of subjects. The results indicated that the differences in model
evidence (Bayes factor) between the best fitting model of the HMB RL family, and the non-
hierarchical model-based RL (family 1)/model-free RL (family 2)/ model-free, model-based
hybrid RL (family 3), were 50, 47, and 51 respectively. In Bayesian model comparison literature,
Bayes factors greater than 10 are considered to be strong evidence (Jeffreys, 1961), and thus
the above results of model comparison reveal that subjects were very likely utilizing HMB RL
action selection.
We then simulated the HMB RL model in the task conditions with the best fitting parameters
(please see section 5.5 for how parameters were obtained) and analyzed stage 1 and stage 2
choices. Analysis of stage 1 choices (Figure 5.7f) revealed a significant main effect of reward
(β=0.25 (CI: 0.19, 0.32), SE=0.03, p<0.001), and a significant interaction between whether the
previous trial was rewarded, and the transition type of the previous trial (β=0.29 (CI: 0.19, 0.38),
SE=0.04, p<0.001). Analysis of stage 2 choices (Figure 5.7g), revealed a significant interaction
between staying on the same stage 1 action and earning a reward on the previous trial (β=0.52
(CI: 0.33, 0.70), SE=0.09, p<0.001), which is consistent with predictions from HMB RL regarding
stage 2 choices.
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5.4 Discussion
Model-based reinforcement learning provides a computational framework for studying goal-
directed actions. This notion, however, assumes that the states and available actions are
given to an agent a priori, whereas the ability to (i) create new states to be able to correctly
represent task space, and (ii) create complex actions out of simpler actions to make hierar-
chical decisions, is also an integral part of goal-directed decision-making. Using a sequential
decision-making task in rats, we firstly provided behavioral evidence that, at the beginning
of training, animals make decisions based on a simple representation of the environment,
but with sufficient training, they learn the sequential nature of the task and build the correct
state-space representation of the environment as required for the operation of model-based
RL. Secondly, within this multi-stage representation, we show that animals chunk actions
together and create action sequences that are then integrated into model-based RL, revealing
a hierarchical organization of decision-making processes.
The results of the experiments showed that the operation of HMB RL requires certain experi-
mental conditions, such as pre-training on action sequences and low intrusion of other factors
on the performance of action sequences. Without these conditions, choices at stage 1 are
consistent with the operation of HMB RL, but not choices at stage 2. This would have been due
to inhibition of action sequences. Alternatively this pattern of choices could also indicate the
operation of another RL system, such as model-free RL, instead of HMB RL with interrupted
sequences. Within this alternative framework, choices are a mixture of goal-directed actions
(model-based), and model-free actions that are guided by their ‘cached’ (as opposed to their
current values) (Daw et al., 2005). Our results are ambivalent with respect to this interpretation,
but since, in other conditions, there is positive evidence for HMB RL, it seems to be more
parsimonious to interpret this result in terms of the inhibition of action sequences, rather
than being the output of a model-free system.
Besides theoretical considerations regarding the hierarchical component of the task, the cur-
rent decision-making task provides a behavioral protocol for investigating the acquisition
144
5.5. Appendix: computational modeling
of the correct state-space in a multi-stage decision- making task, which can be used to un-
cover the neural substrates of this process. Furthermore, using a computational modeling
procedure, the task provides a quantitative measure of the inhibition of action sequences by
other monitoring processes, which again can be used to uncover the neural substrates of this
process.
5.5 Appendix: computational modeling
As we mentioned in the article, we compared four different families of the RL algorithms: (1) a
non-hierarchical model-based RL family, (2) a model-free RL family, (3) a hybrid model-free,
model-based RL family, and (4) a hierarchical model-based RL family. Each family had several
instances, that we described them below.
5.5.1 Simulation environment
We assumed that the environment has five states; the initial state denoted by S0, stage 2 states
denoted by S1 and S2, the reward state denoted by SRe and no-reward state denoted by SN R .
For the case of non-hierarchical models, we assumed that actions L and R are available in
states S0, S1 and S2, and for the case of hierarchical models, we assumed actions L, R, LR, LL,
RL, and RR are available in stats S0, and actions L and R, are available in states S1 and S2.
5.5.2 Model-based RL (MB)
The model-based system works by learning the model of the environment, and then calculating
the value of actions using the learned model. The model of the environment is composed
of the transition function (T (.)), and the reward function (R(.)). We denote the transition
function with T (s′|a, s) which is the probability of reaching state s′ after executing action a
in state s. We assume that the transition function at the first stage is fixed (T (S1|R,S0)= 0.8
and T (S2|L,S0)= 0.8) and it will not change during learning. For other states, after executing
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action a in state s and reaching state s′, the transition function updates as follows:
∀s′′ ∈ {SRe ,SN R } : T (s′′|s, a)=
 (1−η)T (s
′′|s, a)+η : s′ = s′′
(1−η)T (s′′|s, a) : s′ 6= s′′
(5.1)
Where η(0 < η < 1) is the update rate of the state-action-state transitions. For the reward
functions, we assumed that the reward at state SRe is one (R(SRe )= 1), and zero in all other
states.
Based on the above reward and transition functions, the goal-directed value of taking action a
in state s is as follows:
∀s ∈ {S0,S1,S2} : V G (s, a)=
∑
s′
T (s′|s, a)V G (s′) (5.2)
Where:
V G (s)=
 maxa V
G (s, a) : s ∈ {S0,S1,S2}
R(s) : s ∈ {SRe ,SN R }
(5.3)
Finally, the agent uses the calculated values to choose actions. The probability of selecting
action a in state s, denoted by pi(s, a), will be determined according to the soft-max rule:
pi(s, a)= e
β(s)V G (s,a)+κ(s,a)+d(s,a)∑
a′ eβ(s)V
G (s,a′)+κ(s,a′)+d(s,a′) (5.4)
The above equation reflects the fact that actions with higher values are more likely to be
selected. The β(s) parameter controls the rate of exploration; the parameter κ(s, a) is the
action preservation parameter and captures the general tendency of taking the same action as
the previous trial (Ito & Doya, 2009; Lau & Glimcher, 2005). Finally, the term d(s, a) represents
the tendency of the subjects to take the discriminative actions at the stage 2 states (taking
action R in S2 and action L in S1). A positive value for this parameter entails that a subject has
a tendency to take the discriminative action at stage 2 states. Please note that the effect of this
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parameter is on top of the effect of values at stage 2 states.
For the exploration parameter, we assume that β(s)=β1 if s = S0 and β(s)=β2 if s ∈ {S1,S2}.
For the perseveration parameter we assumed that if s = S0 and a being the action taken in
the previous trial in the S0 state, then κ(s, a) = k, otherwise it will be zero. Finally, for the
discrimination parameter, we assume d(s, a) = φ if (s, a) ∈ {(S1,L), (S2,R)}, and d(s, a) = 0
otherwise.
In the most general form, all the parameters (β1,β2,η,k,φ) were treated as free parameters. We
also generated eight variants by (1) setting β1 =β2 (i.e., rate of exploration at stage 1 and stage
2 states are the same), (2) setting k = 0 (there is no tendency to perseverate on the previously
taken actions), and (3) setting φ= 0 (there is not tendency to take the discriminative action at
stage 2).
5.5.3 Model-free RL (MF)
Here we used Q-learning (Watkins, 1989) for model-free learning. After taking action a in state
s, and reaching state s′, model-free values update as follows:
Q H (s, a)←Q H (s, a)+α(V H (s′)−Q H (s, a)) (5.5)
Where α(0<α< 1) is the learning rate, which can be different in stage 1 and stage 2 actions.
For the first stage actions (actions executed in S0), α=α1, and for the second stage actions
α=α2. In equation 5.5, V H (s) is the value of the best action in state s:
V H (s)=
 maxa Q
H (s, a) : s ∈ {S0,S1,S2}
R(s) : s ∈ {SRe ,SN R }
(5.6)
In the trials in which the best action is executed in s ∈ {S1,S2} the value of the action executed
in state S0 also updates according to the outcome. If a was to be the action which was taken in
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S0, a′ the action taken in s, and s′ the state visited after executing a′, values update as follows:
Q H (S0, a)←Q H (S0, a)+α1λ(V H (s′)−Q H (s, a′)) (5.7)
Where λ(0< λ< 1) is the reinforcement eligibility parameter, and determines how the first
stage action values are affected by receiving the outcome after executing the second stage
actions. The action selection method, and variants of this form of learning are described in
the next section.
5.5.4 Model-free, model-based hybrid RL (MF-MB)
This model is a combination of model-free RL, and model-based RL, in which final values are
computed by combining the values provided by model-free and model-based processes:
V (s, a)=wV G (s, a)+ (1−w)Q H (s, a) (5.8)
Were w(0<w < 1) determines the relative contribution of model-free and model-based values
into the final values.
The probability of selecting action a in state s will be determined according to the soft-max
rule:
pi(s, a)= e
β(s)V (s,a)+κ(s,a)+d(s,a)∑
a′ eβ(s)V (s,a
′)+κ(s,a′)+d(s,a′) (5.9)
Were parameters are same as the ones we described in the ‘Model-based (MB)’ section.
In the most general form, all the free parameters are included in the model: β1, β2, η, α1,
λ, w , k, φ (we assumed that α2 = η). We generated 32 simpler models by setting (1) λ = 0,
(2) α1 =α2 (learning rate of model-free system is the same at stage 1 and stage 2 states), (3)
β1 = β2 (rate of exploration is the same at stage 1 and stage 2 states), (4) k = 0 (there is no
tendency to perseverate on the previously taken actions), and (5) φ= 0 (there is not tendency
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to take the discriminative action at stage 2).
By setting w = 0 the above hybrid model degenerated to a model-free system described in
the previous section, and therefore, we generated 32 variants of model-free RL (similar to the
hybrid model), system by setting w = 0.
5.5.5 Hierarchical model-based RL (HMB)
Implementation of the hierarchical structure is similar to hierarchical RL, with action se-
quences (LL, LR , etc) as options (section 2.4.5). We assumed actions L, R , LL, LR , RL, and RR
are available in stats S0, and actions L and R , are available in states S1 and S2. After reaching a
terminal state (SRe or SN R ), transition functions of both the action sequence, and the single
action that led to that state update according to equation 5.1. In the case of single actions,
the transition function will be updated by the η = η1 update rate, and in the case of action
sequences, the transition function will be updated by the η= η2 update rate. Based on the
learned transition function, value of action a in state s is calculated by the goal-directed
system using equation 5.2.
After calculating values of actions (V G (s, a)) using equation 5.2, the probability of selecting
each action will be as follows:
pi(s, a)= e
β(s)V G (s,a)+κ(s,a)+d(s,a)∑
a′ eβ(s)V
G (s,a′)+κ(s,a′)+d(s,a′) (5.10)
β(s, a) is the rate of exploration. The rate of exploration for stage 2 states (s ∈ {S1,S2}) is
β(s, a) = β2. For stage 1 actions (s = S0), if a is a single action, we assume β(s, a) = β1, and
if a is an action sequence β(s, a) = β3. As before, κ(s, a) captures action perseveration. We
assumed that κ(s, a)= k1 if action a is a single action, and κ(s, a)= k2 if action a is an action
sequence. Parameter d(s, a) is similar to the previous sections.
For calculating the probability of selecting actions in the second stage, given the first choice
of the subject, we need to know whether that action is a part of an action sequence selected
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earlier, or is it under goal-directed control. Assume we know action L has been executed in
state S0 by the subject; then, the probability of this action being due to performing the LR
action sequence is:
p(LR|S0,L)= pi(LR|S0)
pi(L|S0)+pi(LR|S0)+pi(LL|S0)
(5.11)
Similarly, the probability of observing L due to selecting the single action L is:
p(L|S0,L)= pi(L|S0)
pi(L|S0)+pi(LR|S0)+pi(LL|S0)
(5.12)
Based on this, the probability that the model assigns to action a in state s ∈ {S1,S2}, given that
action a′ is being observed in S0 is:
p(a|s)= p(a′|S0, a′)pi(a|s)+p(a′a|S0, a′) (5.13)
Where p(aa′|S0, a′) and p(a′|S0, a′) are calculated using equations 5.11 and 5.12 respectively.
Next, we assumed that even under the conditions in which an action sequence is being
executed, there is a chance that the performance of the action sequence will be interrupted.
Let’s assume that the probability of interrupting an action sequence is I , then equation 5.13,
will become as follows:
p(a|s)=pi(a|s)(p(a′|S0, a′)(1− I )+ I )+ (1− I )p(a′a|S0, a′) (5.14)
The above equation, in the case of I = 0, i.e., action sequences never become interrupted, will
degenerate to equation 5.13. In the case of I = 1, i.e., all the action sequences are interrupted
and they have no effect on stage 2 choices, and we have:
p(a|s)=pi(a|s) (5.15)
Which indicates probability of taking each action at stage 2 is guided only by the rewards
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earned on that stage 2, and not by the action sequences in the first stage.
In the most general form, all the free parameters are included in the model: β1, β2, β3, η1, η2,
k1, k2, φ,I . We generated 256 simpler models by setting (1) β1 =β2 (exploration rates at stage
1 and stage 2 choices are the same), (2) β1 =β3 (exploration rates for action sequences and
single actions are the same), (3) η1 = η3 (learning rates for action sequences and single actions
are the same), (4) k1 = 0 (no perseveration for single actions), (5) k2 = 0 (no perseveration for
action sequences), (6) φ = 0 (no tendency to take discriminative actions), (7) I = 1 (action
sequences are always interrupted), (8) I = 0 (action sequences are never interrupted).
5.5.6 Model comparison
We took a hierarchical Bayesian approach to compare different models. This approach pro-
vides a framework to compare models based on their complexity, and their fit to data. Bayesian
model comparison is based on the model evidence quantity, which is the probability of the
data given a model. The approach that we took to calculate this quantity is similar to the
approach taken in (Piray et al., 2014), which is based on (Huys et al., 2011).
For each model, there are two sets of free parameters: group-level parameters denoted byΘ
(we call these parameters hyper-parameters), and subject-level parameters denoted with θi
for subject i . The hyper-parameters define the prior distribution over subject-level parameters.
The aim is to calculate the probability of data (denoted by D) given model M :
P (D|M)=
∫
Θ
P (D|M ,Θ)P (Θ)dΘ (5.16)
Since the above integral is intractable, we approximate it using Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) (Schwarz, 1978):
logP (D|M)≈∑
i
logP (Di |M ,ΘML)− 1
2
|Θ| log |D| (5.17)
Where ΘML is the maximum-likelihood estimate of Θ, and Di is the data of subject i . |Θ| is
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the number of hyper-parameters, and |D| is the sum of number of choices made by all the
subjects. In the above formula, the term inside the sum is:
P (Di |M ,ΘML)=
∫
θi
P (Di |M ,θi )P (θi |ΘML)dθi (5.18)
Which is again intractable to compute, and we use Laplace method (MacKay, 2003) to approxi-
mate it:
logP (Di |M ,ΘML)≈ logP (Di |M ,θM APi )+logP (θM APi |ΘML)+
1
2
|θi | log2pi− 1
2
log |Hi | (5.19)
Where θM APi is the maximum a posterior (MAP) estimate of θi . |θi | is the number of free
parameters for model M , and |Hi | is determinant of the Hessian matrix at θM APi .
Thus in summary, we calculated the model evidence for each subject using equation 5.19, and
then we summed over all the model evidence for all the subjects to calculate equation 5.17,
which is the model evidence over the whole group.
The only remaining question is how to calculateΘML , which is:
ΘML = argmax
Θ
∑
i
log
∫
P (Di |M ,θi )P (θi |Θ)dθi (5.20)
Similar to (Huys et al., 2011), we solved the above optimization problem using the expectation-
maximization (EM) procedure (Dempster, Laird, & Rubin, 1977). This procedure starts with
an initial value for the hyper-parameters Θ, using which the posterior distribution of each
individual’s parameter will be estimated using the Laplace approximation. These individual
posterior distributions then shape a new value for the hyper-parameters (Θ), which will be
used again to get new posterior distribution for each individual. This process continues until
the hyper-parameters do not change anymore across iterations. Please refer to (Huys et al.,
2011) for the details of the method.
The prior over all the individual level parameters (θi ) where assumed to be a Gaussian distribu-
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tion, and the mean and variance of the Gaussian were included in the hyper-parameters (thus
the number of hyper-parameters for each model were twice as the number of free parameters
of the model). Parameters that had a limited range (e.g., learning rates), were transformed to
stratify the constrains.
We used the NLOPT software package (S. G. Johnson, n.d.) for nonlinear optimization using
‘BOBYQA’ algorithm. Finally, we used ‘DerApproximator’ package (Kroshko, n.d.) in order to
estimate the Hessian at the MAP point.
5.5.7 Model comparison results
In total we tested 328 models (MB:n=8, MF:n=32, MB-MF:n=32, HMB:n=256). For the best
four models in each family, Table 5.3 below represents the negative log-model evidence
(− logP (D|M)) (obtained from equation 5.17) for each model, the number of free parameters
of each model (df), the free parameters of each model, and the family of each model. The
table also represents a pseudo-r statistic (p–r 2), which is a normalized measure of the degree
of variance accounted for in comparison to a model with random choices (averaged over
subjects).
Out of 328 models that we tested, one of the models, which had eight free parameters
(β1,β3,η1,η2,k1,k2,φ, I ), was not identifiable (the estimated hessian matrix was not a positive-
definite matrix), and therefore it was excluded from the analysis.
Table 5.4 below represents estimated parameters for each individual in the best model (in-
dicated by * in the table). The term ‘–logP (Di |M ,ΘML)’ represents the negative log-model
evidence for each subject, obtained from equation 5.19.
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Table 5.3 – For the best four models in each family, the table represents the negative log-model
evidence (− logP (D|M)) for each model, the number of free parameters of each model (df),
the free parameters of each model, and the family of each model. The table also represents a
pseudo-r statistic (p–r 2), which is a normalized measure of the degree of variance accounted
for in comparison to a model with random choices (averaged over subjects).
model family free-parameters p-r 2 df − logP (D|M)
HMB* β1,η1,k2,φ, I = 0 0.21 4 1172.09
HMB β1,η1,k2,k3,φ, I = 0 0.21 5 1176.48
HMB β1,η1,k1,k2,φ, I = 0 0.21 5 1178.90
HMB β1,η1,k2,φ, I 0.21 5 1178.93
MF β1,β2,α1,λ 0.17 4 1219.57
MF β1,β2,α1,λ,k 0.18 5 1220.41
MB β1,β2,η,k 0.18 4 1222.35
MF-MB β1,β2,α1,λ, w 0.18 5 1223.02
MF-MB β1,β2,α1,λ,k, w 0.19 6 1224.45
MF β1,α1,λ 0.16 3 1224.62
MF β1,α1,λ,φ 0.17 4 1224.74
MF-MB β1,α1,λ, w 0.17 4 1224.82
MB β1,β2,η 0.17 3 1225.02
MB β1,η,k,φ 0.17 4 1225.07
MF-MB β1,α1,λ, w,φ 0.18 5 1225.89
MB β1,β2,η,φ,k 0.18 5 1226.82
Table 5.4 – Value of the estimated parameters for each subject.
subject df p-r 2 no. choices − logP (Di |M ,ΘML) β1 η1 φ k2
0 4 0.25 244 128.11 1.91 0.83 1.33 0.67
1 4 0.30 214 105.23 1.94 0.77 2.53 0.82
2 4 0.18 264 150.42 1.60 0.78 2.20 0.68
3 4 0.32 206 98.92 1.84 0.78 2.68 0.66
4 4 0.06 286 188.33 0.99 0.78 1.96 0.47
5 4 0.20 272 152.94 1.53 0.73 2.38 0.66
6 4 0.19 296 168.19 1.38 0.82 2.36 0.94
7 4 0.15 252 149.48 1.26 0.79 2.28 0.62
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6 Conclusion
6.1 Summary of contributions
The current thesis investigated the theoretical and behavioral properties of automatic actions,
and their relations to goal-directed actions. In chapter 2, we introduced different forms of
decision-making processes in the brain, and motivated the fact that the hierarchical decision-
making process can be regarded as the unifying principle underlying various forms of actions.
Building on this assumption, in chapter 3, we provided a new normative computational model
for learning action sequences as the building blocks of hierarchical decision-making, and
we explored the power of the model in explaining different forms of automatic actions. In
particular, using the proposed computational model, we elaborated the role that dopamine
plays in learning action sequences, and in hierarchical decision-making. Then, we tested
the predictions of the proposed model in chapter 4, and we provided experimental data in
humans, that suggested the computational model can explain some behavioral phenomena
that the previous accounts cannot explain. Finally, in chapter 5, we translated the task that
was developed in chapter 4, to an experimental protocol in rats, and showed, that similar to
the results of humans, rats also utilize hierarchical decision-making.
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6.2 Future directions
In chapter 3, we proposed a normative model for the formation of action sequences, and
their integration with model-based reinforcement learning. This normative model includes
certain underlying computational signals, which can be investigated using model-based fMRI
experiments. In chapter 4, we provided an experimental method for investigating hierarchical
decision-making in humans, which can be used for studying the operation of this method in
humans from different populations with psychiatric disorders. Similarly, the task developed in
chapter 5 for rats, can be followed by investigating the lesion or inactivation of different brain
regions, to uncover the role of each region of the brain in implementing the model.
On the theoretical side, it is likely that other reinforcement learning systems, such as model-
free reinforcement learning, as suggested by previous works, operate concurrently with hier-
archical model-based reinforcement learning. Investigating this possibility using outcome
devaluation experiments, in conjunction with the task developed in chapter 5, can be an
important step toward obtaining a more complete picture of the decision-making processes
in the brain.
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